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TAIWAN AND NORTH KOREA:
DIVISION, LEGITIMACY, COMPETITION, AND NATION-STATE IDENTITY

by

DONALD MICHAEL RODGERS

B.A., Ohio Wesleyan University, 1984
M.A., The University of Georgia, 1991

A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty

of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment

of the

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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To Mom and Dad

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF DIAGRAMS

Page

DONALD MICHAEL RODGERS
Taiwan and North Korea:
Division, Legitimacy, Competition, and Nation-State Identity
(Under the direction of HAN S. PARK)

The regimes in Taiwan and North Korea were created as a result of the division of China and the Korean Peninsula following the end of World War II. Since that time, the two regimes have existed in the shadow of a powerful, threatening opponent. Although the regimes have long promoted the policy of reunification, no progress has been made toward that goal. In fact, instead of moving closer to the system on the other side of the divide, Taiwan and North Korea have both developed increasingly unique and independent identities. The regimes also exhibit behavior that runs contrary to expectations and predictions. Studies often point to domestic political factors to explain the development of these systems and the behavior that has perpetuated the division and conflict. This study posits that division and competition with the enemy on the other side strongly influenced identity development and behavior in Taiwan and North Korea.

A model is proposed to provide a framework for a systematic analysis of decision-making and identity development in the context of division and competition with a salient, more powerful, out-group. The findings support the initial proposition and suggest the need for further research.

INDEX WORDS: Chiang Ching-kuo, Democratization, Divided systems, Identity, Ideology, Images, Intergroup Relations, *Juche*, Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, Lee Teng-hui, Legitimacy, North Korea, Perception, Social Identity Theory, Taiwan.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Although we frequently speak of the end of the Cold War, two legacies of the Cold War environment are still alive and well in Asia. The nations of China and Korea, initially divided due to the power struggle between contending political ideologies, remain divided. Since the divisions, relations with the other side and eventual reunification have consistently been the subject of intense scrutiny and debate within these systems. Each of the systems claims to be the only legitimate government for the entire nation. This has created a zero-sum competition between the regimes for ideological and political superiority to justify their claims to legitimacy and the right to rule the entire nation. Due to the strength and strategic location of these systems, the tense relations between them present Asia and the rest of the world with a precarious and enduring security threat. For those reasons, understanding the development and behavior of the regimes on both sides of the divide and their interaction is of great significance.

This research will focus on exploring the behavior of the two smaller and relatively weaker sides of the divide, Taiwan and North Korea. Despite many geographical, historical, and cultural similarities in Taiwan and North Korea, the two systems have become increasingly different from one another. The systems were strongly influenced by Chinese culture and tradition, both were occupied by the Japanese until the end of World War II, and both are parts of divided nations. Since their divisions, both Taiwan and North Korea have moved in very opposite directions from the larger, more powerful systems on the other side of their divide.

The relative size and power of these systems matter. Psychological research has shown that power differentials affect behavior in competitive or conflictual relationships (Hogg and Turner, 1987; Brewer and Weber, 1994; Everson, Shroyer, and Ayometzil, 1998). The behavior of Taiwan and North Korea presents an interesting puzzle because it does not always match predictions. In fact, their behavior is often perceived as erratic, or even irrational. Since their inception following the end of World War II both nations have lived in the shadow of their larger and more powerful opponents. Both have had to live under constant threat, and in increasing diplomatic isolation. Due to their relative weakness it has been predicted that the regimes would either collapse and be absorbed by the stronger nation, accept reunification on the more powerful nation's terms, or be reunified through an act of force by the stronger nation. None of those predictions has proven accurate.

The divided regimes in Asia have consistently promoted reunification as the most important policy goal. But since division, Taiwan and North Korea have in fact moved in very opposite directions from the systems on the other side of their divide, and seemingly further from reunification. While South Korea is a major player in the world capitalist economy and has moved toward democracy, North Korea has developed into an ultranationalistic, closed system based on the *Juche* ideology. The People's Republic of China has maintained an authoritarian political system while Taiwan has implemented significant democratic reforms. Not only have Taiwan and North Korea survived, but also they have developed unique and independent identities.

The government in Taiwan has transformed from an authoritarian state to a fairly well consolidated democracy. While the democratization process in Taiwan is intriguing

in its own right, even more intriguing is that in the process of democratizing the Kuomintang (KMT) regime in Taiwan has essentially abandoned its identity as the legitimate government of the entire Chinese nation. The competition with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for control of the mainland had long been the regime's primary claim to legitimacy and its maintenance of the state of war with the CCP its primary justification for its authoritarian behavior.

Due to the continuing state of war with the CCP, the regime functioned under the guidelines of *The Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Suppression of National Rebellion.* The *Temporary Provisions* were the legal foundation for the enforcement of martial law on the island. Starting in 1987, the regime initiated significant reforms that included lifting martial law in 1987 and the eventual termination of the *Temporary Provisions* in 1992. Further constitutional reform and political democratization, including very significantly the first popular vote for president in 1996, followed these initial moves.

While Taiwan's government continues to officially proclaim reunification as a policy goal, it exhibits increasingly independent behavior, including seeking separate membership in international organizations. At the same time, China continues to threaten the regime in Taiwan with military action if the island moves toward independence, more recently adding the condition that it will employ military force if the government on Taiwan so much as drags its feet on reunification. Thus, as a process of political reform and democratization, we witness the regime in Taiwan abandoning its prior claim to legitimacy, promoting reunification while behaving more independently, and behaving more independently in the face of intimidating threats from China.

North Korea started as a typical example of an authoritarian state guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology but has transformed over time into a system guided by its highly nationalistic all encompassing *Juche* ideology. *Juche* started as a straightforward political slogan advocating self-reliance and has transformed into an almost theological, philosophical construct or worldview that guides all political, social and economic behavior in North Korea.

While most of the socialist nations of the world have either collapsed or implemented sweeping reform programs, North Korea continues to hold its ideological line and exhibit extremely dogmatic behavior. As North Korea suffers from one crippling economic crisis after another, the regime is adamant in its refusal to fundamentally reform the system and very hesitant to accept any assistance from abroad. In fact, the regime's most common response to economic crisis has been to heighten and strengthen its existing ideologically driven mass movements rather than to implement structural reform. At the same time that it promotes improved relations with the outside world the regime sporadically conducts provocative acts that push it further and further into the category of a pariah state.

These events and behaviors on the part of Taiwan and North Korea lead to several questions: How have the systems survived? Why have the regimes followed their particular form of development? Why do they implement policies that appear contradictory, potentially risky, or destabilizing? Why have the regimes moved in the opposite direction of their opponents while still advocating reunification? Certainly we can not attribute the direction of system development to chance.

1.1 Purpose of the Study

The goal of this study is to explore factors that influence the development of Taiwan and North Korea's political systems with an emphasis on the development of their identities and ideologies. Identity is viewed as how one defines one's self, or as one's self-image as compared to significant others. Ideologies are defined as dynamic formations which both "construct and evaluate the political and social field and motivate behavior within it" (Cash, 1996:3). The study makes an effort to move beyond explaining ideology as a static outcome of existing economic and social conditions or personality traits of leaders and to explain it as a result of the dynamic and interactive process of identity development

Existing studies of Taiwan point to a number of causal factors including leadership personalities, socio-economic conditions, and pressure exerted by popular opposition movements to explain system development. Competing studies of North Korea tend to highlight leadership personalities and factional competition among the elite to explain the unique development of that system. As will be discussed further in Chapter 3, while these approaches each make a contribution to our understanding of these systems, they are not able to accurately explain the course and sequence of events in Taiwan and North Korea. These studies tend to be highly descriptive rather than analytical and point primarily to internal socio-economic and cultural forces influencing development. Thus, they provide us with a solid description of the existence of conditions necessary for change but fail to provide an analytical link between necessary conditions and the specific choices made by the elite.

For example, in Taiwan's case it is often argued that due to rapid socio-economic change he decision to democratize was the only possible alternative for the regime. Yet, appropriate socio-economic conditions for reform existed far before 1986 when the first major reforms were signaled. And given the domestic and international conditions, it is entirely conceivable that the regime could have chosen a path of continuing repression. Existing studies of North Korea that focus on leadership or elite competition can not explain why Kim Il Sung did not reform in the same direction as the socialist superpowers. Given his tight control of power and the facts that North Korea's economy had stagnated and its allies were reforming it is not clear why Kim chose greater isolation, greater repression, and heightened emphasis on ideology. Thus, in both cases, studies that have attempted to explain or predict behavior appear to be missing an analytical framework and a key variable that might strengthen their analyses. Given the salience of the presence of a strong enemy for each of these cases, this study posits that the missing variable is the impact of the division and legitimacy competition on identity development and behavior.

Unfortunately, no appropriate model or framework has been developed that can help to explain how division and competition guide nation-state behavior. More specifically, no appropriate model or framework exists that helps to explain the behavior of weaker states in the unique situation of division and legitimacy competition. While some studies have highlighted the existence of legitimacy competition and the relative strengths and weaknesses of the regimes, they have tended to point to the differences as a result of regime behavior rather than an factor that guides regime behavior (Park and Park, 1990; Gu, 1995; Gillis; 1997).

This study proposes that we can better understand these systems and their behavior by looking at their development through the lens of psychological concepts and theories. Due to the division and the existence of the competition between the regimes for legitimacy and control, the theories of intergroup relations provide us with a rich field to be mined for an appropriate theoretical framework. And given the highly competitive and affective nature of the conflict, perception and image theories provide us with concepts and tools with which we can evaluate the impact of emotion-laden nature of the conflict on decision-making. Thus, the study proposes a model developed through a synthesis of the concepts of perceptions, images, and Social Identity Theory. The model will help us more systematically trace the factors that influence the process of decision making to better understand how division and competition influence the decisions of the elite in these two systems.

1.2 Expected Findings

This study intends to show that alternative studies of Taiwan and North Korea can help to explain some aspects of system development and regime behavior, but that they can not provide a complete explanation of the particular timing and direction of significant political and ideological reforms. In short, it is argued that the causal explanations put forth in those studies provide us with a list of necessary, but not sufficient conditions for reform. This study will make an effort to more analytically show that division and legitimacy competition guided decision making in these systems.

More specifically, in the Taiwan case we expect to find that:

1. The early behavior of the regime was guided by the KMT's efforts to gain control of and consolidate its rule on Taiwan to act as a base of operations for its conflict with the CCP.
2. Authoritarian political behavior was a result of the regime's desire to maintain stability and its legitimacy based on its it state of war versus the CCP.
3. While domestic opposition forces and pressure for reform due to socio-economic change long existed, the regime was willing and able to control them.
4. Regime behavior is increasingly linked to its competition with the CCP for legitimacy and its efforts to establish positive distinctiveness, leading to democratic reform.

In the North Korean case we expect to find that:

1. The initial system and leadership structures were influenced by the socialist superpowers and Kim Il Sung's efforts to establish his authority.
2. The formation of and early modifications to the North Korean *Juche* ideology were guided by Kim Il Sung's efforts to maintain relative neutrality during the Sino-Soviet split.
3. The full development the *Juche* ideology was increasingly linked to the regime's competition with South Korea for legitimacy and its efforts to establish positive distinctiveness.

Because this is an exploratory, theory-proposing study, it will not rigorously test specific hypotheses. Rather, the study will attempt to show through the method of process tracing that the model proposed can provide us with a fuller and more comprehensive understanding of ideology development and regime behavior in Taiwan and North Korea. Through this process we can set up questions and hypotheses for further study. Theory proposing studies and the methodology for this study will be discussed in Chapter Two.

1.3 Significance

The significance of this study is threefold. First, through the process of exploring the historical development of these systems, it will help to shed light on the multiple factors that contributed to system development in Taiwan and North Korea. Second, the study will attempt to show why existing studies of these systems can not explain the specific timing and direction of political and ideological reform. Finally, and most significantly, the study attempts to develop a new framework by borrowing existing theories and concepts from psychology and adapting them to explain the development of political systems. The development of the new framework will assist us in further developing and testing hypotheses for the study of these regimes, and potentially other regimes in conflict, in future studies.

1.4 Outline of the Study

The study continues with six chapters. Chapter Two will explain the research methodology for the study. Chapter Three will present a review of current studies relating to Taiwan and North Korea and demonstrate that while they provide us with

important information about regime development, they can not completely explain the timing and direction of the development of these systems. Chapter Four will present the psychological theories and concepts relevant to building our proposed theoretical model. In addition, Chapter Four will present the model and explain its design. Chapter Five consists of an effort to trace the history of the political system in Taiwan with a look at the interaction between the regime and opposition forces, the regime's justification for continuation of authoritarianism, and finally reform. Finally, the chapter will present the theoretical model and attempt to show how it can better explain the progress of reform in Taiwan. Chapter Six follows a similar pattern as Chapter Five by presenting a history of the political system in North Korea and showing how the proposed framework can help explain and account for regime behavior. Chapter Seven, the concluding chapter, provides a brief overview of the study, its implications and significance, and presents possible future research stemming from the findings of this study.

Chapter II

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study is an effort to propose a theory or a model with which we can better analyze the system development and behavior of Taiwan and North Korea and perhaps other cases of division and conflict. A model will be proposed that will help provide a more complete and comprehensive explanation than existing studies. The study adopts the case study method to present existing explanations for development and then compare them to the historical record.

2.1 Case Study Research

Comparative political analysis presents many methodological concerns for the political scientist. The primary difficulty lies in attempting to develop appropriate categories so that data can be compiled and interrelationships between data can be observed. Comprehensive and parsimonious theories must be developed to enable comparativists to use the proper methods for comparative study under different conditions. To adequately develop and test theories in the social sciences, the social scientist must be able to observe politics in as many contexts as possible. The social scientist will always face weaknesses due to the limited number of cases available for comparative observation. The goal of the comparativist, then, is to come up with

universally applicable concepts and categories with which one can analyze and compare different political systems (Dogan and Pelassy, 1984).

Case studies are the appropriate method in instances when "a 'how' or 'why' question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control (Yin, 1994: 9). Case studies often provide us with a better method to study international events. As Van Evera argues, "The structure of the international historical record, which serves as our data, better lends itself to deep study of a few cases than to the exploration of many cases" (Van Evera, 1996: 28). One of the greatest strengths of case studies is that they allow for more in depth analysis of and predictions about the thoughts and behaviors of political actors. This is useful because as Van Evera states, "Often these predictions are singular to the theory that makes them; no other theory predicts the same thoughts or statements. Case studies are the best format for capturing such evidence. Hence case studies can supply quite decisive evidence for or against political theories. Often this evidence is more decisive than large-n evidence" (Van Evera, 1996: 28).

Yet case studies also present the researcher with some problems. One of the primary concerns with case studies is that they do an inadequate job of controlling for omitted explanatory variables. Another criticism of case studies is that they may be a poor laboratory for determining a theory's antecedent conditions, this is especially true in single case studies (Van Evera, 1996: 27). While these are significant problems for the researcher, they can be overcome.

The problem of limited cases can be overcome by multiplying the number of cases through looking at the historical perspective, identifying relatively homogenous

regions within a country, grouping situations that are not too different, or finally, by concentrating on area studies. These methods will allow for hypotheses to be developed so that the comparativist will be better able to analyze and explain problems or trends in many varied social and political settings. Van Evera proposes the use of within-case comparisons to handle the small-n problem. Process tracing can help achieve stronger controls by testing within uniform background conditions (Van Evera, 1996: 26).

It is not only difficult for the researcher to determine how to study phenomena within and between countries, it is even difficult to decide which systems to study. For obvious reasons, it is nearly impossible to obtain a random sampling of countries for analysis. Given this limitation, cross-national studies usually have a quasi-experimental form. The difficulty then comes in determining which cases are most appropriate for the study (Przeworski and Teune, 1970: 32).

In this instance Taiwan and North Korea were chosen as the cases for the study because their size and power relative to their opponents makes them unique cases. The principle questions being asked in the study are first "how did these nations survive?" And second, "why did they develop such unique identities as compared to their opponents?" The intriguing puzzle is not only how these systems survived in the shadow of a strong enemy but how the avoided being consumed by that enemy. It has not been common to expect that the CCP would be conquered by the KMT, or that the South Korean regime would collapse due to economic decay. For that reason, Taiwan and North Korea present us with theoretically intriguing cases.

2.2 Proposing New Theory

This dissertation falls into the category of a theory proposing case study. According to Van Evera, "A theory proposing study advances new hypotheses. A deductive argument for these hypotheses is advanced. Examples may be offered to illustrate these hypotheses and to demonstrate their plausibility, but strong empirical tests are not performed" (Van Evera, 1996: 50). According to Yin, this methodological approach is best suited for situations in which existing literature provides no clear conceptual framework and therefore does not lend itself to the development of solid theoretical statements. For that reason, new studies are likely to take the form of exploratory studies (Yin, 1994: 28-29). Exploratory studies attempt to develop ideas and build a case for further studies based on the theory proposed and hypotheses generated.

There are several ways one might develop new theories. One is to "start by searching cases for associations between phenomena, and for testimony by people who directly experienced the case on their motives and beliefs about the case" (Van Evera, 1996: 35). Another approach is to develop a theory by importing existing theories from one discipline and adapting them to explain phenomena in another. For example, as I do in this study, students of Misperception in International Relations and students of Mass Political Behavior have borrowed theories from psychology (Van Evera, 1996: 13).

In fact, the theory put forth in this study was developed through a combination of those two approaches. In the process of studying the political and economic development of Taiwan and North Korea I was intrigued by the apparent salience of the division issue in the speeches and writings of the leaders of those countries. Yet I found no adequate theoretical framework in which to more systematically evaluate the influence of that issue

on behavior. I then searched and found the concepts and theories from the field of intergroup relations to be quite relevant to the situation in these two systems.

This method of selection of the theory and the cases begs the question of whether these cases are being selected on the dependent variable. That is, some people argue that you should not choose cases of what you want to explain without also choosing opposing cases. That is a valid concern but one that can be avoided in specific cases and with the correct methodological approach. Van Evera states that selection on the dependent variable is appropriate under three conditions. They are if "the conditions in selected cases can be compared to a known average situation, if there exists a large in-case variance on the study variable permitting congruence procedures, of if the cases are sufficiently data rich to permit process tracing" (Van Evera, 1996: 23). This study will apply process tracing in an effort to develop a theory.

2.3 Process Tracing

In process tracing, "the investigator explores the chain of events or the decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes" (Van Evera, 1996: 33). Process tracing seeks to answer a variety of questions. For example, "Does the chain of events or decision-making process unfold in the manner predicted by the theory? Specifically, do actors speak and behave as the theory predicts? Do they perceive and respond to stimuli as predicted? Do the timing and details of their behavior match predictions? Do the timing and details of other events that comprise the process that translates initial conditions into outcomes match the theory's predictions" (Van

Evera, 1996: 33)? If there is a tight fit between the answers to these questions and the theory's predictions the stronger the inference of validity.

Process tracing allows us to test several predictions within a single case. In this study for example, the general proposition is that competition with a strong enemy affects identity development. That can be divided into several segments to develop a traceable process. We can say, for example, when a nation has a stronger enemy it will compare itself to that enemy. The outcome will determine whether the nation has an adequate or inadequate identity versus the enemy and that the relative identity guides the nation's responses. That process leads to the following predictions: 1) we should see great salience of the enemy in elite statements; 2) the discussion of the enemy should be comparative in nature; 3) the statements will try to emphasize areas where the nation has relative superiority to the enemy; 4) in areas where the nation has superiority it will attempt to maintain its identity; 5) in areas where the nation is inferior it will attempt to seek alternatives to improve its identity. The elite motives are derived from their statements and writings and are verified by their actions.

Another strength of process tracing is that it provides a nice method for theory building because process predictions are often unique, "i.e., no other known theories predict the same patterns" (Van Evera, 1996: 34). Thus, process tracing provides several advantages, it allows us to expand the test of predictions in small-n case studies and it helps us to seek and examine unique predictions. One weakness of process tracing is that it does not, on its own, allow for determining what antecedent conditions are necessary for the theory. That problem can be addressed by studying more than one case through replication.

Case studies should be conducted using replication logic rather than sampling logic. Replication logic is similar to the logic used in multiple experiments. As Yin states:

> If one has access only to three cases of a rare clinical syndrome in psychology or medical science, the appropriate research design is one in which the same results are predicted for each of the three cases, thereby producing evidence that the three cases did indeed involve the same syndrome. If similar results are obtained from all three cases, replication is said to have taken place (Yin, 1994: 45).

In replication each case is similar to a single experiment and the study must follow cross-study rather than in study design.

2.4 Data Sources

The theory presented in Chapter Four guided the collection and analysis of the data. The study calls on both primary and secondary sources to gather data. The secondary sources provide both background information on the cases and competing explanation and analyses of the speeches, statements and events discussed in the study. This is a study of elite perception, images, and behavior. For that reason the primary sources center on the speeches of the key decision-making elite in Taiwan and North Korea. Highly centralized decision-making structures existed during the majority of the time frame of the study leading to a unitary voice from the government. For that reason the study focuses primarily on the writings, speeches, and recorded interviews of four key decision makers: Chiang Ching-Kuo and Lee Teng-hui in Taiwan and Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in North Korea. In both cases the principle decisions for and implementation of reform were initiated at the top, therefore a focus on these key decision-makers is

justified and appropriate in this study. In addition, the study includes key government documents and policy statements.

Due to the limited nature of data or divergent opinions coming from these systems, it is often difficult to locate more than a single source of information for corroboration. For that reason, and due to the nature of the study, the validity of the statements was measured against actual regime behavior. That is, we judged the validity of a particular position statement by determining whether that statement was reflected in policy behavior.

2.5 Time Frame

This study broadly covers the period from the end of World War II until the present. Yet specific attention is given to the periods surrounding significant changes in the environment surrounding the systems and/or periods of significant ideological or policy reform implemented by the regimes as described below. In the Taiwan case we will look at the following events:

1. The dramatic change in Taiwan-US relations during the 1970s.
2. The lifting of the Emergency Decree in the Taiwan Area in 1987.
3. The revision of the Law on the Organization of Civic Groups during the Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion to permit the organization of opposition parties in 1987.
4. The end of the Temporary Provision for the Period of Mobilization and Suppression of the Communist Rebellion in 1991.

In the North Korean Case we will focus on the following events or time frames:

1. The promulgation of the 1972 Constitution.
2. The expansion of the Juche Ideology in 1982.
3. The 1986 – 1987 revision and expansion of the Juche ideology, including the addition of Socio-Political Body theory.

During each of these time frames we will look at the environment surrounding the systems, the speeches and statements of the elite, and the actual policy behavior of the regimes.

2.6 Strategy for Data Analysis

In the Taiwan case the study will attempt to explain how division and the legitimacy competition influenced the democratization process and Taiwan's increasingly independent behavior. In the North Korean case the study will attempt to explain how division and the legitimacy competition influenced North Korea's refusal to implement substantive economic reforms in line with its socialist partners.

This is a theory proposing case study. As such, it does not attempt to perform rigorous empirical tests but rather to advance a new model and new hypotheses for further study. The study will use process tracing to explore the progress of system development in Taiwan and North Korea. The model presented in Chapter Four guides the flow of the data and events analyzed. As will be shown in Chapter Three that existing approaches do not adequately explain the timing and direction of reform. The study therefore gives specific attention to the environment surrounding the systems and the comparison of both objective and subjective factors between the systems and their

enemies. The factors compared are derived from a list of image indicators as guided by the theory and focus primarily on economic performance and international recognition the two systems.

More specifically, we will adopt the image indicators developed by Cottam in her research into US policy in Latin America (Cottam, 1994: 188-189). These indicators attempt to provide a framework in which we can more clearly comprehend images of the other side and one's relative position. Thus, comparisons are based on the other side's capabilities, ideology, performance, intentions, and culture. We look at objective measures such as economic indicators and membership in international organizations. In addition, we will look at elite speeches and writings to determine how Taiwan and North Korea describe themselves in comparison to the other side.

This study will move beyond an observation of how Taiwan and North Korea describe themselves in comparison to the other side and attempt to determine whether this comparison actually influences their behavior. Thus, the study will look not only at language but also at specific policy behaviors. Based on the theory presented we should be able to draw relationships between the images and perceptions discovered and the responses and behavior of the observer. In doing this we will be able to move beyond a general acknowledgement of the importance of division to show with greater clarity and specificity what impact the division and resulting perceptions and images have had on actions.

In its simplest form, our model predicts that in the presence of a stronger enemy, a regime will attempt to attain positive distinctiveness in order to improve its identity and legitimacy. If a regime compares favorably to its enemy we can anticipate no significant

shifts in language or behavior. If the regime compares unfavorably we can anticipate a significant shift in both language and behavior as the regime seeks an alternative to improve its position. The decision-making process is guided by both cognitive and affective components. That is, several cognitive alternatives may be perceived but they may be limited or filtered because of the strong emotions generated by the presence and threat of the enemy. If affect is strong we anticipate the regime choosing the course that gives it the greatest opportunity to adjust its identity away from the enemy.

Thus, in the Taiwan case we attempt to demonstrate that Taiwan's democratization process was guided by a need to develop a more favorable identity and distance itself from the PRC not only in rhetoric but also in action. This competition and the resulting democratization process can help to explain Taiwan's increasingly independent behavior. In the North Korean case we argue that the development and structuration of the Juche ideology was guided by North Korea's need to develop a more favorable identity and separate itself from South Korea. North Korea's current behavior can be better explained in that context.

If the other side is not significant in the development of identity and behavior we might find one of three things. First, we may find little or no mention of the other side in significant speeches and writings. This is unlikely in this case. Second, we may find that while significant mention of and comparisons with the other side exist there is no related linkage in behavior. In that instance the language might be perceived as pure propaganda which has little relevance to actual policy behavior. Third, we may find that a significant directional change in comparison of objective indicators has no impact on language or

behavior. Again, this would indicate that the enemy is not an important factor influencing identity development.

Perhaps the most important step in the case study process is the selection or development of an appropriate theory to guide the study. Without an appropriate theory, the researcher can be left wandering aimlessly through an infinite field of data. It will be impossible to determine which data to gather and without a strong theory as a roadmap there is no way to determine how the data gathered should be presented. The resulting research may end up looking like an encyclopedia with plenty of facts, but no theme. For that reason, this dissertation gives great attention to an effort to develop an appropriate model to guide our data gathering and analysis.

CHAPTER III

REVIEW OF APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF TAIWAN AND NORTH KOREA

How do existing studies explain the unique situation and behavior of Taiwan and North Korea? In both cases existing studies tend to point primarily to internal factors as most influential in guiding the process of regime development. The studies can roughly be divided into three categories: historical explanatory, elite conflict, and in almost a discipline of their own, reunification studies, which look at the specific interactions between the parties. Branching off of those, more recent research in Taiwan has given more attention to opposition movements and electoral behavior. In the North Korean case, some scholars have turned to the rational choice approach to describe and predict North Korean policy behavior. There is generally a paucity of rigorous theoretical studies on either of these cases. A review of the literature in the field demonstrates that much of the research is heavily descriptive. It appears that the cases are perceived as outliers, and therefore, no effort is made to rigorously test existing theory on them. We will provide a brief review of some of the dominant literature in the field.

3.1 Taiwan

Most existing studies attribute the course of Taiwan's political development to one of three factors. The first is correlation theory that links socioeconomic preconditions to democratic transition. Second is interaction theory that views

democratic evolution as a process of calculated struggles and interactions between the ruling elite and the opposition forces. And third is causation theory that emphasizes the ruling elite's initiatives as the primary cause of democratic reform (Tien, 1993: 103). While each of these analytical perspectives contributes something to our understanding of transformation in Taiwan, none of them completely explains what transpired there. Each of those analytical perspectives is primarily internalist. While they make some mention of division, no systematic effort is made to link division to domestic behavior. In other words, they recognize its significance but do not systematically show how it influences behavior. Thus, it is useful to add the additional perspective that points to the influence of the unique relationship between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China on Taiwan's domestic development.

3.1.1 Mobilization Theory

One commonly accepted explanation for the democratization process in Taiwan is tied closely to the mobilizationist school of development theory. This explanation argues that the rapid socio-economic changes on the island created ideological and material conditions that made Taiwan ripe for democratization (Kao and Myers, 1988; Cheng, 1989; Wu, 1989; Hsiao, 1992; Wachman, 1994; Hughes, 1997). Given this, it was inevitable that the leaders had to allow for democratization or face their own demise. In the Taiwan case specifically Wu refers to this as the "Marketization of Politics" (Wu, 1989). He posits that the pressures for political power commensurate with their economic power arose from a growing and increasingly vocal middle class. This pressure forced the leaders to accept democratization.

Wu's theory, firmly grounded in the mobilization school of development theory, is persuasive in some ways but ultimately falls victim to the same shortcomings of the mobilization school and stage theories in general. First, the theory assumes the direction of change. That is, development will follow a linear path from industrialization to urbanization to mass media, to participation. We have witnessed many cases when this path is not followed, or when a country moved part of the way up the path only to fall back into authoritarian or military rule. Another weakness of the theory is that it lacks a temporal component. It can not tell us when changes will occur or even when a system has passed from one stage to another. Thus, the timing of the process appears almost arbitrary. Third, the theory provides no room for human agency. The process appears natural and inevitable seemingly guided by the forces of the market and human nature. Still, it is clear that in viewing political development and change in all countries, the decision making process of the leaders must be considered. Finally, the theory is weak because it is internalist. The theory focuses exclusively on internal socio-economic and political dynamics. It is unrealistic to assume that the environment in which a state exists does not have an influence on political processes.

These studies assume that the only way that the KMT regime could survive was to lead or allow for the democratization process. Thus, they ignore the fact that democratization and independent behavior also presents the KMT leadership with a potential threat to its legitimacy and perhaps even its survival. The KMT regime's primary claim to legitimacy on Taiwan has been its claim to be the legitimate government over the entire Chinese territory and people. The democratization process in Taiwan fundamentally harmed that claim. The KMT can not abandon its position on the status

of Taiwan in relation to China and the goal of eventual reunification without destroying its primary base of legitimacy. Yet, not only has the regime allowed for democracy, it has also exhibited increasingly independent behavior. Mobilization theory can not adequately explain why or how the regime has been able to do this.

3.1.2 Interaction Theory

Another common approach to understanding Taiwan's democratization lies in an analysis of the interaction between the opposition and the ruling elite. (Hsiao, 1992; Lu, 1992; Chu, 1994; Chu and Lin, 1996; Rigger, 1999). This theory is closely tied to the mobilization theory in that it argues that over time and due to changes in socio-economic conditions the opposition becomes strong enough to exert pressure on the regime for change. The path of reform is determined then by the elite's response to the opposition and the interaction between the two groups. Again, this approach provides some interesting insight into the political changes in Taiwan. The opposition was clearly a force to be reckoned with. They had been exerting pressure on the regime for reform since 1947 and it was apparent that they were not going away. For that reason, the KMT had to find some way to deal with them. The opposition must have had some influence over the decision to reform.

A subdivision of interaction that has appeared more prominently in recent research is the study of Taiwan's election mechanism on democratization. The KMT did institute local level elections early in their rule over Taiwan. Some scholars have pointed to that election process as a factor that pushed the regime toward reform (Hu and Chu, 1992; Tien, 1996; Dickson, 1996; Chu and Lin, 1996; Huang, 1996; Chen, 1996; Rigger,

1999). While these studies appropriately point to the significance in elections in promoting discourse, even they admit that the elections held in Taiwan prior to 1996 were heavily controlled by the KMT, which used numerous mechanisms to control voting and the outcome of the elections. True free and fair competitive elections did not become a reality until after 1987.

The weakness in this approach lies in the fact that it can not provide us with an adequate explanation of the timing and direction of the reforms. There is no way to prove that the opposition movement or the influence of elections somehow hit a critical mass by 1986, forcing the regime to implement reform. In fact, some signs show that the opposition was in some ways weaker. First, the regime had caused great damage to the opposition following the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979; a protest led by one of the opposition factions in the city of Kaohsiung. Following the protest, a number of leaders were arrested, tried and convicted of sedition or lesser acts. In addition, there were factions competing with one another for control of the opposition agenda. The opposition had shifted from being a rather unified force to a divided force. Some factions promoted working within the system for gradual reform, while others promoted radical action. This division weakened the opposition.

As will be demonstrated in the case study in Chapter Five, the regime actually began to clamp down more from 1980 until 1986. There is no clear indication that the opposition movement was achieving a level of strength that forced the regime to reform. So while the opposition in Taiwan certainly placed some pressure on Chiang to reform, it is not so certain that the opposition was strong enough to be the most influential or deciding factor in Chiang's decision to reform.

How, then, can one explain that somehow, miraculously, the opposition hit the right note in 1986? Nathan and Ho address this question and the issue of socio-economic mobilization and opposition influence when they write, "In the case of Taiwan, socioeconomic conditions for democratization had been ripe for at least 10 or 15 years, and the domestic opposition and foreign critics had been pressing for change for and equal length of time, before Chiang Ching-kuo made his decision to allow the process to move forward" (Nathan and Ho, 1993: 34).

3.1.3 Leadership

Nathan and Ho's statement leads into another dominant approach to understanding Taiwan's democratization. This approach attributes reform to the prescience of the leaders of the KMT regime, specifically Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui (Shaw, 1989; Tien, 1988; Copper; 1988, Nathan and Ho, 1993; Dickson, 1997). To be sure, Taiwan's transition to democracy has been described by Huntington as "Transformation" (Huntington, 1991). By this Huntington means that the impetus to change in Taiwan came from decisions carried out by the ruling elite rather than from an overthrow of the regime by the popular based opposition forces (Lu, 1991; Tien, 1993). The nature of the regime made this commitment from the top essential. As Tien argues, "Without the ruling elite's commitment to democratic transition, Taiwan's political situation could have oscillated in a vicious cycle of violent protest and political repression" (Tien, 1993:106).

At the same time, attributing the transformation to the leaders leaves many questions unanswered. Why was democratization the path the leaders chose? How can

the timing of the transition be explained? What factors influenced the leaders' decision making process? What were the constraints on their decision making process? To truly understand the influence of the leaders on this process these questions must be answered and current analyses do not do this. As Wachman so eloquently states, "Those who posit that democratization began, deux ex machina, when Chiang Ching-kuo recognized that certain economic conditions were "ripe" have displaced theoretical logic with hagiographical rationalization" (Wachman, 1994: 224).

And unfortunately, Wachman's statement fairly accurately describes most of the studies that have pointed to the significance of Chiang and Lee in promoting reform. The studies point to certain preconditions and then state that obviously Chiang and Lee saw the writing on the wall and knew it was time to reform. Again, there is no dispute that the socio-economic and political preconditions as we know them existed in Taiwan. But they had existed for quite some time. The studies that point to these factors do not show how conditions changed significantly in the 1980s to prompt Chiang to choose reform because they fail to provide an adequate lens through which we can view and better understand the behavior.

In fact, it was quite possible that the KMT could have reverted to a path of repression rather than liberalization. The KMT was losing international recognition as the legitimate government of China. Within Taiwan there were members of the KMT who were not committed to reform and Chiang faced strong opposition from them. Even Chiang showed a level of concern and conservatism in his movements. For example, Chiang was certain to include the safety net of the National Security Law in the constitution after the abolition of martial law. And the reforms chosen were conducted in

a very incremental fashion. Even after Chiang Ching-kuo's death, Chiang Wei-guo attempted to seize control of the party to steer it down a more conservative path.

To be quite blunt, Chiang did not have a history of supporting democratic institutions or behavior. He was long responsible for organizing and running the various secret police organizations in for the KMT in China and later in Taiwan, most notably the Taiwan Garrison Command. These organizations were primarily responsible for the repression of the freedom of speech and assembly, and were directly responsible for the arrest and imprisonment of opposition leaders all the way into the 1980s. As Nathan and Ho state:

> In his early years on Taiwan, CCK played a very tough role. He served as head of the General Political Warfare Department of the army, where he installed a Soviet-style commissar system, established the China Youth Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps to control youth, and became the head of the regime's National Security Bureau, and in Edwin A. Winckler's phrase, its "security czar (Nathan and Ho, 1993: 50).

And according to Tillman Durdin, "operating in the shadows, CCK became one of the most feared men in the leadership. He had no apologies for the repression that went well into the 1970s" (Durdin, 1975: 1024).

While Chiang's rhetoric throughout this period commonly referred to the significance of democracy and Taiwan's democratization in line with *The Three Principles of the People*, for years not only did he fail to implement democratic reform, he was one of the principle agents of its repression.

The argument presented in these studies that Chiang Ching-kuo led the transition is accurate. Yet for the reasons discussed above, that argument does not tell us everything. The primary question it leaves unanswered is why Chiang chose to reform when he did. What forces influenced the timing and direction of his decision?

Lee Teng-hui presents a different case. Lee's legitimacy as President was to a great extent bestowed by his connection to Chiang. It was fairly easy for him to continue the implementation of democratization. Yet everyone in his party did not accept the pace at which he did it as well as the direction in which he took it. There was, to be sure, opposition to his movements. Yet he continued the process, earning himself the nickname "Mr. Democracy."

Lee's decisions were quite controversial because they changed the fundamental relationship between the KMT and the CCP, essentially eliminated the KMT's claims to the mainland, and increased tensions between conservatives and reformers within Taiwan as well as between Taiwan and the CCP. The direction that Lee guided the democratization process basically declared *de facto* independence for Taiwan. It is a bit easier for us to understand Lee's reasons for democratization since he specifically discusses his motivations. As we will see later, Lee specifically points to the competition with the CCP as a guiding factor in his decisions.

This brief review of the literature relating to Taiwan's democratization shows that scholars have pointed to a number of significant factors that contributed to democratic development on Taiwan. Yet each of the approaches fails to point out how the timing and direction of the democratization process occurred. All of the factors they point to can be seen as necessary conditions, but they do not sufficiently explain the specific timing and direction of the process. I argue that it is their almost exclusive focus on domestic dynamics that points them in this direction. It is interesting to note that in a number, perhaps in a majority of studies, the scholars allude to the fact that there is a "division issue" but they do not give it more systematic attention in explaining the course of

reform. This study will attempt to contribute to our understanding of Taiwan's development by adding in the division issue as an influential variable.

3.2 North Korea

There are five major approaches to the study of North Korea. The first approach attempts to provide a more historical, descriptive analysis of the development of the unique North Korean political ideology and system. The second approach looks at factionalism and power struggles as an explanation for system development. The third approach is to apply the rational actor model to attempt to explain and predict North Korean behavior in specific policy cases. The fourth, which as mentioned above is almost a discipline of its own, is to look at and analyze the potential for North Korea's collapse or reform and the effect of either on the reunification issue between North and South Korea. Finally, another approach is to compare North and South Korea in terms of their economic or diplomatic performance.

Unfortunately, these approaches do not often overlap. Many of the historical studies focus exclusively on the internal dynamics of the North Korean system such as power struggles between factions and leadership succession. Any attention given to outside forces usually focuses on superpower influence in the development of the regime. The studies geared toward explaining or predicting specific foreign or reunification policies often look at the external environment as a dependent variable, something created by North Korean behavior. They allude to the external environment as a "problem" for North Korea, but make no systematic effort to look at the dynamic interaction of the environment with domestic decision making.

3.2.1 The Historical Descriptive Approach

Historical studies that attempt to describe or explain the development of the North Korean system often point to superpower influence, specifically pointing to the roles of the Soviet Union and China in the establishment and early guidance of North Korea. To be sure, these countries, especially the USSR, did have tremendous influence over the creation of the North Korean State and political system. From the Korean War forward, China and North Korea had very close ties. In fact, referring to something called the "echo effect" Yang points to a number of instances when North Korea seemed to be directly imitating China and the Soviet Union. For example, North Korea's efforts to negotiate with South Korea and the West corresponded with the improvement in US-USSR and US-PRC relations. Other examples include the similarities between the mass campaigns in North Korea and China, the *Chollima Undong* Movement and the Great Leap Forward, and Mao's Red Guard and Kim's Children's Guard, Young Red Guard, and Worker-Peasant Young Guard (Yang, 1994: 245-246).

Yet, these studies do not adequately acknowledge the differences that emerged in the belief structure and practices of North Korea. These studies might help explain why North Korea moved into the Communist camp, but they can not contribute to an understanding of how and why *Juche* developed as it did, or how it diverged so dramatically from Marxism-Leninism. Nor can they explain why when China was reforming and the Soviet Union disintegrating, North Korea went in a completely different direction. Because China is still North Korea's closest ally some scholars have anticipated that due to its economic crisis North Korea would follow China's example in economic reform (Kim, 1994) or that China will be able to nudge North Korea in that

direction (Han, 1994). None of North Korea's current rhetoric or behavior supports those predictions.

3.2.2 Factionalism and North Korean Political Culture

Many of the studies of North Korean politics focus almost exclusively on internal factors and internal dynamics to explain the development of the system. Several studies have emphasized the influence of factionalism in Korean politics on the development of the North Korean political system and North Korean policy. These studies focus on factionalism as either a unique aspect of Korean and Confucian political culture or as a product of Communist political systems (Rhee, 1978; Suh, 1980). These studies provide valuable information on different leaders and factions in North Korea and provide some insight into the development of the personality cult of Kim Il Sung and later Kim Jong Il. But, as Yang points out, while these studies may be able to provide information on the behavior of specific decision-makers in the North Korean system, they can not provide a complete analysis of the political system and ideology because they fail to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the factors that influenced the leaders (Yang, 1994: 223). Descriptions of the factional battles in North Korean politics fail to provide a strong systematic analysis of the development of the system, of the context in which decisions were made, or of the impact of division on decision making. For that reason, some of the peculiarities of the system do not come to light.

One possible explanation for North Korea's divergence in ideology and behavior is the leadership and personality cult of Kim Il Sung (Yang, 1994; Sakai, 1996; Mikheev, 1996). This explanation is closely tied to the factionalism theories. They point to Kim's

rise to power and his efforts to maintain power as the motivating factors behind his decisions. Yet this argument seems to be a bit tautological. That is, Kim wanted to stay in power so he made specific policy decisions because they would preserve his power. While these studies are accurate in pointing to the significance of Kim's leadership, they fail in more accurately pointing to the factors that influenced the choices available to Kim or his specific decisions. As mentioned, by 1961 Kim had essentially purged any significant opposition. For that reason, he should have had little domestic opposition and a wide range of options for behavior at his disposal, but clearly his options were not unlimited. To understand the choices he made it is equally as essential to understand the constraints do his decision-making as it is to understand his options. Since there appeared to be no significant domestic constraints to action, it is logical to assume that the constraints came from outside the system.

One of the more intriguing studies of the development of the North Korean system is the culturalist analysis provided by Kihl (1994). Kihl attributes the development of the unique *Juche* political system to the strong influence of traditional culture. For example, he claims that traditional Confucian beliefs which place high value on hierarchical human relations interacted with Marxism-Leninism to create peculiar institutions such as the cult of personality and worship of supreme leadership, family like party rule which emphasizes loyalty and personal ties, mobilization, indoctrination and surveillance.

Kihl also attributes much of the development of the system to the leadership of Kim Il Sung. He writes:

> Marxism-Leninism, the initial ideology of North Korean communism, was mediated and modified by Kim Il Sung (acting as a human agent) to arrive at the

> current *Juche* idea in the context of North Korea. This modification (as a rational act) was a necessary and indispensable means to perpetuate the rule of Kim Il Sung and his followers. A cultural apotheosis took place, culture prevailed over ideology in the long run, as the ruling elite utilized the revolutionary rhetoric of Marxist-Leninist ideology as an instrument to perpetuate its rule (Kihl, 1994: 141).

Kihl constructs the following schematic explaining his understanding of the development of the North Korean system:

North Korean Communism (*Juche*) = theory and ideology + cultural mores.

This is an interesting representation of the development of the ideology, yet it does not appear to explain everything. For example, while he describes the *Juche* system as the sum of theory, ideology and cultural mores, he also states that *Juche* was consciously and rationally created by Kim Il Sung "in the context of North Korea" to preserve his power. Kihl appears to be contradicting himself to some extent in that he argues that Kim guided the action, but then arguing that *Juche* was somewhat of a predetermined outcome of the combination of Marxism-Leninism and Korean Culture. He gave Kim agency and then seems to take it away from him again.

Kihl does not present a range of options or constraints on Kim's decision-making. If Kim were truly influential in the process, and he was, one must go on to explain in more detail what range of choices were available to Kim and why he made particular decisions. Kihl's analysis does not provide us with that option. We must try to determine why Kim Il Sung believed that the particular development of the *Juche* ideology was the best way to preserve his power and to develop the North Korean identity. Thus it is important to understand the context in which Kim was operating, and more specifically, the choices and constraints provided within that context.

To be sure, culture plays a role but there are other factors which define context, for example, the nation's position vis-a-vis other nations. It is hard to imagine that in North Korea's situation in which the country is consistently confronted by and competing with a strong adversary, no attention was given by the elite to that competition in the formation of ideology. Thus, while Kihl's argument provides a piece of the puzzle in explaining of the development of the *Juche* ideology, it still leaves room for an addition.

3.2.3 Rational Actor Approaches

Some analyses of North Korean policy have relied on the rational actor approach to explain and predict North Korean behavior (Ahn, 1997; Bueno de Mesquita and Mo, 1997; Mo, 1997). For example, Ahn (1997) uses a two-level game model to analyze North Korea's foreign policy. Ahn correctly argues that most existing studies of North Korean policy do not provide an adequate theoretical framework for analysis. He focuses on domestic political factors and attributes North Korea's behavior to the division between reformers and hard-liners in the government. Referring to what he terms "authoritarian double-edged diplomacy" Ahn argues that the North Koreans consciously fluctuate their demands between the hard and soft line in order to demand better concessions. Ahn makes some interesting observations about North Korean behavior but in his analysis he tends to base his position on assumptions that he does not explain or justify. Specifically, Ahn seems to assume that the North does not truly feel threatened but only acts that way to win concessions in negotiations. He seems to assume that there are no true hard-liners in North Korea who feel a security threat, only those who feign that position maintain power and gain an advantage in negotiations. For example, he

states, "North Korea dragged the nuclear issue to a satisfactory demand threshold by pretending to be very hawkish" (Ahn, 1997:88).

The weakness of Ahn's assumptions are brought to light in his article when he argues that due to the food crisis in the North, economic considerations would outweigh other considerations in the four party talks. In fact, the four party talks held in March of 1998 ended with no satisfactory conclusion when the North Korean negotiators would not move beyond a discussion of the presence of US troops in the south. Any subsequent efforts to make progress in those talks have hit the same roadblock. In addition, despite their desperate food situation, the North Koreans have proven to be very cautious in accepting assistance. The weakness of Ahn's argument may lie in his failure to recognize the significance and emotional nature of competition with South Korea in decision-making. That is, while some within North Korea may feign hawkishness because they feel no real military threat, there are other threats besides the threat of military force. The loss of a zero-sum legitimacy competition may be equally as threatening to North Korea as war.

Bueno de Mesquita and Mo (1997) also apply game theory to analyze how different actors in North Korea influence on another. The attempt to look at the different factions in North Korea and explain how their interaction in the effort to reform the economy will predict policy outcomes. In their study conducted in the mid-1990s, Bueno de Mesquita and Mo conclude that due to conflicts between different factions North Korea is heading for regime change and a regime crisis. In this regime crisis the military will emerge as most the most powerful faction (which it already was) and Kim Jong Il will lose his power and become a figurehead. Contrary to their predictions, Kim Jong Il

has apparently solidified his power base, formed closer ties with the military, and stabilized the regime. And contrary to their predictions, North Korea has not imploded.

3.2.4 Reform and Reunification

Numerous analyses apply a less rigorous method to look at the North Korean economic and political situation and predict the possibility for reform and improvements in relations with the South Korea (Kim, 1994; Han, 1994; Do, 1996; Kim, 1996; Lee, J.S, 1996; Satterwhite, 1996; Chun, 1997; Lee, B.D, 1997; Lee, J.S., 1997; Lee, Y.S., 1997; Manning, 1997, Suh, 1997; Suh, 1998; Zhebin, 1998; Hong, 1999; Yu, 1999). These studies are unanimous in their claim that reform will occur. If no reform is enacted the regime will collapse; therefore the regime has no choice but to reform. Many of them point to the examples of the former socialist states in Europe and China as examples of the course North Korea will follow. The primary difference between the studies is that they may differ on the sequence of events.

Recent events, though, do not support the findings of these studies. North Korea's economic situation has continued to decline. It has not moved closer to the Chinese model of reform. In fact, North Korea's more recent language has included heightened criticisms of the revisionist policies of China. And while North Korea has sent some signals of a desire to improve relations with the outside world, its behavior does not support that language. Why are these studies so certain of reform? First, due to the nature of the studies, they also tend to look at North Korea's contact with South Korea and the outside world strictly as a dependent variable explained by the behavior of the North Korean regime. I argue that the primary reason these studies so often have

difficulty in predicting North Korean behavior is that they fail to give adequate attention to the salience of the legitimacy competition with South Korea, and the zero-sum nature of the game they are playing.

3.2.5 Comparative Legitimacy

Clearly the regimes in North and South Korea sought to achieve and maintain both domestic and international legitimacy. Several studies look at the issue of regime legitimacy and this competition between the North and South Korean regimes for domestic and international legitimacy (Park and Park, 1990; Gu, 1995; Gillis, 1996). These studies provide rather detailed descriptions of how the two regimes compare to one another in areas such as economic development, international recognition, and political stability. Yet they tend to look at the comparisons as more of a result of, rather than an influence on, regime behavior. In other words, the legitimacy competition was looked at as more of a dependent variable. What is not so clearly described or analyzed in these studies is how the context or environment in which North Korea exists and more specifically how North Korea's quest for legitimacy and the development of its nation-state identity was influenced and guided by the competition with the south. This study seeks to view the legitimacy competition in a more dynamic light through the lens of the model presented in Chapter Four.

While existing studies and approaches make a solid contribution to furthering our understanding of the reasons for the particular development and behavior of Taiwan and North Korea, this brief review of that literature has also shown that they leave some questions unanswered. Most significantly, while it is commonly recognized that the national division is an important issue to both regimes, no study to date has made an

effort to explain in a more specific and detailed fashion exactly how division influences the behavior of the regimes. This study will attempt to do that by proposing a psychological model of decision-making that allows for the analysis of the influence of interaction with out-groups in intergroup relations.

CHAPTER IV

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATION-STATE IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT

Because of the state of the division and the stated goal of reunification, the context in which these regimes operate is fundamentally different from other regimes. Due to the military threat imposed by the other side, the regimes must constantly keep a watchful eye on their adversary. While the concern with a security threat does not make these systems unique, their environment may make the perception of threat greater and more pressing.

A truly unique condition for these regimes though is the state of division and the issue of reunification. Each of the regimes exists in the environment in which it is competing with the other side for absolute control of a stated territory. Each has long claimed to be the legitimate government for the entire nation: for every square inch of territory, and for every person.[1] The competition with the other side therefore takes the form of a zero-sum game; any relative gain for the one side is a loss for the other. The regimes in Taiwan and North Korea have attached great importance to the stated goal of reunification. The goal is not only to reunify, but also to reunify under one's own

[1] Taiwan ended the Period of Mobilization for Suppression of Communist Rebellion in 1991. This officially eliminated the KMT's claim that the Communist Government was illegal and recognized them as the authority on the mainland. This did not, however, eliminate the KMT's claim that it was the better or more legitimate government.

conditions and control. For that reason the superiority of one regime over the other takes on life or death consequences for the regime.

In this section, I will discuss the concept of legitimacy and legitimacy competition. Following that I will explain the psychological processes at work when decisions are made in the context of division and legitimacy competition. This will involve a lengthy discussion of the development of images and the cognitive and affective processes at work in building legitimacy and identity. Finally, I will propose a model which attempts to synthesize the concepts from the study of perceptions and images with Social Identity Theory that can be used to view the development of identity in these two systems and attempt to link identity development to ideology and policy. We will start with a discussion of legitimacy.

4.1 Legitimacy Competition

Cottam argues a number of context effects can be significant. Included in these are time pressure, ambiguous information, the presence of third parties, one's goals, the salience of the goals, and one's interpretation of goals of others. It is clear that there is interaction between context, or situational characteristics, and perceptions (Cottam, 1994: 29). As Folkman states, "The person and the environment are in a dynamic relationship that is constantly changing and the relationship is bi-directional, with the person and the environment each acting on the other" (Folkman, 1984: 836).

For these reasons, it is essential that this study provide background on the environment and history surrounding North Korea and Taiwan and attempt to determine to what extent this context helped to create and perpetuate division and the construction

of perceptions of the other side. The construction of a more objective description and analysis of the context in which the systems operated combined with their perception of their opponent will provide us with a much clearer understanding of the factors which influenced the development of images and policy. One significant factor is that the existence of division fundamentally altered the way in which the regimes in Taiwan and North Korea sought legitimacy.

Since the division of these nations the opposing sides have existed in a state of constant conflict. At times the conflict has involved actual armed confrontation and at times it has been more ideological and rhetorical in nature. Because the official policies of Taiwan and North Korea include the eventual reunification of their divided nations they are constantly attempting to justify their rule and display themselves as the more legitimate system to guide the nation. Because of this the regimes have existed in an environment guided by the constant competition with the other side resulting in what might be described as a legitimacy war.

All political regimes strive to gain legitimacy in the eyes of their people. There are different ways in which a regime can attempt to gain legitimacy and different bases of legitimacy. Traditional definitions of legitimacy have ranged from legalistic, based on the notion of "right" or "just" rule based on constitutional law, to those which are more abstract and include ideas such as the regime's conformity with the existing culture. Regimes might attempt to gain both ideological and performance legitimacy. That is, they will attempt to build a system which satisfies both the "spiritual" or more metaphysical desires of the people, such as identity and belongingness, and the more concrete physical needs of the people such as food, shelter, and clothing. In any event,

efforts to achieve and maintain legitimacy presents itself as a daunting task for any political regime. The way in which a regime attempts to gain and maintain legitimacy can be strongly guided by the environment in which it exists.

Legitimacy on the one hand can be viewed as a moral concept. A government must be able to comply with certain fundamental principles and be in line with prevailing cultural norms and values. At the same time, legitimacy can be looked at as a very practical and pragmatic concept: the ability of the government to respond to ever changing demands placed upon it by the members of the political system and by the surrounding environment. Here we can see how the concepts of a moral definition of legitimacy and the more practical concept of effectiveness are intertwined.

Perhaps Moulakis was most successful in describing the difficulty in understanding and defining legitimacy, when he wrote that legitimacy is:

> Neither merely a matter of fact nor is it just a normative postulate. It is also not simply an analytical category. In reality, where it exists, it is constituted of a particular historical conjunction of logically and ontologically disparate elements, and it is never a permanent and inalienable achievement. It can be lost, adapted, distorted or maintained (Moulakis, 1986:2).

The traditional definition of legitimacy was based on the notion of legality. Weber argues that one of the basic legitimations of domination by the states is "legality, by virtue of the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional 'competence' based on rationally created rules" (Weber, 1958:79). Weber continues, "Orders are given in the name of the impersonal norm, rather than in the name of personal authority; and even the giving of a command constitutes obedience toward a norm rather than an arbitrary freedom, favor, or privilege" (Weber, 1958: 294-295). Therefore, for a regime to obtain and maintain legitimacy it must function in the realm of an impersonal form of legality.

Mayo argues that legitimacy of the state is based on the rulers' compliance with rules as set forth by a constitution (Mayo, 1960). While legality may be one aspect of legitimacy, it should not be viewed as the all-inclusive definition. It is possible for the regime to abide by the law, but there is no guarantee that the laws or the constitution are themselves legitimate. The possibility of the regime to establish law or constitution for the simple sake of rationalizing its rule is too great. In this light, Cipriani defines legitimacy as "the attribution of validity to a given situation, action, function, or authority (from below); and (from above) the more or less motivated justification of what by itself would not be lawful or valid" (Cipriani, 1987:1). Sorokin, too, sees the possibility of governments using legitimation procedures for self-serving purposes and rationalizing their rule. From this cynical perspective he claims that, "any theory, however silly it may be, is elevated to the rank of the eternal truth when it glorifies government" (Sorokin, 1937: 14).

Another problem with the legalistic conceptualization of legitimacy lies in determining how much emphasis should be placed on legality as a description of legitimacy and in determining whether legality precedes legitimacy or vice versa. In short, law is but one way that a regime expresses itself. The legal description of policy cannot be allowed to serve as its sole description. Easton writes, "political science is concerned with every way in which values are allocated for a society, whether formally enunciated in a law or lodged in the consequences of practice (Easton, 1953: 131).

Ferrarotti, too, questions the use of legality as the primary determinant of legitimacy. If law is not based on the accepted norms and values of society in a historical

framework, then the law itself may not be perceived as legitimate and the law in no way can be expected to provide legitimacy to the regime. Ferrarotti argues

> In this strong sense, legitimacy includes and also goes beyond and precedes legality. The process of legitimation itself could not be exhausted in a formal production of norms were it not coherently underpinned by the common sentiments of the community. Furthermore, legitimacy is a fundamentally historical concept (Ferrarotti, 1987: 23).

Due to these problems with using legality as the primary aspect of legitimacy, many social scientists are making an effort at looking for different ways to define the concept. A broader definition of legitimacy involves the importance of the norms and values of the society. Legitimacy, then, is based on the common sentiments of the community. Swartz, Tuden and Turner support this view of legitimacy when they state, "legitimacy is the type of support that derives not from force or its threat, but from the values held by the individuals formulating, influencing and being affected by political ends" (Swartz, Tuden and Turner, 1988: 23). Lipset puts forth the same argument when he writes

> Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for society. While effectiveness is primarily instrumental, legitimacy is evaluative. Groups regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit with theirs (Lipset, 1963: 64).

Cohen states that legitimacy is a function of the moral validity of the political order (Cohen, 1988: 18). Moulakis claims that legitimacy is the "regard in which a polity is held by its members: the extent to which that polity is thought to be worthy of support" (Moulakis, 1986: 3). And Busch sees legitimacy as "a moral bond between the citizen and the state," and argues further, "to the degree that this bond exists, most members of the polity see their political institutions as morally proper for their society" (Busch, 1974: 1).

Thus, Park and Park state, "many social scientists construe legitimacy as a social-psychological concept denoting the feelings, dispositions, beliefs and opinions of individuals" (Park and Park, 1990: 10). If one accepts this psychological conceptualization of legitimacy, many difficulties arise. One problem lies in determining whether there is a connection between legitimacy and effectiveness. That is, it must be determined whether legitimacy can be gained by a regime that functions in an effective manner or whether legitimacy is bases solely on the acceptance on the regime based on a historical perspective. Another difficulty lies in operationalizing the concept of legitimacy if it is based solely on the psychological attitudes of the members of the society. It is a daunting task to develop empirical definitions and knowledge based on the beliefs of the people. Therefore, such a conceptualization will not be very beneficial for the political scientist (Park and Park, 1990: 11).

In reality, people seek both physical and metaphysical gratification and make demands on the government for the gratification of these needs. In that sense, there is a connection between regime effectiveness and regime legitimacy. Analysts of political systems have acknowledged this connection. While Lipset provides separate definitions for effectiveness and legitimacy, he does argue that the legitimacy of political systems "depends in large measure upon the ways in which key issues which have historically divided the society have been resolved" (Lipset, 1960: 64).

Regimes are constantly seeking acceptance and compliance to their rule. While they may obtain some level of acceptance based on history, there must come a point where the members of the society are obedient due to the rewards they receive based upon their obedience. Claessen and Skalnik stress the importance of this level of

performance and effectiveness in regime legitimacy when they argue that relations between the regime and the members of the society are "characterized by reciprocity: people are supplying goods, food, and services and the rulers providing protection against supernatural forces, secular powers, poverty, and anarchy" (Claessen and Skalnik, 1978: 24).

Cohen argues that legitimacy is, at least in part, determined by benefits the people receive by complying with the rule of the regime. A precondition for support from the populous is the regime's ability to provide for the needs of the people. He states:

> If continuing droughts, invasions, raids, disease and indeed widely diffuse misfortunes occur, the monarch and the government of early states can be blamed. They are the ones responsible for the welfare of the polity. The price of power is the obligation to verify by real results, the widespread belief in the elite claim to foster and take on responsibility for the welfare of the polity (Cohen, 1988: 17).

The regime must win and maintain acceptance and legitimacy by providing for the needs of the people.

It is important to note that the needs that must be satisfied are not solely materialistic but are at times also psychological or metaphysical in nature. O'Connor mentions the importance for the regime to create the conditions for social harmony. These conditions can be physical as well as more psychological or metaphysical (O'Connor, 1973: 52). Cipriani discusses the importance of the regime's ability to build a foundation based on the scaffolding of a complex of "guiding ideas." Upon this foundation is based the entire psychological orientation of the people toward the regime. He claims that upon this foundation is based the "potential for diffusion and ability to provide the sense of belonging to a group as to a party, a community, or a whole nation

(Cipriani, 1987:1). So, the performance of the regime is based not only in its ability to provide for material needs but also for the psychological need of group identity.

Due to the fact that its foundation is based on satisfying either physical or psychological needs of the people, legitimacy is extremely context dependent. That is, people's needs or desires are highly dependent on the context or environment in which they exist. As the environment changes, both physical and psychological needs will change as well. Therefore, in order to understand a regime's efforts to achieve and maintain legitimacy, it is quite important to develop an adequate understanding of the context in which the regime functions.

For the same reasons, the concept of legitimacy is extremely dynamic. That is, environment and the needs of the people are ever changing, the efforts the regime must make to achieve and maintain legitimacy must change as well. The relationship between the people and the regime is continuously evaluative. And the regime is or should constantly be going through a process of self-evaluation. In this way, thedynamic evaluative nature of legitimacy can cause a regime to consistently adjust is goals, strategies and policies to respond to a different environment and different demands.

While the above discussion primarily focuses on a regime's efforts to achieve and maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the people within its defined political borders, in the real world regimes do not live in isolation within the confines of their political borders. For that reason, they must also concern themselves with achieving a degree of legitimacy within the community of nations and within the global community that transcends borders. For example, regimes try to gain membership, acceptance and influence in international organizations. Or the regime may make an effort to become the leader of a

group of nations with similar ideologies, goals or strategies. While the process of legitimacy achievement is fundamentally the same in these instances, the arena clearly changes. This leads to an expansion of the evaluative process to include the attitudes and behaviors of groups outside the national boundaries.

In the case of a divided nation or in any instance when an intense dispute exists, this struggle for legitimacy might be altered in form. Specifically, each sides' struggle for legitimacy moves beyond the effort to satisfy the needs of its people in an isolated sense and becomes an intense and direct competition with the other side to prove that it is more valuable, more successful and more worthy of support. As Goertz states such rivals, "are competing over a scarce good. This good may be intangible such as political influence or ideological/religious dominance. The competition may also be over more tangible goods such as natural resources or territory" (Goertz, 1994:197-198).

Relations between parts of divided societies take on a unique form, that is, they are neither strictly international nor domestic in nature. Gu refers to this unique relationship as "transpolital relations," defined as relations between polities in divided nations (Gu, 1995: 5). Because of this unique relationship the search for legitimacy in divided system may be altered in form. Specifically, each side's struggle for legitimacy exists on several levels. The regime must not only attempt to achieve legitimacy within its own polity but it must demonstrate its legitimacy relative to the polity on the other side of the divide. This results in a direct and intense competition for relative legitimacy.

And according to Gu, this measure of success in competition for legitimacy can be quite comprehensive. He states, "ordinarily, it can be measured in terms of the number of countries that accord them recognition and, to a lesser extent, vote in favor of

their admission to universal international organizations based on judgement of their effective control over population and territory and their general performance (Gu, 1995: 3). Evaluation includes both internal policies and external behavior and can include factors such as the guiding ideological system, human rights and civil liberties, social stability, economic performance, and cooperation with commonly accepted international norms and rules of behavior.

In practice, rival governments have used a wide variety of means to achieve comparative legitimacy. As Gu points out:

> over the years, the rival governments have battled against each other to obtain more control over the national population, form alliances with the superpowers to win their favor, compete to grant aid to Third World countries with a view to getting their support for representation in international organizations and for diplomatic recognition, and engage in domestic reforms to improve their image in the world (Gu, 1995: 3).

This process may be described as a legitimacy war. The regimes are not fighting a hot war with guns and bombs, but instead fighting an ideological and political war to prove their superiority to the other side in some way. In this context, legitimacy becomes a highly relative concept based on a comparative evaluation of performance and status vis-à-vis the rival regime. When this occurs, the regime or society may begin to build its entire identity based on its competition with the other side. Rather than looking inward to find sources of identity and legitimacy, the regime will look toward the competing regime to seek out terms of competition and define relative success. In this process, the context and content of the competition with the other side may guide the behavior of the regime.

This study proposes that we can better understand the behavior of the regimes viewed through the lens of legitimacy competition and identity development. It is

possible that the competition with the other side changed the very foundation of regime legitimacy in these two systems. To better understand how legitimacy competition can guide behavior it is essential to understand the psychological processes that are at work when individuals or groups strive to achieve legitimacy and acceptance. This study looks at those processes and then will use psychological theory to build a model through which we can analyze and better explain the behavior of the regimes in Taiwan and North Korea.

4.2 Images and Identity

In his novel, *Requiem for a Glass Heart*, David Lindsey touches upon the notion of the enemy image in the context of competition. In discussing the relationship between two exceptionally hostile adversaries, he writes:

> I was a new officer, with responsibility for this patrol for only four months, but my first Sergeant had been on the Black Sea coast for six years. He was intimate with the Krupatkins, in the same way that enemies are intimate. Sometimes they can be closer than friends (Lindsey, 1996: 179).

In describing the relationship between his fictional adversaries, Lindsey touches upon a fundamental concept of adversarial relations and the development of identity in the context of these relations. In cases of close and extreme competition, the line between the adversaries begins to blur and a situation develops in which the adversaries need one another for self-identity. As Stein states, "Opposition occurs where unconscious similarity cannot be acknowledged. Consequently, the adversaries become locked in a permanent 'dance.' They become, in fact, a cultural 'pair,' since the self-definition of one becomes impossible without reference to the other" (Stein, 1990:71).

Crucial to the development of identity and behavior are the perceptions, or more accurately, the images that one has of significant others and one's relationship to those significant others. Images can be defined as "the perceptual filters that organize our environment and enable us to predict and respond to that environment" (Cottam, 1994: 10). Images inform us how to interpret the behavior of others and tell us how to react to that behavior. Policy makers all have images of other countries.

All individuals and groups have images of people and objects around them. In the most elementary form we categorize people into "in-groups" or "out-groups." Beyond that we determine whether these groups are allies or enemies, friendly or threatening. In the face of extreme threat or competition it is likely that these images will be stronger and more influential in thought processes. Images are determined by the perceptions of the other side's capabilities, disposition, motivations, and actions. It is commonly accepted that one's self-image is strongly influenced by perceptions of and comparisons to others in one's environment. For that reason, to better understand behavior in the context of division, one must understand the image held of the other side. That image serves as the basis of comparison in the development of identity.

Psychologists have long attempted to understand identity in the context of one's self-perception in relation to others. This search for identity takes on a special meaning in the face of the existence of a strong opponent. Out of that research have emerged several concepts that have furthered our understanding of peoples' and societies' perceptions of one another. Erik Erikson pioneered a concept known as pseudospeciation. The concept of pseudospeciation posits that while man is obviously one species, man divides into groups that provide members with a sense of a unique and

often superior human identity. This concept is relevant to political science in that this psychological division creates the sort of real divisions in the world that can lead to conflict. As Erikson states:

> What has rendered this seemingly "natural" process a potential malignancy of universal dimensions, however, is that in times of threatening technological and political change and sudden upheaval, the idea of being the preordained foremost species tends to be reinforced by a fanatic fear and anxious hate of other pseudospecies. It then becomes a periodic and often reciprocal obsession of man that these others must be annihilated or 'kept in their places' by periodic warfare with the most up to date armament, by stringent legislation or cruel local custom (Erikson, 1985:214).

This concept of pseudospeciation is also important to the study of politics because it has contributed to a further development of an understanding not only of how man relates to man, but also how societies and political systems relate to one another. Important to this analysis is the way in which people create enemies and allies. In short, to a great extent, man creates his identity in relation to those who surround him. As Volkan states, "the sense of self, put simply, is the impression one carries of how his emotional, intellectual and physical components combine in response to the world around him" (Volkan, 1985:231). This goes beyond how the individual develops an atomistic sense of self, it is also relevant to the development of groups, group identity and group dynamics. Again, Volkan states:

> suitable targets of externalization have much to do with how the individual begins to be a part of the group, above and beyond the influence of his internalized parental and social values. Such "targets" play a part in the genesis of ethnicity, nationality and other similar phenomena, and are the foundations for building up concepts of enemies and allies (Volkan, 1985:231).

In discussing his "suitable targets of externalization," Volkan is referring to what Mack referred to above as "a human tendency to externalize responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions." In short, human beings are looking for someone else to blame

for their shortcomings and mistakes. If we have suitable targets of externalization we can shift responsibility for our questionable actions onto another party. This is the root of the concept of the need for enemies.

Group serving attributions can both help to preserve existing ethnocentric images and serve to maintain a favorable self-image as rooted in one's social identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Thus, as Sande, Goethals, Ferrari, and Worth argue:

> For the same reasons that people often make "self-serving" attributions for their own behaviors and outcomes, they may make "group-serving" attributions in order to maintain a moral self-image and a positive social identity. Because, according to Tajfel and Turner, positive social identity also depends on favorable comparisons between one's ingroup and outgroup, one's self-concept is enhanced by perceiving the outgroup in a less favorable way (1989: 94).

This conceptualization of enemies and allies is relevant to the study of politics and political development because it provides us with a framework in which we can begin to better comprehend the motivations that underlie political action. Murray Edelman argues that categorization, and more specifically the creation of enemy and ally images, is one common way that a political system may build and perpetuate power. Edelman posits that the power seat will attempt to perpetuate itself by creating clear distinctions between enemy and ally, "attributing to the latter all the qualities the culture considers good: honesty, integrity, cleanliness, and loyalty. The 'enemy' category becomes the receptacle for the antithesis of the same virtues" (Edelman as quoted in Volkan, 1985:224). In a situation of division or conflict, it is even more common for one side to create a strong stereotype of the other and to base its behavior on a reaction to that stereotype.

In a state of crisis, individuals and groups cling even more stubbornly to a sense of identity and the enemy and ally images. What can occur in the event that a regime, a

society, or a nation exists in direct confrontation with another is that its efforts to build and maintain its self-identity and its legitimacy will be based on an effort to become what the other side is not. This is especially true when the competition is stronger, or holds an advantage in certain, specific areas. For example, if one side is much more economically powerful and secure, the other side is likely to de-emphasize economic legitimacy and focus on another base of legitimacy, such as ideology or nationalism. This rationale in action can also be applied in responding to an opponent's weakness.

The reasons for conflict between parties are multi-faceted and complex and are tied to psychological, cultural, historical, economic, and political forces. As John Mack states, among the forces that can contribute to hostility are, "individual and group fear and hostility; competition over scarce resources (or resources that appear to be limited); the need of individuals to identify with a larger group or cause that gives their lives transcendent meaning; a human tendency to externalize responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions; and a particular susceptibility to be manipulated" (Mack, 1990: 57).

When a group is confronted with another with which it feels it is in competition, it will develop a stereotype of that group and build its reactions accordingly. Broadly the most common stereotypes are the enemy stereotype and the degenerate stereotype (Herrmann, 1985). In the development of these stereotypes, the motivations, capabilities and decisional processes of the opposing side are analyzed (Holt, 1989; Koopman, Snyder & Jervis, 1989; Silverstein, 1989; Silverstein & Flamembaum, 1989; Silverstein & Holt, 1989.) In the enemy stereotype the motivations of the observed actor are evil and unjustified. The actor's motivation is represented in a simple, often monolithic fashion

with an emphasis on aggressiveness and the power of the leader or the state. The capabilities of the observed actor are described as derivative of the weaknesses of one's own community. As Herrmann states, "the observed actor derives strength from another's weakness" (Herrmann, 1985:673). Volkan agrees, stating that it is interesting to note that the enemy often resembles the observing nation or group in obvious ways. Volkan writes:

> Hate and aggression make for attachment to the other as much as love, and sometimes, even more. We use them for externalization of our bad self and object images; these we may superimpose upon (or condense with) the projections of our unacceptable thoughts. We focus, obsessively, when stressed, on our differences in order to cling to the illusion that the enemy is quite unlike us. This process strengthens our sense of self and our sense of solidarity with our side (Volkan, 1985:243-244).

The decisional process of the observed state will be seen as rational and conspiratorial. Herrmann states, "they will be able to plot in advance and execute sinister plans of enormous complexity. The locus of decision-making in the observed actor will be depicted as a wholly unified monolith bonded together in a common cause" (Herrmann, 1985:673).

Cottam describes an enemy state as:

> Attributed with evil intentions, harmful ambitions, and an insatiable desire to dominate and destroy. It is seen as culturally strange and bad but sophisticated enough to be dangerous. The enemy is seen as powerful, as powerful as oneself and therefore threatening. Enemy regimes are assumed to be run by a cabal of evil geniuses who plan elaborate strategies and who wait patiently to put those plans into effect (Cottam, 1994: 10).

The degenerate image, on the other hand, represents the other side as weak and rather than presenting a threat, perhaps presenting an opportunity for gains in competition. The degenerate stereotype sees the other side as immoral, perverted, spiritually empty and passive. The capabilities of the degenerate state are perceived as

weaker than they might be because of a lack of will. The decision-making process in the degenerate state is seen as "corrupt and immoral, incompetent and indecisive, confused and perhaps even anarchic. The 'degenerate' state lacks focused leadership, organization and discipline" (Herrmann, 1985:38). While the enemy, the ally, and the degenerate are some of the most common images held, other images can include categorizations such as the ally of the enemy, the neutral, the dependent, and the dependent of the enemy (Cottam, 1994; Herrmann, 1986).

In extreme cases in which a group or country perceives a particularly strong threat, it may begin to develop a siege mentality which is fed by and feeds upon the enemy image. In this instance, the group becomes almost obsessed with its isolation and its competition with the enemy side. This siege mentality then feeds and strengthens the enemy image and leads to a perpetuation of division and conflict and to an almost singular focus on developing ones self-identity in the context of that threat. This is important in an effort to understand a system's effort do develop its legitimacy. The stronger the feeling of competition and the stronger the perception of threat and an enemy image, the more likely the presence of the enemy is to influence and guide a system's efforts to create an identity and to establish and perpetuate legitimacy.

This study operates under the assumption that due to the state of division and the competition for legitimacy, an enemy image exists. The language and behavior of the regimes support this assumption. Because they hold the enemy image, they believe that the other side maintains an aggressive stance. They attribute the other side's actions to a desire to conquer and respond to all actions with suspicion. Yet to understand the process involved in decision-making in that context, and to build a model for analysis, it is still

useful to review some of the literature on perception, attribution, and their influence on decision making. This will be explained further below.

4.3 Perception and Attribution

This study will focus much of its attention on the development of national identity and system characteristics in North Korea and Taiwan. Existing psychological studies of international relations bear relevance to the study because of the unique situation of these systems. The psychological study of perception has often been applied to the study of international relations (Holsti, 1963; Jervis, 1976; George, 1982; Herrmann, 1985; Cottam, 1986). Again, because of the unique environment in which North Korea and Taiwan operate, this study will argue that a similar approach can be applied to the study of domestic political development in North Korea and Taiwan.

In studying perception, observers attempt to develop an understanding of the beliefs and motives of an observed actor. More specifically, the observer attempts to determine how the observed actor perceives the world around it and how that perception influences or guides its action. Behavior then is guided not only by an observation of objective conditions, but also by perception. In a sense, the study of perception is a reaction, as well as an addition, to realist and neo-realist theories of international behavior.

Structural studies of international behavior appear to assume that the environment is an objective condition. Thus, while structural theories provide information about the environment in which actors act, they do not make an effort to understand the actor's perception of that environment. Little or no emphasis is placed on, or relevance given to,

any effort to better understand actors perceptions of the environment. As Waltz states, "Structurally we can describe and understand the pressures states are subject to. We cannot predict how they will react to the pressures without knowledge of their internal predispositions" (Waltz, 1979). In fact, a number of psychological studies have proven that what some may perceive as an objective condition can be perceived differently by different actors, and that these differences in perception can have a profound impact on actions. Furthermore, the actions may go against predictions put forth by structural or rational approaches to the study of politics.

Psychological approaches to the study of international behavior argue that human beings tend to develop different perceptions of the world. As Mandel states:

> For varying reasons, and with varying levels of awareness and intentionality, humans distort their view of the world, their analysis of their subjective reality, and their behavioral response to this analysis. Their distortions could more specifically occur at a number of different stages: when one is identifying a problem, gathering information, processing information, formulating a decision, implementing an action, or responding to feedback (Mandel, 1986).

Thus, perception theories attempt to determine how people assimilate and process information about their environment. Without understanding the perceptions, objective measures have less meaning. Saying that one country is stronger than another has little meaning unless we understand the relations between the two. Is it a friendly relationship in which strength will be used for assistance, or a hostile relationship in which strength will be used for aggression and harm?

There are a number of different approaches to the study of perceptions. The most common is perhaps cognitive consistency theory (Jervis, 1976; Kinder and Weiss, 1978; Mandel, 1986; Lebow, 1981; Mitchell, 1981). This theory argues that people hold

specific images of a situation or object and attempt to fit new events into the existing images. By doing this, people prevent challenges to strongly held beliefs.

Attribution theory can be very useful in helping us define and analyze images. Attribution theory was initiated by Heider (1958) who discussed the process of "causal attribution in the perception of others." As stated by Heradstveit and Bonham, "The individual, according to this viewpoint, is a 'constructive thinker' or a 'naive scientist' who searches for the causes of events and draws conclusions about people and their circumstances as a basis for action" (Heradstveit and Bonham, 1996: 273).

Attributions can serve many purposes. Included in the motives hypothesized to affect attributions are the need to enhance or protect self-esteem and to create a favorable impression to others (Heradstveit and Bonham, 1996: 273). That is, in attributing motivation to behavior observers will consciously or unconsciously allow their own goals, ambitions, and desires to affect their understanding of the situation. In addition, it is hypothesized that the presence of an audience will affect the attributions people communicate. As Tetlock and Levi state, "According to the self-preservation position, people often communicate attributions designed, consciously or unconsciously, to gain public approval and avoid embarrassment" (Tetlock and Levi, 1982: 78). While this process may border on propaganda, it should not be dismissed as merely a manipulative game. The process still has a very significant impact on the structuration of ideology and practice because it still publicly defines one's perception of another and guides the observer's reaction to that perception.

Crucial to an understanding of perceptions is the attribution of causality (Hewstone, 1989). The objective of this is to determine to what factors one can attribute

the cause of certain behaviors. In achieving this one can give attention to the salience of information and to persons or objects. In attributing causality more attention is usually given to people than to objects, this is especially significant in cases of adversarial relations. As Vertzberger states, "Higher causal effects are attributed to persons than to objects, which explains the tendency to attribute and enemy state's behavior to the predisposition of its leadership rather than to environmental or accidental factors and explains the concentration of attention on the elites behavior" (Vertzberger, 1990: 69-70).

Empirical studies show that what really counts is not so much the objective reality surrounding the information as much as the subjective definition of the information by the decision maker. As Brecher writes, "Most strikingly, the evidence suggests that, while it is valid to define issue-areas objectively, that is, by the content of the decision, the analytically significant dimension of the issue-area concept for understanding the behavior of states is not that *reality* definition, but, rather, the way decision-makers *perceive* the issue" (Brecher, 1974:573).

Existing research has contributed to the development of a fairly complete list of the attributes associated with the different images. Images contain a variety of information concerning such factors as a country's military strength, its decision making process, its economic power, its goals, and its cultural sophistication. This information contributes to summary perceptions of the type of state's intentions toward their own, its power, its expected behavior, and the observer state's potential reactions (Cottam, 1994: 19). This process can also contribute to our understanding of national identity because in a competitive relationship, the definition of one's identity can be guided by comparisons with the other.

In order to categorize a country the analyst must go beyond simply matching attributes and must make inferences about the relation between the perceived attributes, observed behavior, and the decision context. As Cottam states:

> Conclusions about the perceived state, and hence its category membership, are derived not simply from the presence or absence of a bundle of attributes but from conclusions about the meaning of those attributes in a particular context. In short, categorization is not merely a psychological act of summarizing the properties of an observed actor or object. It is affected by the context in which the judgement takes place (Cottam, 1994: 20).

Thus, to understand behavior we must be able to understand the interaction of the contextual and psychological variables in the formation of goals and strategies. The process of evaluating the other side had a strong influence on the decision making process. The perceptions determine how we evaluate the objective measures and behavior of the other side. Without that, objective measures mean little. For example, the statements, "the Chinese have a strong military," and "the Chinese are militaristic," mean quite different things. Which statement one chooses to make is determined not solely by the strength of the Chinese military but rather by what one thinks the Chinese intend to do with that military strength. The environment surrounding the situation may also influence the salience of the issue. The strength of the Chinese military may not be significant if the environment prohibits the Chinese from displaying that strength.

This study posits that we can better understand the behavior of North Korea and Taiwan if we look at it in the context of each regime's competition with the other side of the divide. It is clear that the systems are in a confrontational state. What we seek to explain is how that confrontational state influences the choices available to, and decisions made by each side. The choices are guided by the objective condition in combination with the perceptions and images held by the decision-makers. For that reason, the

concepts and theories of intergroup relations provide us a nice framework within which to work and deserve elaboration here.

4.4 Intergroup Relations and Social Identity Theory

Given the nature of the division and the level of competition between the sides of the divide, it seems appropriate to look at each group's behavior in the context of intergroup relations and intergroup behavior. As Sherif states, "whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its members, *in terms of its group identification*, we have an instance of intergroup behavior" (Sherif, 1996). More specifically, we must determine how such interaction affects behavior. As Brewer and Miller write, "Understanding how basic perceptions, affect, and motives are influenced or transformed by an intergroup setting is the essence of the social-psychological approach to the study of intergroup relations" (Brewer and Miller, 1996: 5).

Even in instances when groups are extremely large, or when social, political, or economic factors limit their face-to-face interaction it is likely that the behavior of one group will have an impact on the other group. The groups need not always have direct contact in order to influence on another. In some cases chosen leaders will represent the groups in direct interaction or negotiation. In this instance, even though the interaction is dyadic the group is symbolically represented as a whole (Sherif and Sherif, 1996: 223; Brewer and Miller, 1996; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994: 6). Therefore, in the cases of North and South Korea, and Taiwan and China, cases in which direct interaction between the parties is limited, one party's behavior might still influence the behavior of the other.

There are several approaches to studying intergroup relations. These include but are not limited to Equity Theory, Relative Deprivation Theory, Realistic Conflict Theory and Social Identity Theory. This study will employ a model developed through Social Identity Theory in its analysis. Yet because these theories are related and in fact have been built upon one another, before going into a more detailed discussion of that theory it will be useful to provide a brief introduction to the others.

Equity Theory is based on the assumption that all human beings strive for justice in relationships. People evaluate their position based on the inputs they provide and the outcomes that result. These outcomes can be tangible as in the form of monetary remuneration or intangible as in the form of status or position. Evaluation of justice is based on a ratio of inputs to outcomes. That is, the appropriateness of one's outcomes is determined not simply by making direct comparisons to other's outcomes but as a ratio of the inputs or contributions made. These evaluations are primarily subjective. For example, while a lawyer may have a greater income and higher status in society than a bricklayer, the bricklayer may not feel any sense of injustice if he perceives that the lawyer's contributions are greater. Any sense that there is injustice will lead to psychological stress, which can, in turn, lead to efforts to alter the situation by either the advantaged group, the disadvantaged group, or both.

While equity theory presents some interesting propositions concerning human relations it suffers from some theoretical and methodological flaws. First, studies in equity theory tend to be extremely vague when discussing inputs and outcomes and how they are measured. There is no way to be certain what inputs or outcomes will be most salient in a given situation. This lack of specificity can lead to tautological arguments

because different inputs or outcomes can always be identified to justify a particular outcome. It is clear that equity theory is based on the assumption that people compare themselves with significant others, yet it never clearly demonstrates what or how they compare.

Another problem with equity theory is that it doesn't answer the big "so what?" question. That is, it doesn't provide any linkage between the existence of injustice and potential for and the direction of responses. For that reason, equity theory stops at the point when justice or injustices are determined to exist. This does not serve us well in attempting to understand the relationship between competition and behavioral responses.

Relative deprivation theory is another theory used in the study of intergroup relations. In short, relative deprivation theory argues that individuals will determine their satisfaction based not strictly on their position but on where they are positioned in relation to others around them. The theory was initiated by Stouffer et.al. in 1941. Stouffer and his colleagues initiated a large-scale research project on the attitudes of American soldiers. Some of their findings were interesting. For example, they found that even though there were more officers in the Air Force than in the Military Police, more people in the Air Force expressed serious dissatisfaction with their rank. It was concluded that the reason for the dissatisfaction was that more people in the Air Force received promotions and therefore those who did not felt especially slighted. The majority of soldiers in the MP were privates and since they did not expect promotion they were not as disaffected when they were not promoted. Another interesting finding was that black soldiers in the south were not as likely to express dissatisfaction. The researchers concluded that the black soldiers compared their situations to those of the

black civilians in the south and therefore felt less dissatisfied (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994; Brewer and Miller, 1996).

Relative deprivation theory has two components, the cognitive component, which involves the process of comparison with other individuals or groups, and the affective component, which involves the emotional response to that comparative evaluation. Naturally if the comparison of groups or individuals evokes no emotions of fear, resentment, anger, or hatred, then relative deprivation is not an issue.

The primary criticism of relative deprivation theory, and of most social-psychological theories of intergroup behavior, comes from the resource mobilization school, which argues that studying these psychological inputs to dissatisfaction and rebellion is trite since only dissatisfied people will respond. They argue that it is more essential to determine whether the individuals or groups have the resources and capability to mobilize to change the system. To be sure, people can only revolt if they have the capability, but there are certainly instances in history in which people had similar capabilities but still did not revolt.

I find that a more apparent weakness of relative deprivation theory is that the behavioral component of theory is somewhat lacking. It fails to provide us with a better way to determine how people might respond to feelings of relative deprivation. In many instances behavior is not clearly operationalized, and it seems that quite often the emphasis is on behavioral intention rather than on the specific decision making and behavior process. This weakness is caused in part by the limited range of emotions looked at in the theory. The research has focused on emotions such as anger, rage, or frustration. It is equally possible that people will experience different emotions such as

hope or faith that might lead to very different behavior. Thus, the research has often been limited by a focus on a single form of behavior, revolt. If that behavior is not followed then relative deprivation is considered irrelevant. In reality, when people feel a sense of relative deprivation they may behave in a variety of ways from attempting to assimilate into the relatively higher group, to changing the rules of competition, to attempting to eliminate the other group through violent revolution. In this study, an effort to connect comparative relations with possible policy alternatives and policy choices is essential.

Realistic conflict theory (RCT) is primarily an economic theory of group behavior. It is based on the assumptions that people are essentially selfish and will work to maximize their rewards and that conflict arises out of incompatible group interests. It is also assumed that the social-psychological aspects of group behavior are more a result of incompatible group interests than a cause. In other words, in realistic conflict theory social-psychological aspects of group behavior are the dependent rather than the independent variable. This is not to say that all researchers in the school of RCT completely dismiss the significance of psychological variables. For example, Deutsch argues that objective conditions do not rigidly determine the presence or absence of conflict because such factors such as bias or misperception can influence the situation (Deutsch, 1969; Deutsch, 1973).

Perhaps the most notable research in the field of RCT was the naturalistic study conducted by Sherif and his colleagues in a summer camp setting (Sherif, 1951; Sherif and Sherif, 1953; Sherif, White and Harvey, 1955; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif, 1961; Sherif, 1966). In this study, Sherif placed young men into a summer camp setting to observe their behavior in a controlled group. The first two stages of this

research related to spontaneous friendship choices. In this stage, Sherif first let the boys spontaneously choose their friends. Following that, the boys were divided into separate cabins with an effort made to separate those who had developed spontaneous friendships. This was done in order to ensure that the research results could not be explained in terms of interpersonal attraction. Following the separation of the boys into new cabins they immediately began to form new friendships and allegiances within their newly created in-groups.

The most famous segment of this research was called the "Robber's Cave Experiment," because it was conducted near a cave that was reputed to have been a hideout for Jesse James. In this part of the research Sherif and his colleagues began to stage interactions and competitions between the newly formed groups. In the Robber's Cave Experiments, Sherif found that the subjects clearly developed in-group biases. They tended to refer to issues in terms of fairness and justice and they systematically perceived events in a manner that favored the in-group.

Because the primary goal of researchers like Sherif is to find a method to reduce conflict between groups he then implemented a strategy to alleviate the level of competition and hostility between groups. The researchers operationalized the notion of superordinate goals to see if they could reduce the level of competition and tension. They specifically chose tasks that required the cooperation of both groups for success and that would equally benefit both groups if achieved. These superordinate goals included tasks like reestablishing the water supply to the camp and starting a truck that brought food to the camp. Following the completion of these tasks the researchers observed a clear reduction in tension and competition.

While Sherif's findings point to some interesting behavioral tendencies, the research method may not be without its flaws. The way in which Sherif first created group competition and then cooperation makes the applicability of the research to more real world situations questionable. In short, since in the final stage the subjects were essentially placed into a large, single group in order to complete tasks, it can be argued that the cooperation was not between two groups but between individuals in one larger group. Of course, elimination of divided groups in a real world setting is not so easily accomplished.

Because the research is based almost exclusively on material conditions it ignores the issue of ideology. The avoidance of the issue of ideology makes it difficult if not impossible for gaming studies to explain why some groups mobilize and others don't even if they have similar material conditions (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994: 48).

While RCT has made some significant contributions to the understanding of intergroup behavior, it is not without its flaws. Some of the flaws include: 1) its definition of conflict; 2) the assumption that all conflict is bad; 3) the neglect of power as an issue; and, 4) the emphasis upon psychological solutions to problems arising out of material conflicts of interest (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994: 55).

The first concern, the definition of conflict, relates to the wide range of conflicts studied in RCT. Conflict has been defined both as competition in a game in a summer camp, and as military competition between nations. Obviously these two situations are extremely different and applying conclusions from one to the other is methodologically questionable at best.

The second concern, that all conflict is bad, is related to the extrapolation of conflict at the interpersonal level to that at the larger group or international level. While it is clear that international conflict in the form of destructive war is an undesirable outcome, it is not so clear that all forms of conflict are bad and will always have negative consequences. This is problematic for several reasons. In some instances, a bias toward avoiding conflict in the short term may lead inevitably toward an escalation of conflict later. This is especially true in the case of disadvantaged groups. The pursuit of cooperation in all instances may simply lead to the perpetuation of exploitation. Thus, due to the manner in which it causes evaluation of a situation, conflict can sometimes have positive outcomes.

The third criticism relates to the avoidance of psychological factors in determining perceptions of difference of interests. That is, RCT is based on the assumption that adversarial relationships are a result of very tangible conflicts of interests between clearly defined groups. In addition, due to the nature of the experimental studies conducted in which no power differentiation is simulated, RCT does not account for power distribution. As mentioned above, power differentials have been shown to have an impact on decision-making processes and behavior. Finally, because of its focus on material conflicts of interest, beliefs and ideology are not taken added into the equation. We have seen many instances in history when people have sacrificed material well being for the sake of ideology or belief. What is missing then in RCT is a clearer analysis of which psychological factors help to determine when conflict will result and what form it might take.

A final concern with RCT is that while material factors are pointed to as the cause of conflict, the solution proposed by RCT is psychological. Very real disputes over issues such as economic or political resources lead to conflict. Yet, RCT proposes to solve these conflicts through psychological means by creating superordinate goals. For that reason, RCT never really focuses on the initial issues and behaviors that caused the conflict in the first place. In fact, because RCT automatically divides groups through conflict of material interests, it never truly explains interaction between the groups: what choices are available to the groups, what choices are made, and why choices are made. Instead, due to its bias against conflict, it attempts to inject a choice for the groups. This borders on denial of differences or issue avoidance and once again highlights fact that RCT is not focused on understanding the true cause of conflict and the behavior of the conflicting parties. It seems more realistic to confront the true causes of conflict if one really desires long term stability.

Social Identity Theory (SIT) provides an interesting contrast to RCT and attempts to respond to the criticisms of RCT by providing a more systematic method to understand the linkage between perceptions, relative superiority or inferiority, and action. SIT assumes that people are motivated to achieve a positive social identity, defined as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1978: 53). The individual will divide the world into in-groups and out-groups and make comparisons between them with the goal of creating a positive and distinct position for the in-group.

Although objective conflicts of interest can play an important role in intergroup relations, some social psychologists argue that such competition is not the sole basis for competition and conflict. In some instances competition may be a consequence of in-group out-group differentiation rather than its cause (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Limited group experiments have shown that in-group favoritism and discrimination against the out-group members occurs as soon as people are divided into groups, even in the absence of pre-existing conflicts of interest. According to SIT that occurs because positive group identity is achieved through comparison with the out-group. As Tajfel states, "The characteristics of one's group as a whole achieve most of their significance in relation to the perceived differences from other groups and the value connotations of those differences" (Tajfel, 1981: 258; see also Brewer and Miller, 1996: 119-120). Thus the need for positive identity creates a level of social competition between groups that is the product rather than the cause of in-group-out-group categorization.

SIT brings more psychological factors into play in the analysis of international relations. Social science usually points to economic or political factors to explain conflict, and even RCT focuses on material conflicts of interest. Yet as Brewer and Miller point out, "ultimately wars are entered into, fought, and ended by the decisions and behaviors of individual human beings. Whatever the institutional factors that precipitate and sustain intergroup conflict, it is psychological factors that make war possible in the first place" (Brewer and Miller, 1996: 134). Thus, SIT attempts to better understand how people create, or at least build upon, existing ingroup-outgroup divisions,

and how this influences behavior. This better allows the researcher to determine what psychological forces are at work in creating or exacerbating conflict between groups.

Individuals are generally motivated by a need to reduce uncertainty. One way to do this is to develop a coherent, positive, and consistent self-image (Brewer and Miller, 196: 44-45). This leads to group categorization and self-enhancement. The process of group categorization and self-enhancement has both cognitive and affective dimensions. As Hogg states, "Social Identity Theory formally articulates these basic socio-cognitive processes of categorization and self-enhancement with subjective belief structures which can be ideological constructs. Subjective belief structures influence the specific behaviors that group members adopt in pursuit of self-enhancement through evaluative positive social identity" (Hogg, 1995: 260). The categorization process is guided by self-enhancement because norms and stereotypes will favor the ingroup and comparisons will occur in areas that allow for positive evaluation of the ingroup.

Brewer and Miller point to the concept of optimal distinctiveness. According to Optimal Distinctiveness Theory, it is essential that the line that separates groups and group identities be very clearly drawn. People want to believe that they are members of a distinctive group. This distinctiveness is not strictly based on an objective evaluation of group differences but is actually an active process that guides and influences thought and behavior. People and groups define themselves by comparing themselves to others. Or as Tajfel and Forgas state it, "We are what we are because *they* are not what we are" (Tajfel and Forgas, 1981:124). But it is not enough to be optimally distinctive; a group must also be positively distinctive. That is, the group attempts to create certain positive advantages over the outgroup.

Social identity is highly dynamic and very responsive to immediate social comparative contexts. Ingroup prototypes are defined by what outgroup is salient. Thus, changes in the ingroup can occur over time if the relevant or salient comparison outgroup changes. This change can include either a change of the salient outgroup or a change within the salient outgroup. For example, if a group perceived as an enemy outgroup becomes an ally over time and a new enemy outgroup emerges, the basis of comparison and the prototype for the ingroup will likely change over time as well. The extent and content of change will depend to a great extent on the objective and subjective contextual factors (Hogg, 1995:261).

The judgements made about the ingroup and outgroup are relative rather than absolute. The process is inherently competitive. For that reason, the evaluation is not so much on whether one is good as it is on whether one is better than the other. The evaluation might also be influenced by a directional shift in the relative comparison. That is, if a regime is superior in the comparison but appears to be losing ground it can still develop a sense of inadequate identity. For that reason, groups tend to focus on areas for comparison in which they maintain positive distinctiveness and to attempt to ignore areas in which the comparisons are not so favorable.

Hogg provides an excellent explanation of this process:

> Social identity theory tries systematically to articulate the psychological level of analysis (socio-cognitive processes) with the sociological level (socio-historical dimensions of intergroup relations). In this respect, social identity is a social construct that mediates individual and society. The content of social identity is dynamically responsive to immediate contextual factors: different contexts may prescribe different contextually relevant behaviors contingent on the same social identity (Hogg, 1995: 265).

It is important to note that this process does not limit itself to mere cognitive representations and self-descriptions, but research has shown that this process can also profoundly influence motives, intentions, and behavior. Hogg points out that because social identities have important self-evaluative consequences, groups and their members are motivated to adopt behavioral strategies for achieving or maintaining ingroup-outgroup comparisons that favor the ingroup (Hogg, 1995: 260). And as Brewer and Miller explain, "self-cognitions include more than abilities and personality traits that we attribute to ourselves. They also include the beliefs and attitudes that we hold as expressions of our values and theories about the world. Of most relevance is evidence of the effect that social categorization alone can have on salience, extremity, and commitment with which individuals hold positions on specific social or political issues" (Brewer and Miller, 1996: 27).

As mentioned above, because of the comparative and competitive nature of SIT, the process is very dynamic. When individuals within a group perceive that their group membership is providing them with inadequate social identity, they may attempt to seek change. A move by one group will elicit a response from the other group in this competitive cycle. Yet, perception of inadequate social identity is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to motivate change. Cognitive alternatives must also be present if there is to be a real effort for change. The determination of cognitive alternatives is judged by whether individuals believe that the situation has stability or instability, that is, if there is room for change. Also important is whether individuals believe that the present system is legitimate or illegitimate, or to use the concepts from equity theory, just and fair.

When cognitive alternatives are perceived to exist, there are several potential actions or responses. First is absorption, or the effort for a group to be absorbed into the dominant group. A second response is to redefine a previously negative conceptualization or characterization of the group so that it is positively evaluated, for example, "black is beautiful." A third potential response is the creation and adoption of new dimensions for intergroup classification and comparison, or in changing the valuation of the existing comparisons. In other words, a group may try to change the rules of competition. If for example one group perceives itself to be physically weaker but intellectually superior, it will accentuate intellectual capability and achievement over physical accomplishment. A pop culture example of this process is the movie "The Revenge of the Nerds," in which the intellectuals changed the terms of campus competition from physical to mental prowess. Finally, if a group believes that it has the capability it might choose to confront the outgroup in head to head competition. For example, in the international arena, if a country perceives itself to be militarily inferior it could choose to strengthen other aspects of its society or economy or it might decide to increase defense spending to match the power of its opponent. Again, which course the group chooses will depend to a great extent on its evaluation of the subjective and objective conditions or environment (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994: 84).

The choices the group makes will also depend on its motives and orientation. Broadly classified there are five potential categories into which a group may fit. First is relative gain orientation, in which the group will simply attempt to gain more than the salient outgroup(s). Gain is measured in relative, rather than absolute terms. The second is joint gain orientation. Joint gain orientation can be seen as cooperation. Again, the

gain is not measured in absolute terms, but in comparative terms with the objective being that each group gains the same amount. Next is equality, which may not be concerned with gain at all. Here the primary concern is that both groups are equal, regardless of whether they have gained or lost. Fourth is other's gain orientation. Other's gain orientation can be defined as altruism, in which the primary concern is for the other. Finally is other's loss orientation. Other's loss orientation signals an aggressive tendency, focused on the other's loss regardless of the impact on the self (Brewer and Miller, 1996: 17-18). Experimental research has shown that people tend to be more concerned with relative gain when deciding on behalf of a group (Insko, et.al., 1992).

The question of one's motives and priorities in a relationship is important in another sense. That is, they influence whether increased contact between parties will be beneficial or harmful. It has long been assumed that one way to reduce conflict or discrimination is to increase contact and interaction between the parties so that they can develop similar goals and objectives. This assumption has had an influence on specific efforts to reduce division and conflict. For example, the effort to integrate schools in the United States was in part guided by the belief that interaction in school would reduce interracial conflict. In the international arena, efforts are frequently made to increase substantive relations or people to people contacts to reduce tension. In some cases these efforts are successful. In others they seem to have either no effect or exacerbate tension and conflict. The difference is determined by the conditions surrounding the contact.

Psychological research has shown that intergroup contact will improve relations when it involves relations that are intimate, where there is equal status between the parties, where the surrounding environment is supportive and where the interaction is

cooperative rather than competitive. If those conditions do not exist, contact is just as likely to lead to further discrimination and tensions (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994: 180). As we will see in the cases of Taiwan and North Korea, increased contact often had the effect of the parties making stronger efforts to distinguish themselves from the other.

These points are quite significant for this research. Because of the competition for legitimacy between the regimes, it is argued that they are primarily concerned with their relative advantage. In the case of extreme competition interaction is played out as a zero-sum game. Therefore their policy choices and behavior were strongly guided by the presence of the competition. The regimes made conscious efforts to highlight differences through comparison *and* to behave in ways that provided for optimal and positive distinctiveness and self-enhancement. Understanding these issues may provide us with a more complete understanding for the nature and timing of decisions on the part of the leaders of these countries. SIT therefore provides us with a useful theoretical framework in which we can evaluate these systems.

Based on the psychological concepts and theories discussed above, this study proposes the framework of Social Identity Theory as an appropriate framework for the study of Taiwan and North Korea. Yet Social Identity Theory is not without its flaws. One criticism of Social Identity Theory is that in describing the socio-cognitive process of comparison and response, it seems to view human beings as mere computers, processing information in the most logical way. SIT allows for the comparison of non-material factors such as ideology, but it does not provide a clear way in which to view the influence of affect, or emotion. But as we have seen in our discussion of perceptions and images emotion can play a strong role in the decision making process. As Taylor and

Moghaddam state, "what is needed, clearly, is the development of intergroup theories that emphasize the emotional consequences associated with bitter conflict, and the apparent sheer irrationality of many current, real-world intergroup conflicts (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994: 203). Without giving attention to the environment, the terms of the competition, and the emotional content of the competition, it is difficult for us to specify the priorities of the regime.

Thus, in order to develop a more complete model within which we can view behavior we must synthesize the theories to make sure that affect is accounted for in the process of comparison. The study proposes that we might be better able to understand regime behavior if viewed in the context the model represented in **Diagram 4.1**. This model is adapted from the representation of Social Identity Theory presented by Taylor and Moghaddam (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994: 234).

This model shows the process of comparison and how comparison guides decision-making. The decision-maker first goes through a process of comparison with the other side to determine its relative position. If an adequate relative identity is determined, the nation will either try to maintain that identity or to strengthen it. If an inadequate comparative identity is determined, an effort will be made to seek change through locating cognitive alternatives for the improvement of the situation. While the comparisons often are based on objective factors such as economic and diplomatic performance, the process is also influenced by emotional factors. The level of competition and the image of the other side will be especially influential in locating acceptable cognitive alternatives. When the enemy image is held and the competition is of a zero-sum nature, any option that is perceived to grant more legitimacy to the other

Diagram 4.1 Process of Identity Development



side's beliefs or behavior will be seen as unacceptable. The affective nature of this process leads to potential responses to distance oneself from the enemy even if that response is potentially harmful to oneself. Those affective factors guide the process of finding acceptable alternatives.

We will use this model to analyze the identity development and behavior of each of these regimes. In each case, the model will be applied during different points in history to show how changes in domestic and international environmental factors changed the response of the regime. The application of this model gives us a more systematic way to analyze behavior by explaining the process of comparison and the choices available to the regime in the context of legitimacy competition.

It will be necessary in each case to provide a rather detailed history of the development of the system and then to look at that development in the context of changes in the environment in which the systems existed. We will trace the development of democracy in Taiwan by looking at the relationship between the regime and the people of Taiwan, the efforts of the opposition movement, and the behavior of the elite over time. In the North Korean case we will trace the development of the Juche ideology by looking at Kim Il Sung's efforts to establish his control, the regime's effort outperform South Korea in economic development, and finally the efforts of the regime to establish ideological superiority. The study shows that the changes in the environment altered the terms of the competition and the cognitive alternatives available to the regimes. Based on the model presented, the study will show that the decision making process of the elite in these two systems was strongly guided by their comparisons with their enemy and their efforts to achieve or maintain relative superiority to the regime across the divide.

CHAPTER V

TAIWAN: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME

In the past year, the government of Taiwan has all but officially declared independence. In a July 9th interview with *Deutche Welle* Radio, the President of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui answered a question about Taiwan independence by stating, "in 1991, amendments to the Constitution designated cross-strait relations as a special *state-to-state* relationship. Consequently, there is no need to declare independence" (Lee, 1999:1). This language and behavior is perplexing to some observers. And perhaps it should be. First, any language indicating a desire for independence inspires the wrath of the PRC and increases the potential for conflict between the two sides of the divide. Second, the movement toward de facto independence also appears to rob the Kuomintang regime of what had been for decades its primary policy goal and basis of legitimacy: reunification with the Mainland. Finally, the language is simply confusing. The question of how one can claim to be a sovereign state and not be independent leaves many people bewildered.

On March 18, 2000, Taiwan took another interesting step in its political process by electing Chen Shui-bian of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party as the island's next President. The election of Chen initiates will usher in the first non-KMT government in 50 years. Chen and his party have long been advocates of Taiwan independence. Although Chen softened his pro-independence rhetoric during the campaign, and is unlikely to make any dramatic moves to destabilize Taiwan, his election

sent a strong signal about Taiwan's democratic development to China and to the rest of the world.

Taiwan has consistently exhibited other independent behavior such as conducting a full-scale campaign to gain separate admission into international organizations such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization. All the time that the government of Taiwan is pushing this seemingly independent agenda it is still claiming that it has no desire to declare independence and still maintains reunification as a primary policy goal. These statements and this chain of events make many observers wonder why Taiwan would provoke China in this manner. There is resulting confusion within and outside of Taiwan about the true policy objectives of the ruling government. In discussing Taiwan's seemingly unusual behavior, Christopher Hughes points to the statement from an article in *The Economist* which claimed that "if Taiwan were a person, it would be in the hands of a psychiatrist" (Hughes, 1997: 1). In reality, the more recent statements and actions coming from Taiwan only represent another step in a long series of maneuvers that moved Taiwan further from the Mainland toward a quasi-independent status.

For years following the KMT retreat to Taiwan the CCP and the KMT each promoted reunification as the ultimate goal of their governments and each claimed to be the sole legitimate government of all of China. The mutual claim led to a protracted zero-sum legitimacy competition between the two sides in which each tried to prove its superiority. Yet over the years it has become apparent that rather than progressing toward unification, the two sides have moved further apart. This dissertation argues that it is that very competition to control the terms of the unification that influenced the

direction and timing of Taiwan's political development and led the two sides further apart from one another.

This study puts forth the argument that the competition between the two sides for comparative legitimacy has had a repelling effect. In its desire to distinguish itself from the regime on the Mainland, the KMT regime has moved in a direction that eliminated their claim to be the only legitimate government of China and has created a separate, sovereign system on Taiwan. This transformation took the form of democratization and the repeal of the provisions of the constitution that denied the CCP's claim to legitimacy on the Mainland. Taiwan changed the terms of the game from zero-sum to positive-sum. But the game is not over; Taiwan simply tried to change the rules.

While the dramatic political reforms on Taiwan are often explained as the outcome of economic modernization, popular opposition, and enlightened leadership, none of those explanations appears to tell the entire story of the moves made by the regime. This study will apply the model developed in Chapter Four to the case in an effort to provide a more comprehensive explanation of these events. In the process of identity development, one nation will compare itself to another to define itself. If a nation is comparatively stronger, it will either try to maintain or expand that relative strength. If the nation sees itself as comparatively weaker, it will seek cognitive alternatives to improve its position. It is argued that the regime in Taiwan, seeing itself lose its edge in the legitimacy competition, sought and found the cognitive alternative of democratization to improve its position. The actions of the regime can be perceived as an effort to distance itself from the CCP and to create a unique and superior political identity as compared to the CCP. For that reason, the study will place emphasis on the

significance of comparative legitimacy and identity development in looking at the progression of politics on the island.

This study will trace the process of development and decision making in Taiwan by looking at the changes in the relationship between the Kuomintang Government and the people of Taiwan, the influence of opposition forces in Taiwan, and the reform process of the 1980s and 1990s. These events and relationships are highlighted to show that domestic forces alone can not explain the specific timing and direction of the reform process.

While the Nationalist government has advocated democracy under the *Three Principles of the People* since its founding in 1911, it did not actually implement democratic reforms until very recently under the leadership of Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui. For most of the Nationalist government's existence both in the Mainland and after it moved to Taiwan, it was an extremely authoritarian, quasi-Leninist regime (Cheng, 1989; Tien, 1993). After the government lost the Civil War to the Communists and retreated to Taiwan, the primary objective of the regime was consolidation and strengthening on the "bastion of national revival" with the goal of eventually regaining control of the Mainland. This objective was made evident in both rhetoric and behavior. Reminders that the war with the communists was not over and eventually the KMT would again rule all of China existed throughout the society.[1] Thus, what is perhaps most puzzling about Taiwan's transition is that the Taiwanization and democratization on the

[1] I first went to Taiwan in 1982 to study Chinese. I was often amazed during my year there by the constant references to the fact that the Civil War was not over. The KMT had simply "strategically relocated" to Taiwan, the "bastion of national recovery," to regroup for its eventual continuation of, and of course victory in, the conflict. This message was seen on television, in the movies, and in the various monuments and museums around the island. In addition, it was a part of the curriculum in classrooms from elementary school through university. None of the people I knew at the time believed this message but it was still a major component of the regime's political rhetoric and claim to legitimacy.

island represented not only political liberalization but also a fundamental alteration of the status of Taiwan *vis-à-vis* the PRC and the essential elimination of KMT regime's initial claim to legitimacy. The transition also served to increase tensions between the PRC and Taiwan at a time when conditions for significantly improved relations seemed most ripe.

For years the KMT behaved in a way that indicated that they expected the imminent collapse of the Communist government in China. For that reason, all they had to do was maintain the status quo and wait for the PRC to collapse so that they could move back in. As stated by Lucian Pye:

> The first view, held almost solely by high KMT officials, is that change is taking place in Deng Xiaoping's China, and eventually the leadership there will find that communism doesn't work and therefore all Chinese can be reunified in the spirit of the benign ideology that the KMT has kept alive for so long. According to this view, all that Taipei needs to do is keep its defenses modernized and its economy humming, and gradually there will be a peaceful reconciliation (Pye, 1986: 625).

During the first forty years of its rule of Taiwan the regime maintained a state of national emergency: *chieh-yen*, or martial law. The regime explained that martial law and authoritarian tactics were necessary because a state of war existed with China and because numerous threats to stability and security existed on the island and from the PRC. Due to its precarious situation in relation to China and because of its often-conflictual relations with the Taiwanese people, the Nationalist regime focused on economic development and stability as a means of establishing legitimacy. Over the years, though, the government in Taiwan has changed, following a gradual path toward democratization.

The majority of studies of Taiwan's democratization point to the importance of the domestic socio-economic and political factors to explain the possible reasons for the timing and direction of political reform. Yet, one factor that might be given more serious

attention is the impact that the reforms in China had on Taiwan. That is, rather than witnessing the decay of the Communist regime in China, the Taiwanese started to witness its economic rejuvenation and minor political and social liberalization. This robbed the KMT of its stated justification for maintaining the authoritarian status quo and forced them to find alternative means with which they could claim superiority to the Mainland regime. For that reason, it is especially important to look back in history to understand some of the key issues and events that created the domestic political and social environment in which change occurred. This chapter will trace the history of political activity in Taiwan, including the activities of the opposition movement and the regime's response to the opposition. Domestically, we will focus on the events surrounding the opposition movement and three major opposition events, the February 28th Incident of 1947, the Chung-li incident of 1977, and the Kaohsiung Incident of 1979. In addition we will look at some of the government policies implemented to maintain strong authoritarian rule. We will see that a pattern emerges in which the opposition makes a series of efforts to push for reform only to eventually be crushed by the regime. It is clear throughout the process that the regime has both the capability and willingness to use its power to control any and all movements for change. This pattern was suddenly and somewhat unexpectedly broken in 1986 when Chiang Ching-kuo not only allowed for the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party but also announced that he was considering the termination of martial law.

The sudden shift in KMT policy begs the question of why Chiang chose this time to allow for change. While the existing explanations for this series of decisions point to a number of valid factors that were necessary for change, none of them can adequately

show that the factors were sufficient in leading to reform. One factor that is often alluded to but not given careful analytical attention, is the impact of division and the legitimacy competition between the regime on Taiwan and the regime in the PRC. This study points to the importance of division and legitimacy competition with the PRC as a factor that strongly influenced the direction and timing of reform and which will likely continue to influence change in the future. To better explain this, the study also looks at the very significant changes in China and the international environment that had a profound impact on Taiwan.

5.1 The Kuomintang on Taiwan: The Early Years

While Taiwan has a long and fascinating history, the very recent political past of Taiwan really starts with the end of World War II and the termination of fifty years of Japanese control of the island. When the war ended, according to the agreement reached in the Cairo Declaration, control of Taiwan was given to the Nationalist government of China, a decision that was met by mixed emotions among the people of Taiwan. The people of Taiwan were obviously not involved in that decision-making process and understandably had some concerns about the decision. This ambivalence is still evident in the language in Taiwan: while some people refer to this event as "the return" (*so hwei*) others refer to it as the "take over" (*jie guan* or *jie shou*). This study does not intend to delve into the legal or political implications of this issue. Yet, it is important to recognize that this decision set the stage for a number of significant events that would shape the political and economic development of Taiwan and the relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China.

Things did not start well for the KMT on Taiwan. The Mainlanders who came in the 1940s were in the minority, comprising only approximately thirteen percent of the population. While the Taiwanese majority was generally content to have the Chinese replace the Japanese, they did not automatically or immediately accept the KMT regime their legitimate government. Almost immediately, the problems the regime was experiencing on the Mainland influenced its ability to rule Taiwan efficiently and effectively. In addition, the fifty-year occupation of Taiwan by the Japanese had created some fundamental divisions and differences between the people of Taiwan and the people of the Mainland. While Japanese rule of the island had not been pleasant for the people of Taiwan, the Japanese had provided Taiwan with certain benefits. The Japanese colonial government built a solid economic infrastructure, provided education to a great many Taiwanese, and created a sense of order and stability on the island. For whatever hardships the Taiwanese people had to endure at the hands of the Japanese colonists, toward the end of Japanese rule the island of Taiwan was far more stable and economically developed than the Mainland. As Phillips states,

> Although the Mainland, sometimes called the motherland (*tsu-kuo*), was the source of most of the island's population, the legacy of Japanese rule assured that integration was marked by ambiguity, then conflict. Furthermore, both Taiwan and Mainland China had changed so much between 1895 and 1945 – politically, socially, and economically – that the retrocession was less the restoration of historical ties than the attempt to forge and entirely new relationship (1999:276).

During the initial years of KMT rule following the end of World War II the people of Taiwan were suffering from a number of social and economic problems including high unemployment and rapid inflation. Taiwan's currency was tied to the Mainland currency, causing problems with monetary and fiscal control. Unemployment was caused by a lack of adequate economic planning combined with the return to the

island of tens of thousands of people who had been serving the Japanese as either soldiers or laborers. There were severe shortages of basic necessities like food and housing, and the state monopolies were unable to meet the demand for items such as tobacco, alcohol, salt and matches. Public health and sanitation declined with outbreaks of cholera, malaria, leprosy, and bubonic plague occurring around the island (Rubenstein, 1999).

At the same time, the Nationalist government was struggling to maintain territorial, political, and economic control of the Mainland. The conflict with the Chinese Communist Party was consuming the Nationalist's resources and attention, leaving little for Taiwan. In addition, the KMT probably cared very little about the condition of Taiwan. Taiwan for the KMT was seen as an outer province that was at best useful as a base of operations in the war against the Communists. It was never projected to be the permanent home of the government. Therefore, during the first few years following the war, the KMT, unwilling to devote adequate resources to improve Taiwan's situation, primarily extracted resources and people from Taiwan to support its efforts on the Mainland. It was not until it became apparent that Taiwan was going to become the more permanent home of the KMT and its base of operations in the struggle against the CCP that it was given more attention.

The economic and social problems in Taiwan, combined with the KMT's apparent lack of concern, caused increasing tensions between the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders. While some people initially greeted Taiwan's retrocession to China with enthusiasm, attitudes quickly began to change. The perception emerged that there was really no difference between the Japanese colonial government and the nationalist government. In fact, there was perhaps a more positive perception of the Japanese. For

while both governments were seen as exploitative, the Japanese were perceived as more efficient, competent, honest, and predictable than the new government. In short, while the Japanese ruled with cruelty and efficiency, the KMT ruled with cruelty and inefficiency.

The conflicts between the Taiwanese and the newly arrived Nationalist government came to a head in 1947 with what came to be known as the February 28 Incident (*er-er-ba*). On February 27th, six officers of the monopoly bureau went to arrest a woman selling untaxed cigarettes illegally in Taipei. One of the officers struck the woman with the butt of his gun. A crowd gathered, and violence broke out. One of the officers fired a shot into the crowd, killing a bystander. The incident sparked an island-wide rebellion with Taiwanese and government forces struggling for control of important political, economic and communications facilities (For a more detailed discussion of this incident see, Kerr, 1965; Lai, Myers and Wei, 1991; and Phillips; 1999: 275-219). The nationalists quickly lost control and the Taiwanese elite, very few of whom had participated in the initial protests, were surprised to find themselves in a position to negotiate with the government.

The Governor of Taiwan, Chen Yi, publicly indicated a willingness to listen to the demands of the Taiwanese opposition leaders. He initiated the formation of a committee of Mainlanders and Taiwanese elite, called the "February 28 Incident Settlement Committee" to discuss the most pressing issues and present a list of suggested policy responses. In hindsight, Chen's statements of willingness to work with the Taiwanese were clearly insincere. Some people argue that the committees were set up as nothing

more than a guise to bring the Taiwanese opposition out into the open so that they could be eliminated. A 1947 article that appeared in *The Nation* discusses this series of events:

> With calculated trickery Chen Yi continued his efforts to appease the people while he waited for military reinforcements. On March 2, over the radio, he expressed his love for the Taiwanese, and promised that no one would be prosecuted for rioting, that the families of the dead would be compensated, and that he would appoint a committee to settle the incident. This group composed of Mainlanders and representative Taiwanese, most of whom have since been shot, was to be known as the "Committee to Settle the February 28th Incident," and was to present to him by March 10th their suggestions for the reform of the administration" (*The Nation*, May 24, 1947).

This committee came up with a list of approximately 32 demands. Included in these demands were the following:

1. Taiwan be given provincial rather than colonial status
2. Provincial magistrates and city mayors should be elected before June
3. A larger proportion of Taiwanese should be given administrative, police, and judicial positions
4. All special police should be abolished and political arrests eliminated
5. Freedom of press, speech, and the right to strike
6. Managers of all public enterprises should be Taiwanese
7. Committees should be elected to supervise public enterprises and factories taken over from the Japanese
8. Trade and monopoly bureaus should be eliminated
9. Political and economic rights of the aborigines should be guaranteed
10. More Taiwanese appointments to the military
11. War Criminals should be released
12. The government should repay the Taiwanese for appropriated sugar and rice
13. Garrison headquarters must be abolished (*The Nation*, May 24, 1947).

Even some Nationalist leaders essentially condoned the suggested policy reforms from the Committee. The Chinese Defense Minister recommended several administrative reforms demanded by the Taiwanese opposition. The Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang voted in favor of Governor Chen's dismissal. As reported in Newsweek that year, Chen responded with force. "Governor Chen responded on March 24th by executing another 70 Formosans who had reportedly established a 'people's government'

in the southwestern town of Chiayi. Formosans in Shanghai protested bitterly, 'the government keeps Chen so it won't lose face by admitting its own maladministration. But every day it saves face hundreds of Formosans die'" (*Newsweek*, April 7, 1947).

On March 8th reinforcement troops arrived from the Mainland, landing in the northern port of Keelung and the southern port of Kaohsiung. The troops moved swiftly and violently to wipe out the Taiwanese uprising and to arrest or execute the leaders of the movement. The troops moved through the major cities and then into the small villages to rout out any dissidents in hiding. Reporters from major publications like the *New York Times* and *Newsweek* stationed in Taiwan and China at the time sent back gruesome reports of indiscriminate killings and arrests. There were reports of troops riding through the streets and gunning down anyone in sight, as well as arrests and executions of suspected leaders of the opposition. Corpses were seen floating in the rivers and harbors, often bound with very fine wire. Estimates of the number of Taiwanese killed range from 5,000 to closer to 100,000, with a commonly accepted estimate being around 10,000. An estimated 30,000 were wounded. Thousands more were imprisoned. It was clear that the KMT was making a concerted, and ultimately effective, effort to wipe out the leadership of the Taiwanese opposition. For that reason they targeted the political and intellectual elite.

While the number of people killed, wounded or imprisoned in that episode is certainly significant, even more significant is the impact the incident had on the future relations between the Taiwanese and Mainlanders. Chen had taken an uprising against inefficient government and transformed it into a conflict over the Kuomintang presence on the island. The Taiwanese who were initially pleased with the removal of the

Japanese and the arrival of the Nationalists, were thrust into the position of treating the KMT as an unwelcome colonial power. At that point, the New York Times reported that some Taiwanese began to seek assistance from abroad. As reported in March of 1947, "Formosans are reported to be seeking United Nations' action on their case. Some have approached foreign consulates to ask that Formosa be put under the jurisdiction of Allied Supreme Command or be made an American Protectorate. Formosan hostility to the Mainland Chinese has deepened" (*New York Times*, March 27, 1947).

From that point forward the Mainland government was resented by the Taiwanese and became increasingly forceful and repressive. A ten-year period known as the White Terror followed during which the Nationalists continued their efforts to effectively eliminate the Taiwanese elite. The February 28th Incident also continued to create animosity between the Mainlanders and the Taiwanese because not only did the Nationalists refuse to admit any culpability for the events; they refused to admit that anything happened at all. Any discussion of the events of 1947 was strongly prohibited until the 1990s.

At the same time that the government was tightening its control over Taiwan, conditions on the island continued to worsen due to the collapse of the nationalist government and military on the Mainland. Refugees were starting to flock to Taiwan, exacerbating the tensions between Taiwanese and Mainlanders. To make matters worse, the Taiwanese perceived that Taiwan was not only becoming the home for too many refugees but that they were receiving the worst of the lot. It was argued that the wealthiest and most influential refugees went to the United States, the second wealthiest to Hong Kong, and the remnants to Taiwan. Crime, unemployment, and food and

housing shortages increased dramatically. Inflation continued to be a problem as Mainlanders flooded the island with useless currency.

By the end of 1948, it became clear that the island would become the last bastion of survival for the nationalist government. The government started to reduce the number of resources being sent from Taiwan to the Mainland to support the war effort. As the war came to an end and the Communists established the PRC on the Mainland in 1949, the Nationalist rhetoric on Taiwan started to shift toward local self-government and economic reconstruction of the island. Yet in the years following, it was apparent that the Nationalist government was much more interested in economic development than political reform. In fact, political repression in the name of domestic tranquility was promoted as an essential ingredient of Taiwan's economic development. While the economic development of the island was so spectacular that it was often referred to as the Taiwan miracle, the political system stayed much the same all the way into the 1980s.

While the events of 1947 exhibited a strong Taiwanese desire for at a minimum greater input into the system and at a maximum democratic self-rule, such desires were quite effectively quelled for decades. Not only did the *2-28* incident and the ten years of the *White Terror* physically eliminate much of the Taiwanese opposition; it also caused the remaining opposition to be much more conservative and cautious in their demands. The following four decades in Taiwan witnessed a continuous cycle of movements for reform, usually centered around political opinion magazines. These publications and the movements surrounding them were often tolerated to a point only to be strongly and sometimes violently crushed when the KMT regime became concerned that they were becoming too powerful or too radical. While small intellectual movements did exist and

some clashes occurred between the government and the opposition, the next major uprising did not occur until over thirty years later with the Chung-li Incident of 1977, and then the Kaohsiung Incident of 1979.

5.2 The Temporary Provisions and Marital Law

The primary legal instrument used in the suppression of dissent or opposition in Taiwan were the *Temporary Provisions in Effect during the National Period for Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion*. The original constitution of the Republic of China was very democratic in its structure. It contained language that guaranteed the protection of human rights and civil liberties and provided for a division of powers between several branches of government. Yet the democratic nature of the constitution and the protections guaranteed therein were thrown out the window with the adoption of the *Temporary Provisions* in 1948. Adopted by the National Assembly on April 18, 1948 and promulgated by the National Government on May 10, 1948, these Amendments gave the Kuomintang and the president almost unlimited power and set the table for Chiang to declare martial law. The provisional amendments made any challenges to the party illegal. In short, the party controlled all political activity. Some relevant sections of the *Temporary Provisions* read as follow:

> In accordance with the procedure prescribed in Paragraph 1 of Article 174 of the Constitution, the following Temporary Provisions to be effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion are hereby enacted:
> 1) The President during the Period of Communist Rebellion may, by resolution of the Executive Yuan Council, take emergency measures to avert an imminent danger to the security of the State or of the people to cope with any serious financial or economic crisis, without being subject to the procedural restrictions prescribed in Article 39 or Article 43 of the Constitution.

2) During the Period of Communist Rebellion, the President and the Vice President may be re-elected without being subject to the two-term restriction prescribed in Article 47 of the Constitution.
3) During the Period of Communist Rebellion, the President is authorized to establish, in accordance with the constitutional system, an organ for making major policy decisions concerned with national mobilization and suppression of the Communist rebellion and for assuming administrative control in war zones.
4) To meet the requirements of national mobilization and the suppression of Communist rebellion, the president may make adjustments in the administrative and personnel organs of the Central government as well as their organizations.
5) Representatives to the first elective offices at the Central Government level were elected by popular vote throughout the nation. These representatives, as well as those representatives, who were elected later to fill vacancies or to provide additional representation, therefore shall continue to carry out their function in accordance with law. As soon as the Chinese Mainland is recovered, elections shall be held one by one as areas are recovered.
6) The termination of the Period of Communist Rebellion shall be declared by the President.
7) Amendment or abrogation of the Temporary Provisions shall be resolved by the national assembly (*ROC Yearbook*, 1989: 707-708).

As can be seen above, the Temporary provisions not only granted the President nearly unlimited authority but also effectively suspended elections for the period of the rebellion preventing the ability of people in Taiwan from replacing the legislature. These were the principle mechanisms used in limiting political discourse and dissent in Taiwan for almost 40 years.

In part because of the threat imposed by the PRC to attempt to take Taiwan by force, and in part due to internal dissent on Taiwan, martial law was declared on May 20, 1949. During the period of martial law in Taiwan civilians were subject to military trial if they committed any of four types of crimes: 1) sedition, 2) espionage, 3) theft, or 4) unauthorized sale or purchase of military equipment and supplies, or theft or damage of public communication equipment or facilities. In 1976 the government expanded the list of crimes to include crimes such as homicide, kidnapping, and robbery. While the crimes under the jurisdiction of the military courts sound fairly limited, in reality the definition

of the crimes was left fairly broad. For that reason, government could and did use and apply the crimes classified under martial law to limit even the most peaceful opposition. Individuals and organizations that pushed for even limited reforms to the system could be accused of sedition if they crossed the KMT. This was in evidence with the government's continuing struggle against the opposition magazines.

The imposition of martial law also prohibited the formation of new political parties in Taiwan. This ran completely contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution that guaranteed people the right to assembly and association. Article 23 of the Constitution which read, "The freedom and rights enumerated in the above articles shall not be restricted by law except by such as may be necessary to prevent infringement upon the freedom of other persons, to avert and imminent crisis, to maintain social order, or to advance the public welfare," was used to justify the restriction of parties (ROC Yearbook, 1989: 699-707).

Under the *Temporary Provisions* and martial law two agencies have had a significant impact on the governance of Taiwan. First, the National Security Council, chaired by the President, had the authority to order the implementation of laws. In addition, the Central Personnel Administration of the Executive Yuan, established by the President in accordance with the Temporary Provisions, took over many of the roles and responsibilities of the Ministry of Personnel of the Examination Yuan (Chiu, 1993: 25). These agencies gave the President the authority to control most major policy decisions and to strongly control the selection of personnel for government positions, thereby giving him the ability to fill his government with loyal followers.

At the same time, a number of secret police organizations were put into place to enforce the KMT's rule and to control political movements in Taiwan. The organization most active in the suppression of popular movements was the Taiwan Garrison Command. The work of the Garrison Command was heavy-handed and efficient. Ironically, the individual in charge of the security apparatus in Taiwan and responsible for its efficiency in Taiwan was the same person who later stripped it of power, Chiang Ching-kuo.

In addition to exercising strict control over political discourse, efforts were made to rid the island of any legacy of Japanese rule and of Taiwanese culture and language. In a process Wilson referred to as *Learning to Be Chinese* the government embarked on a massive socialization program (Wilson, 1970). Not only did the government impose Mandarin as the official language and make Taiwanese illegal, but it also attempted to inculcate the people of Taiwan with the teaching and symbols of the Mainland, and more specifically the nationalist government. Students were taught only the history of the Mainland; local leaders and heroes were eliminated from teachings and replaced with those from the Mainland. Pictures and statues of the leaders of the KMT were placed all over the island. Students were forced to learn the Nationalist Anthem (*The Three Principles of the People* or *San Min Ju I*), and to pledge allegiance to the Nationalist Flag each day.

The symbols and ideology of the KMT were even strongly present in the movie theaters. Before the showing of any film, the national anthem was played over the backdrop of Nationalist Soldiers marching and fighter jets flying. The song was concluded with the image of the map of Taiwan covered by a Nationalist flag that

emanated rays of light over the Mainland. This was all part of a KMT program to insure the primacy of reunification as a national policy goal. The more "Chinese" the people felt, the more they were likely to work toward reunification. While the socialization efforts of the KMT were perceived as somewhat successful, it is apparent that the success was somewhat superficial.

5.3 The Formless Enemy: Political Opposition in Taiwan

As mentioned above, the early acts of repression by the KMT were successful in keeping radical movements for change relatively quiet for a number of years. This is not to say that no voices of opposition existed. The most visible forms of protest against or pressures for reform of the system came in the form of intellectual publications that tended to be both the mouthpieces and organizational centers for members of the opposition. As mentioned above, the KMT's tolerance for these voices seemed to fluctuate. A publication would appear and be printed and disseminated until, at some point the government decided it was no longer tolerable, sometimes after one issue, sometimes after several years. Due to the nature of the government control of publications, new journals or magazines were often mere reincarnations of old ones, and many of the same people were associated with the publication of a variety of scholarly journals and magazines. Often groups would register a number of publication names at the same time. Once one was shut down, the group would immediately start publishing its materials in a publication of a different name. This ethereal quality of the publications led government censors to refer to opposition publications as "the formless enemy" (Berman, 1992: 187).

But clearly pressures for change continued to exist, and what emerged was a complex dance between the opposition and the KMT. The political opinion magazines and journals clearly took on the role of a political organization or political party and were the center of opposition activities. The opposition used the publications to pressure for reform, organize meetings, propose policy and criticize specific individuals or policies. Publications would be allowed to exist for some greater or lesser period of time depending on their content. Then suddenly, in what appeared to be a rather arbitrary fashion, the KMT would clamp down on the opposition, arresting leaders and shutting down publications.

The first and perhaps the most famous opposition publication was *Free China*. One of the major moves on the part of the government versus any liberal opposition was the elimination of *Free China*. The magazine was initially published by members of the KMT in Shanghai as a voice of opposition to the communists. After they started to grow roots in Taiwan the writers and publishers started to shift their focus from Anti-Communism to domestic affairs. *Free China* became more of a mouthpiece of criticism of the government on Taiwan. As early as 1956 *Free China* started to initiate calls for more local autonomy in Taiwan. Specifically, the publishers of the magazine called for greater scope of elections, the adoption of a cabinet system to limit the power of the president, and a change in the role of the military from a tool of the KMT to a true force for national defense.

Some of the rhetoric coming from *Free China* was quite strong. For example, the publication started to question the very legitimacy of the KMT and claim that the party acted only to preserve its power. In February 1958 an editorial stated, "we have tolerated

too much for the unity of the war against to the Communists. This in turn has led to an embrace of one-party politics and hampers the path toward progress" (Berman, 1992: 175). An even stronger statement came from the publisher of *Free China*, Lei Chen, in which he called for a strict separation of party and state. He argued that if the party refused to do so and insisted on maintaining the status quo, "then there is no hope at present for democratic government in China. In that case, the only recourse is to wait for the next revolution! Let more blood flow!" (Berman, 1992: 175).

The KMT started to wage a subtle war against *Free China*. Rather than simply shut *Free China* down, the government made it difficult for the publication to advertise, and find printers. The real and final clash between *Free China* and the KMT came when the leaders of the magazine protested the extension of Chiang Kai-shek's presidency to a third term. Under the Nationalist constitution the president is limited to two terms in office. Yet the National Assembly decided that due to the national state of emergency a third term for Chiang would be best for national interests. After this, Lei Chen pushed for the formation of an opposition party, The Chinese Democratic Party. Finally the Garrison Command could take no more and they arrested Lei for sheltering an employee who was suspected of being a communist spy. *Free China* was shut down and Lei was sentenced to 10 years in prison and once released was never again active in publishing (Berman, 1992).

After *Free China* was shut down some of *The Intellectuals* involved in the publication of that magazine became either directly or indirectly involved in the publication of other opinion magazines. One such publication was *Apollo*, published from 1957 until 1965. While *Apollo* officially focused on cultural issues it often used

culture as a metaphor for politics and it had connections to some of the previous writers from *Free China*. Li Ao, one of the contributors to the publication was a student of Yin Hai-kuang, a professor at National Taiwan University and a former contributor to *Free China*. Li was eventually imprisoned for slander and the publication attacked from many angles, including attempts to associate it with the CIA and pro-Mainland US academics, most notably John K. Fairbank.

The next publication to emerge as a voice for reform was *The Intellectual*. First published in 1968, *The Intellectual* was very open in its discussion of social and political issues and in demanding reforms. *The Intellectual* brought together a very diverse group of individuals ranging from university professors and students, Taiwanese and Mainlanders, businessmen and literary figures. The publication pressed for funding for social welfare, assistance to farmers, and the development of an opposition party and greater political institutionalization.

Most importantly, *The Intellectual* achieved a higher level of development of the concept of the journal serving as the center of political activity. In 1971 *The Intellectual* held several public debates on topics such as reelection all national representatives. Also of significance, *The Intellectual* was actively tied to a movement to claim the *Tiao-yu-tai* Island chain, as part of the sovereign territory of the Republic of China. The political activities of *The Intellectual*, including the publication of the reform program led to a an increasing amount of agitation and activities which started to exert more pressure on the party and government. The mainstream newspapers even started to follow suit, publishing editorials, although not as strongly worded, calling for consideration of political change.

Finally, *The Intellectual* became too vocal and too radical for the KMT and the party started to clamp down on the publication. As stated by Berman:

> KMT conservatives ultimately succeeded in dismantling *The Intellectual* before it solidified a mass following. They absorbed those leading figures who allowed themselves to be co-opted into the KMT power structure. Those who proved recalcitrant were dealt with in other ways, such as the 14 faculty members of National Taiwan University's department of philosophy who in 1974 were all fired in one fell swoop. The final result was a diffusing of the opposition organization to the point that it was no longer effective (Berman, 1992: 182).

It took several years for the opposition to regroup and form another publication that once again started to serve as the center of opposition activities. In 1975 a vocal grassroots politician Kang Ning-hsiang and some of his colleagues, Chang Chun-hung and Huang Hsin-cheih published the first issue of *Taiwan Political Review*. *Taiwan Political Review* was not subtle and attacked the government's continuation of martial law, the KMT's refusal to hold nation elections, favoritism toward children of Mainlanders over Taiwanese, and censorship and control of the media. The *Taiwan Political Review* attacked the very basis of the KMT's claim to legitimacy by essentially ridiculing the regime's position that it was the sole legitimate government of all of China and that the Mainland would eventually be recovered.

Given the fact that over 60% of its content were in the form of direct criticism of the government, it is not surprising that *Taiwan Political Review* did not survive for very long. After only five issues the government closed the journal accusing it of containing ideas sympathetic to the Mainland and of encouraging crime and disorder (Berman, 1992). This cycle of publication and punishment exposed two facts about Taiwan's politics at the time. First, the opposition would not be easily discouraged from voicing its opinion and pushing for change. Second, the KMT had both the willingness and the

capability to clamp down on any political movement it found too extreme or troublesome. It became ever clearer that while the opposition was an essential ingredient in Taiwan's political reform, true reform would not occur until the leadership of the KMT decided that the time was right.

Over the next few years, the ongoing battle between the KMT and the opposition would begin to expose divisions within both camps. The KMT was divided between hardliners and moderate reformers while the opposition started to divide between more moderate and more radical elements. This all became more apparent during and after the local elections of 1977. The opposition was perhaps more united and organized during the elections of 1977 than ever before. This organization paid off. The opposition candidates won 35 percent of the seats in the Taiwan provincial assembly and 20 percent of the gubernatorial positions. Yet the 1977 elections had their downside as well.

In the town of Chung-li in Tao Yuan county, residents became extremely agitated over what they perceived to be inappropriate or illegal polling practices. A crowd gathered and a riot ensued, leading to a violent clash between supporters of the opposition and the police. The police station and some police vehicles were burned. But the impact of the election went far beyond the electoral outcome and the rioting. The 1977 elections also had the effect of exposing and exacerbating the divisions between the different factions within the opposition and the KMT. Segments of the opposition became increasingly frustrated with the slow pace of reform and believed that they could not bring about change through the existing institutional channels. For that reason they started to press for more radical actions. On the KMT side, the moderates who had been pushing for more inclusive political reform suffered a setback because of both the

electoral successes of the opposition and the anti-government rioting. The hardliners made the argument that the opposition was getting out of control and had to be contained before matters deteriorated. Once again, the regime returned the hard line and attempted to shut down the opposition (Cheng & Haggard, 1992: 12-13).

From 1977 on, the anti-KMT elite was more visibly divided. There were several factions, ranging from very moderate to very radical in their political orientation, that presented their varying views in a number of publications. In 1979, Kang Ning-hsiang initiated the publication of another journal, *The Eighties* while his fellow *Taiwan Political Review* alumnus Huang Hsin-chieh introduced a publication called *Formosa* (*Meilidao*). *Formosa* and the group involved with its publication, were more extreme in their criticism of the government, but more importantly were much more open about acting as a *de facto* political party. It had eleven "service offices" island-wide, which were set up as party offices. The group organized a number of meetings and protests around the island, but its efforts were brought to an abrupt end with the Kaohsiung Incident of December 1979 (Cheng and Hsu, 1996: 145; Cheng, 1989; Lu, 1992).

5.4 The Kaohsiung Incident

In 1979, as a continuation of its efforts to organize a number of political protests and rallies across the island, the Formosa faction organized a mass rally to coincide with International Human Rights Day. The rally turned into a violent confrontation between the people attending the rally and the police. Tear gas was fired into the crowd and violence erupted. How the confrontation started is a hotly debated issue to this day. Supporters of the opposition claim that "the police encircled the peaceful crown and

started using tear gas, and pro-government instigators incited violence" (Press Release on www.netaiwan.virtualave.net). The government claims that the police were simply stationed along the parade route to maintain order when the crowd turned on them without provocation. As would be expected, the numbers of people injured in the confrontation are also greatly disputed.

More significantly, the Kaohsiung Incident led to the eventual arrest of all of the key members of the Formosa faction. Many of the leaders were imprisoned and held incommunicado for several months. Reports of very harsh treatment started to filter out. Those arrested were tried in three different groups according to the charges against them. The eight most prominent leaders, "the Kaohsiung Eight," were tried in March and April of 1980, convicted and sentenced to terms ranging from 12 years to life. In April and May of 1980 the second group, the "Kaohsiung Thirty-Three" was tried and sentenced to terms ranging from 2 to 6 years. The third group tried was primarily affiliated with the Presbyterian Church of Taiwan. This group was charged with supporting the demonstration and hiding one of the leaders of the opposition. Dr. Kao Chun-ming, General-Secretary of the Church received a seven-year sentence. The rest of that group received lesser sentences. This event and the trials that followed served the purpose of gutting the opposition of much of its leadership and also had the effect of forcing the opposition to be more cautious in its efforts. Once again, the government exhibited its willingness and ability to shut down the opposition when it so desired.

On the domestic front, during the late 1970s to the early to mid 1980s, the people of Taiwan witnessed what appeared to be a rejuvenated effort on the part of the

government to suppress opposition. Evidence of this effort is displayed in table 3.1, which shows that a dramatic increase in press censorship occurred from 1980-1986.

Table 3.1 ***Press Censorship in Taiwan, 1980 - 1986***

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Total Number of Actions	16	19	27	33	211	275	302
Confiscation/Banning	9	13	23	26	176	260	295
Suspensions	7	6	4	7	35	15	7

(Source: Tien, 1992: 47)

While there was an increase in the number of publications produced at the time, that increase was not proportionate to the increase in censorship. A clear sign of the Garrison Command's increased vigilance was that even some of the more moderate journals were closed down. In addition, some observers claim that the KMT was pouring opposition journals into the market to create confusion and to dilute the market (Berman, 1992: 294; Tien, 1992: 46).

5.5 The 1970s: Diplomatic Setbacks

During the 1970s, changes in the international environment occurred simultaneously with dramatic changes in Taiwan's domestic situation. These changes put Taiwan in the position of having to make serious decisions relating to its identity and behavior (Gold, 1993: 169). Among these changes were the initiation of Nixon's "Ping-Pong" diplomacy and the eventual US recognition of the PRC in 1979. Within China, Deng Xiaoping signaled the early stages of the PRC's economic reforms in the Third Plenum reforms of the CCP Eleventh Central Committee in December of 1978.

Strategic concerns in the 1970s compelled the United States to direct its attention to the PRC as a strategic partner to help contain the Soviet Union. This led to the chain reaction of Taiwan's exclusion from International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and the loss of diplomatic recognition for Taiwan through the 1980s. Membership in IGOs is a strong sign of international legitimacy for all governments. Taiwan suffered one blow after another to its recognition in the international community starting with China's admission to the UN in 1971. In 1971, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758 by which the PRC was brought into the UN, taking China's seat as one of the Permanent Five Members of the organization. This opened a floodgate of China's replacement of Taiwan in IGOs. Table 3.2 shows the shift in memberships for China and Taiwan in both IGOs and International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs).

Table 3.2 ***Participation of Taiwan and China in International Organizations, 1960 – 1992***

Country	Type	1960	1966	1977	1984	1986	1987	1989	1992
Taiwan	IGO	22	39	10	6	6	6	6	7
	INGO	108	182	239	429	419	464	554	695
PRC	IGO	2	1	21	29	32	35	37	44
	INGO	30	58	71	355	403	504	677	865

(Source: Kim, 1992:160)

The competition for membership in took the form of a zero-sum game in which neither side would accept dual membership. Thus, as the world rushed toward ties with the PRC, Taiwan was being left behind.

This competition affected not only Taiwan's membership in IGOs but its bilateral relations as well. Once the United States started the process to shift its diplomatic

recognition the rest of the world followed suit. Starting in 1971, Taiwan was quickly losing diplomatic partners as shown in **Table 3.3**.

Table 3.3 Number of Countries Recognizing the PRC and The ROC, 1969 – 1992

Year Ending	PRC	ROC	Total UN Membership
1969	49	67	126
1970	54 (+5)	67	127
1971	69 (+15)	54 (-13)	132
1972	87 (+18)	41 (-13)	132
1973	89 (+2)	37 (-4)	135
1974	96 (+7)	31 (-6)	138
1975	105 (+9)	27 (-4)	144
1976	109 (+4)	26 (-1)	147
1977	111 (+2)	23 (-3)	149
1978	113 (+4)	22 (-1)	151
1979	117 (+4)	22	151
1980	121 (+4)	22	152
1981	121	23 (+1)	157
1982	122 (+1)	23	157
1983	125 (+3)	24 (+1)	158
1984	126 (+1)	25 (+1)	159
1985	127 (+1)	23 (-2)	159
1986	127	23	159
1987	127	23	159
1988	130 (+3)	22 (-1)	159
1989	132 (+2)	23 (+1)	159
1990	136 (+4)	28 (+5)	160
1991	140 (+4)	29 (+1)	167
1992	154 (+14)	29	179

(Source: Kim, 1992: 151)

The impacts of domestic events such as the Chung-li Incident, the Kaohsiung incident, the U.S. normalization of relations with the PRC, the loss of diplomatic recognition, and the Kaohsiung Incident all combined to cause the government great concern. During the early 1980s it appeared that conflicts with the domestic opposition

and the changes in the international environment forced the KMT to clamp down even tighter. This makes sense in the context of the KMT's claim that stability was required to protect Taiwan from Communism and to allow for continuing economic prosperity.

5.6 The Reasons for Authoritarianism: Economic Stability and Anti-Communism

Why did the regime on Taiwan, a regime built on the ideological foundation of The Three Principles of the People, refuse for so long to liberalize and democratize? How did the regime describe itself and justify its policies? Chiang Ching-kuo was often pressed to explain the political situation on Taiwan. The primary goal of most of Chiang's statements appears to be an effort to avoid specific discussion of Taiwan's situation by focusing more on comparisons with the Communists. Naturally he liked to emphasize the superiority of the Three Principles of the People and the economic success on Taiwan. Those comparisons, like much of Chiang's speech, were usually full of flowery language and were generally vague. In his Inaugural Address in May of 1978 Chiang exhibited this pattern when he stated:

> Our construction here in the bastion of national recovery has proved that only the Three Principles of the People can save the country and ensure our self-salvation. This also provides a sharp contrast with the performance of the Chinese Communist regime on the Mainland – a contrast between benevolence and violence, between happiness and agony, between brightness and darkness and between total right and total wrong (Chiang, 1984: 6).

The significance of the comparisons between Taiwan and China was frequently made clear in similar statements. Chiang made it clear that the regime in Taiwan was not the regime in China. Chiang would often compare Taiwan and China in terms of economic development, constitutionalism and preservation of Chinese culture: all areas in which

the KMT could claim superiority. For example, in an address to the 12th National Congress of the KMT in 1981 Chiang stated, "we can now confirm that all areas under Communist rule are unable to solve the problem of the people's livelihood and that Communism is declining and doomed (Chiang, 1984: 38). In the same speech he continued to say that the Communist world is doomed because Communism counters rationality and humanity, "but also because the Chinese Communist regime has totally betrayed Chinese culture and deviated from Chinese tradition" (Chiang, 1984: 39).

While the comparisons between China and Taiwan were common and fairly pointed, Chiang was not so specific in defining the positive identity of the regime in Taiwan. Yes, it was anti-Communist, but what was it for? Chiang was fairly vague in explaining the positive identity of Taiwan. When he did make statements about the success of the regime on Taiwan, Chiang tended to focus on the issues of constitutionalism and the economic development of the island.

When discussing the ideals of the government, his statements tended to indicate not so much a desire for democracy as for anti-Communism and national recovery. The words were used together and almost interchangeably. For example, in his Inaugural Address in 1978 Chiang stated, "we can say positively and clearly that the Republic of China will never change its determination to remain in the democratic camp and oppose communism" (Chiang, 1984: 6). Statements like these, in which Chiang would relate democracy and anti-Communism indicated the zero-sum nature of the competition with the Mainland. Because they were competing for complete control of the same territory, there is no room for both the KMT and the Communists. Therefore, democracy was essentially defined as anti-Communism and vice versa.

When discussing the practices of the government he tended to focus on the concept of constitutionalism instead of democracy. The government on Taiwan was a legitimate government because it was a constitutional government. This allowed him to deftly deflect any questions about the democratic nature of the government. In an Address to the Annual Constitution Day Meeting of the National Assembly in December of 1978, Chiang emphasized the *Constitution*:

> As a result of the Communist Rebellion, hundreds of millions of our Mainland compatriots are unable to enjoy the benefits of constitutional government. To the contrary, they are still suffering from the ravages of Communist Tyranny. They have no freedom and no human rights. They have lost their human dignity. As we here in Taiwan bask in the glory of constitutionalism, we never cease to think of the Mainland and our suffering compatriots there. It is our inescapable duty to recover the Mainland at the earliest possible moment so as to convey the whole of the Constitution to the Mainland and enable out compatriots there to join us en enjoying the fruits of constitutionalism (Chiang, 1984: 19).

In making this statement, Chiang naturally ignored the fact that the Chinese also had a constitution that was, in writing, as democratic as Taiwan's. Of course, in the Mainland, as in Taiwan, the democratic components of the constitution had never been implemented. In addition to constitutionalism, the other catch phrase for Taiwan's situation was stability. Taiwan was stable, while the Communist system was in turmoil. Stability was necessary for economic development to strengthen Taiwan and to protect Taiwan against the Communist threat. Only through stability could Taiwan survive. Chiang exhibited such language in his address to the Fifth Journalists Conference in November of 1978 when he stated that Taiwan must "seek the continued development and growth of our national economy under stable conditions (Chiang, 1985: 13).

When Chiang was forced to discuss the absence of true democracy and Taiwan's questionable human rights record, he usually explained that the government's policies

were necessary because of the Communist threat. According to the regime, the threat was ever present. As Chiang stated in a 1981 interview with a reporter from the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, "we are continuously stalked by the enemy" (Chiang, 1984: 208). Because of the presence of the Communists and their desire to conquer Taiwan, the regime was constantly confronted by threats from home and abroad. In his *Address to the Fifth Journalists Conference* he stated:

> First, at this time of ominous change in the world – with the Chinese Communists doing everything the possibly can to destroy us – everyone should regard national salvation as his own responsibility so that we can overcome all adverse tides. I am convinced that under the conditions of today no one should take advantage of the national crisis and engage in illicit activities for private gain in total disregard of the national interest as a whole. We should support the government's anti-Communist policy all the way and fortify the nation's position and power (Chiang, 1984: 12).

Chiang stuck to this theme in an address to the Annual Constitution Day Meeting of the National Assembly in December of 1983. In this address Chiang once again referred to the legitimacy of the government based on constitutionalism and the regime's inability to enact further reform due to the Communist threat. He stated:

> The *Constitution of the Republic of China* is a constitution that is just and honorable and proclaims that the world is for all. It is also a multi-party democratic constitution for all the people. If every one of us safeguards the Constitution, the Constitution will be our legitimacy. With this confidence, I think it is not suitable to consider the possibility of revising the *Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion* to expand the scope of the election of members of the Legislative Yuan, Control Yuan, and National Assembly. I also think that we must recognize that this is a period of national emergency and the government system under the present Constitution should not be changed (Chiang, 1984: 56).

While shifts in diplomatic recognition were difficult to swallow for Taiwan, they alone were not enough to compel the regime to seek change. Taiwan was still clearly outperforming the regime in terms of stability and economic progress. Taiwan was still

able to trumpet the claim of the superiority of its capitalist economic system, and to point out that its political policies had propelled the nation into a strong position in the international economy. Taiwan could continue to maintain a preeminent place on the world stage due to its economic strength. Taiwan's economic superiority and anti-Communist stance gave the regime some hope that the United States and the rest of the world would grant it some protection.

It was clear that although domestic pressures for reform were present in Taiwan, and international pressure was increasing, the Nationalist government concluded that the best way to promote its comparative legitimacy versus the PRC was to continue to enforce stability and promote economic development. As long as Taiwan was progressing economically and remained a staunch member of the anti-Communist camp it maintained comparative superiority to the PRC in these terms. Taiwan was outperforming the PRC in a number of areas including economic growth and political stability. While the regime had lost ground in terms of diplomatic recognition it was able to turn that into a claim that its loss of recognition confirmed its status as staunchly anti-Communist because it stood alone in refusing to buckle to Communist threats and tricks.

On the practical side, the regime responded to the loss of diplomatic recognition by switching its efforts to developing substantive relations by using its economic power to establish ties with other nations. In this way, the regime was able to soften the blow of losing official diplomatic recognition. While a number of nations had shifted their recognition to China, domestic political and economic difficulties in China still made those relationships somewhat tenuous. Taiwan could point to its stability and economic performance even when discussing diplomatic recognition. In that context, it is not

surprising that given the cognitive alternatives available to the KMT, it chose to maintain the status quo in its domestic politics to preserve its relative superiority. To address the problem of diplomatic isolation, the regime responded with creativity by redefining the rules of recognition by pursuing substantive relations. It is clear that direct confrontation was not working so they changed the rules, emphasized their economic superiority to the Mainland and went for non-diplomatic recognition. It is clear that due to the affect-laden nature of the division, Taiwan could not accept absorption through reunification. Nor could it at that time risk its claim to legitimacy through partial absorption by recognizing the legitimacy of the CCP. For that reason, it could not easily pursue membership in IGOs. This process is represented in **Diagram 5.1**.

5.7 The 1980s – The Reform Era

While Chiang continued to tow the line of the superiority of Taiwan's constitutionalism, the regime in the PRC continued to implement reform. Included in these reforms were the promulgation of the new constitution in 1982, the election of County level People's Congresses in the early 1980s, slight liberalization of the media, and finally, Deng's opening to discussion of more significant political reform in 1986. All of these events threatened to isolate Taiwan and weaken it in relation to China. As Rigger states, "Taiwan's isolation intensified in the 1980s, when Deng Xiaoping's reforms led many in the West to conclude that China's economic and political systems were converging with the industrialized nations" (Rigger, 1999: 149).

Taiwan paid great attention to the economic reform program implemented in the PRC. China had long suffered economic problems due to the failure of the Great Leap

Diagram 5.1 Taiwan Pre-Reform Process of Identity Development



Forward and the devastation of the Cultural Revolution. But when China crawled out of the rubble of the Cultural Revolution it started to attack its economic problems with a vengeance. By the early 1980s the reform program in China was creating extremely rapid growth. In the 5-year period from 1981 through 1985 China's GNP growth was estimated at approximately 10%, outpacing Taiwan's average growth rate of approximately 7% over the same period (Hickey, 1997: 100; Wang, 1995: 263). While a 7% growth rate is very impressive, it appeared less impressive to Taiwan when looked at in comparison to the PRC's.

More troubling to Taiwan was the fact that the rest of the world was taking notice of China's economic progress and countries were competing to get a chunk of the awe-inspiring China Market. As we will see below, it was fairly common for the KMT to dismiss the reforms in China as nothing more than a propaganda tool to lure the world away from Taiwan. The reforms were described as superficial and as destined to fail. It is not easy to determine whether the leaders in Taiwan truly believed that the reforms wouldn't last. Regardless of their opinions of China's reforms from an economic standpoint, the leaders could not deny that the rest of the world seemed to be impressed. Media around the world were devoting great attention to China's reforms and the potential of the vast China market. Nations were rushing to China's door to negotiate trade deals. Businesses were taking huge risks to be the first to get their foot in the door. Even businessmen from Taiwan did not want to miss out on opportunities in China.

Yet another troubling factor for the KMT leadership was the issue of security and its security relationship with the United States. The people of Taiwan still felt a bit betrayed by the US shift of diplomatic recognition to the PRC. Even after the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act, the people of Taiwan and were quite concerned about their

security. U.S. promises to continue to protect Taiwan were met with some level of skepticism. This skepticism was well justified if one looked realistically at the development of relations between the U.S. and the PRC. For example, while the United States continued to provide weapons to Taiwan, it was at the same time selling weapons to the PRC at an increasing rate as shown in **Table 3.4**.

Table 3.4 **U.S. Foreign Military Sales Agreements with Taiwan and the PRC, 1984-1989**
(Unit: U.S. $ in thousands)

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Taiwan	703.9	697.6	508.9	507.1	501.1	524.7
PRC	629	421	36,045	254,279	12,913	416

(Source, Hickey, 1992: pgs. 40, 63)

Taiwan could perceive the growth of U.S. sales agreements as a true indication of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan's security.

China's emergence in the international economic arena was troubling to Taiwan for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that it threatened the primary advantage Taiwan could boast over China: economic superiority. Taiwan found itself in a rather awkward position at that time because the leaders found it necessary to shift their emphasis of condemnation of the PRC from economic to political factors. This awkwardness was evident in a speech given by Chiang in June of 1980 in which he was attempting to condemn the political oppression on the Mainland. The speech was given just after the conviction of the Formosa faction leaders for their participation in the Kaohsiung Incident. Chiang was forced to provide a lengthy explanation of why these convictions were necessary and justified (Chiang, 1984: 87-90). This was particularly

uncomfortable since the regime had spent much of the previous year ranting and railing against the CCP's repression of those involved in the Democracy Wall movement.

Year after year, Chiang was increasingly confronted by the question of why Taiwan still had martial law. These questions asked in interviews became more pointed and seemingly more difficult for Chiang to respond to. Foreign journalists interviewing Chiang would frequently point to the reforms in China and then ask Chiang about the continuation of martial law in Taiwan. Chiang would typically respond by claiming that the reforms in China were not sincere and were merely a smokescreen to fool the free world. He constantly pointed to the impossibility of true reform in China. Martial law in Taiwan was primarily a device to protect the people of Taiwan from the Communists. In March of 1981, a Belgian journalist asked Chiang a question concerning martial law, political prisoners and the potential for democratization. Chiang gave the following response:

> If there had been no special security law to curb pro-Communist activities that run counter to the interests of the people, we would not have been able to assure a stable environment in recent decades nor to create an economic miracle and develop democratic politics. The government of the Republic of China respects freedom of the press and encourages lawful political activity. We have no so-called "political prisoners," only some seditionaries as defined by the criminal code (Chiang, 1984: 208).

In an interview with a *Newsweek* reporter in November of 1982, Chiang was forced to answer a question about human rights, the reporter asked him to respond to the criticisms of the regime's human rights record by the US State Department and Amnesty International. Chiang replied, "We do not like to refute the criticisms made by the people who are biased or who do not know all the facts. The government of the Republic of China has consistently striven to safeguard human rights and advance justice" (Chiang, 1984: 216).

One very controversial 1983 interview with Wulf Kuster of *Der Spiegel* got significant international attention. Kuster repeatedly asked Chiang to clearly explain the policies of the regime. The tone of the interview was quite hostile and because it touched on so many of the difficult issues with which Chiang was dealing at the time, it deserves repeating here:

> **Q**. Your brother, General Wei Guo Chiang, has said in a newly published book that Taiwan is an anti-Communist citadel on the fringe of the Pacific. Ironically, we find that your people seem not to have the mood of living in a beleaguered city. Specifically, you claim to be the only orthodox and *Free China*, but you have enforced martial law for as long as 34 years. Never before in modern history has there been a country as long under martial law as Taiwan. When will it be lifted – on the day the Mainland is recovered?
>
> **A**. This is indeed a dilemma. On the one hand, we are faced with a threat and possible disaster. But, on the other hand, we hope that the people of Taiwan can lead peaceful and happy lives and that we can assure the normal functioning of freedom and democracy. Our people's determination in maintaining freedom and democracy remains unchanged. This anti-Communist psychological foundation has never been shaken. We are aware that every Communist regime, including the one on the Chinese Mainland, is cruel and totalitarian and does not tolerate the development of democracy. No free and democratic country in modern history has suffered Communist threat for so long as the Republic of China. To prevent Communist infiltration and subversion so as to safeguard national security, the Republic of China has no alternative but to introduce *chieh-yen* or "a state of serious alert," which you call "martial law," in accordance with its constitution and other laws.
>
> **Q**. Many countries in the world have been threatened by the Communists, but few of them have coped with the threat through the enforcement of martial law. No country has enforced if for such a long period.
>
> **A**. In the face of the Chinese Communist threat, this measure is unavoidable. But its application is very limited in scope. Instead of impeding the people's freedoms and well-being, and disrupting social stability and prosperity, the "state of serious alert" has actually safeguarded all these. Therefore, the "state of serious alert" is a far cry from the military control envisioned by Westerners in a martial law situation.
>
> **Q**. If martial law has no direct bearing on the lives of the people, what does it mean in practical terms?

A. Our *chieh-yeh* is enforced to cope with the emergencies that may arise at any time.
Q. Your country has consistently called itself "*Free China*," but why is Taiwan so slow in democratization? A true democracy should tolerate the existence of rational argument.

A. In the Republic of China, there are many ways for the people to express their views. I agree with you that public opinion should accommodate rational argument. In fact, our parliament and our media often hold intelligent discussions on various issues. Historically, the development of democracy in the Western nations took several centuries. For instance, democratization in England began after the Magna Carta was signed in 1215. The U.S. has had two centuries of democratic experience. Compared with advanced democratic nations, the Republic of China's development in democracy is not so slow. It has been just 71 years since China became a republic after the 1911 revolution (Chiang, 1984:234-235).

The rest of the interview continued on to cover the absence of competitive political parties, the Kuomintang, and the future leadership of Taiwan. In all of those answers Chiang continued to argue that Taiwan was doing well in following constitutional policies and anti-Communism. This section of the interview is interesting because it exhibits the common themes of the regime at the time: the tie between democracy and anti-Communism, the impact of the threat, and that martial law was not affecting the day to day lives of the people.

It was hard enough for Chiang to be pounded with questions about democracy in Taiwan. To make matters worse, around the same time as this interview, Chiang was constantly being barraged by a number of questions relating to other sensitive topics including U.S.-PRC normalization, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, China's political and economic reform program, and China's efforts to negotiate with Taiwan. It was apparent that Taiwan was starting to lose some legitimacy as compared to the PRC. The media portrayed the changes in China as impressive and seemed to be looking at the Communist regime in a very positive light. According to Chiang's personal secretary, Wang Chia-

hua, Chiang was frequently embarrassed by these questions. Wang said that even before Chiang became President he used to ask Wang to read him the emergency decree and discuss whether if the decree was lifted it could be re-imposed during an emergency. Chiang's personal secretary, Ma Ying-jeou also indicated that Chiang was concerned about international public opinion and asked him to get information on how the West perceived Taiwan's martial law (Nathan and Ho, 1993: 35-36).

In our model, we saw why the regime chose to maintain its authoritarian stance. Simply, even with authoritarianism, or according to the regime because of authoritarianism, Taiwan was able to maintain relative superiority to the PRC. Yet the events surrounding Taiwan began to change the environment and the regime's perception of superiority and comparative legitimacy.

In 1986, somewhat suddenly and unexpectedly, Chiang Ching-kuo implemented the most sweeping changes to the system to date. This seemed an odd decision given the regime's behavior in the early 1980s and the fact that it appeared that the threats to Taiwan's stability remained at least constant and perhaps even increased. The explanation for the regime's reforms will be discussed below, but first we will provide an overview of the reforms implemented by the regime.

5.8 Taiwan's Democratic Reforms: The Chiang Years

The KMT regime on Taiwan is certainly unique. The KMT is perhaps the only non-Communist party in the world that is organized along the lines of a Leninist party. As Tien states, "its relations with both state and society have also demonstrated a strong functional resemblance to a Leninist corporatist state" (Tien, 1993: 102-103). Yet the regime differs from most Leninist states in a number of ways. Included in this are first that the official KMT ideology, based on Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles of the People,"

commits the regime to ultimately creating a representative democracy. Secondly, the KMT has promoted a capitalist economy that allows for a certain level of economic and social autonomy for the people. Third, although the regime has traditionally been quite authoritarian, it does not officially subscribe to proletarian dictatorship or the monopoly of political power (Tien, 1993: 103).

Another matter that makes the regime quite unique has been its existence as part of a divided system. This led to the primacy of its official policy to reunify with the Mainland and also to its very ambiguous international status. While the KMT had a very democratic constitution, its ongoing conflict with the PRC was used as a justification to suspend many provisions and operate under martial law. The combination of these issues has created an unusual conundrum for the regime in that while the regime will not admit it, in practice its promise to reunify and its promise to democratize have contradicted one another. In the process of democratization the regime rescinded its claim to be the sole legitimate government of all of China, thereby eliminating what had been for decades its primary claim to legitimacy. Each step along the democratic path has not only made Taiwan more of a separate system and moved Taiwan and China further from one another, but has also increased tensions between the two systems. If the government's claim to the Mainland and the process of democratic reform run contrary to one another the question must be asked why the regime has essentially chosen to abandon reunification for the sake of democratization. We will first discuss some of the reforms undertaken by the regime and then discuss possible explanations for them below.

Although the KMT government had long been under pressure to reform, it had been able to hold off those pressures by continuing to claim that strict social and political order was necessary due to the ongoing security crisis. And although Chiang Ching-kuo

started as early as 1981 to hint that perhaps the time for reform had arrived, no significant reforms were implemented. Finally, in 1986 the KMT made a decision to enact reform. While the official reforms were initiated in the Second Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee of the KMT in March of 1986, the beginning of the process was actually signaled by two other events. The first was the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party on September 28, 1996. Or more accurately, the beginning of the process was signaled when the KMT did not retaliate against the individuals who created the DPP. When a group of powerful members of the opposition met in the Grand Hotel in Taipei, they were so concerned about the KMT's reaction that they registered the meeting as a meeting of the Rotary Club. That night the group announced the illegal formation of the DPP. Several people who attended the meeting said they fully expected to be arrested as soon as they walked out of the hotel. Surprisingly, the KMT did nothing.

The second and somewhat related event was Chiang Ching-kuo's surprise announcement in an October 1986 interview with Katherine Graham of the *Washington Post* that he was determined to end martial law and lift the restrictions on political parties. This was a message to the members of the DPP that the government would not prosecute them for their actions, as well as being a message to the people of Taiwan that Chiang was ready for reform. And because it was no coincidence that the announcement was made in the *Washington Post*, Chiang was clearly sending a message to the rest of the world that the KMT was going to finally begin to fulfill its promise of democracy.

The official process of reform was set into motion by the decision of the Third Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee of the KMT in March of 1986. A list was created that contained six areas in which Chiang wanted reform to be considered. The six areas of reform included: 1) the strengthening of the national legislatures; 2) legalization

of local self-administration; 3) the consolidation of laws on national security; 4) the establishment of a legal basis for civic organizations; 5) a rectification of public mores as well as a strengthening of public order; and 6) a clarification of the important tasks of the KMT (Halbeisen, 1993: 83).

The meeting showed Chiang's determination to implement reform. At the same time, many people were skeptical about the prospects for democratization because despite Chiang's agenda, no reforms were actually implemented. In addition, the government-controlled newspapers were not giving clear signals to the people about the implementation of reform. At least part of the reason for this was that strong resistance to reform still existed within the KMT, in part because many members knew that reform would include their forced retirement (Wu, 1995: 37). Still with the October announcement, Chiang made it clear that he fully intended to move ahead.

The first efforts of reform were geared toward liberalization, political participation, and democratization. While the reforms were significant, it was clear that the leaders of the KMT were not ready to radically reform the system in one stroke of a pen. The leadership was going to promote a cautious and incremental implementation of reform. For example, when Martial law was lifted on July 15, 1987, pointing to the continuing threat from the PRC the leadership immediately implemented a National Security Law that still gave the government some control to restrict political activities. Thus, while the lifting of martial law removed many of the restrictions on speech, assembly, publication and the right to strike, the new freedoms were not absolute. And while the creation of new political parties was allowed, the new parties were required to support the constitution and refrain from advocating either communism or Taiwan

independence. In addition, while Chiang lifted the ban on the publication of new newspapers, the Government still maintained some restrictions over them.

Another important policy change under Chiang was the lifting of the restrictions on travel to the PRC. Although the new rules technically only allowed Mainlanders to travel to the Mainland to visit relatives, in practice any Taiwanese who could express a valid reason for travel there were usually permitted to go. Valid reasons included conducting business or attending academic meetings. The authorization for travel to the PRC had a significant impact on the perceptions of the people on Taiwan toward China, and it may be argued had an effect on future policy decisions. This matter will be discussed further below.

One of the most significant issues on the reform agenda initiated during Chiang's rule was the handling of the issue of the senior parliamentarians. These were the people elected on the Mainland in 1947 who were still serving in the government. This was a very sensitive issue for the KMT and the process of reform. It was clear that for true reform to occur these people would have to step aside and their seats opened for electoral competition. At the same time, efforts to force them out of office could gridlock the reform program. Chiang expressed support for the study of the issue of the total re-election of the public organs stating that the changes should follow "the spirit of the constitution and the forms of constitutional government" (Moody, 1991: 94). In February of 1988, just after Chiang's death, the Standing Committee of the Nationalist Party, approved some parliamentary reform. Included in this reform was the clause that lifetime members of the parliament would be "encouraged" to retire. While Chiang died before these reforms could be fully implemented, his efforts set the tone for the implementation of these reforms under the leadership of Lee Teng-hui.

5.9 Reforms Under Lee Teng-hui

> *On June 21, 1990, in a conference of the grand justices of the Judicial Yuan, it was decided that the old representatives who had been elected decades ago must all retire before the end of 1991. From then on, members of the National Legislature were all directly elected by the people of Taiwan. This signified a new starting point. The general election is significant not only because of our country's democratization, but also because it marked the birth of a new nation.*
>
> Chen Shui-bian
> in a Speech to the DPP China Policy Conference
> September 20, 1999

When Chiang Ching-kuo died in 1988, Taiwan experienced a peaceful succession of authority from Chiang to his Vice President, Lee Teng-hui. That transfer of power in itself was not insignificant. While in hindsight it appears that there was no real reason to be concerned with the transfer of power, at the time people in Taiwan were not entirely certain things would go smoothly. One reason for concern was that there were divisions within the KMT over who should assume the leadership of the party and the nation. Members of the conservative non-mainstream faction of the KMT believed that Lee was not well suited to take on the challenges of leading the nation and feared that he would destroy the foundation of the KMT's authority and legitimacy.

Led by Chiang Ching-kuo's half brother Chiang Wei-kuo and his ally Lin Yang-kang, the non-mainstream faction advocated a preservation of the authoritarian rule and adherence to the primacy of the official goal and policy of reunification with the Mainland. This group eventually challenged Lee for control of the party and the Presidency, but was unsuccessful in its efforts and eventually split from the KMT and formed the New Party (*Syin dang*). Once he did assume control, Lee Teng-hui immediately set about the task of implementing profound reforms. Therefore, while the reforms initiated by Chiang in his last years were not insignificant, perhaps even more

important was the fact that he set the table for the implementation of far more comprehensive reforms under the Lee Presidency.

The Lee administration fundamentally altered the scope and structure of the government in Taiwan. Included in the reforms implemented were the following:

1. A large number of Taiwanese and western educated technocrats were brought into the Presidential Cabinet and Central Standing Committee of the KMT.
2. A National Affairs Conference was held to discuss constitutional reform.
3. The senior members of all three chambers of the parliament were forced into retirement at the end of 1991.
4. The Emergency Decree was abolished.
5. The constitution was reformed several times.

When Lee assumed the control of the party and government, things were a bit unsettled. The KMT was very divided over the most desirable future course of action, the opposition was increasingly vocal, and Taiwan was facing increasing international isolation. Lee's immediate response to these problems was to organize a National Affairs Conference. The participants in the National Affairs Conference were assigned the very specific task of drawing a blueprint for the future of the government on Taiwan. Lee invited a diverse group of people to the Conference, including scholars, labor leaders, members of the opposition, and of course, leaders of the KMT. The participants were directed to discuss four primary issues: 1) the structure of the local government system; 2) the structure of the central government; 3) constitutional revisions; and 4) Mainland policy.

In April of 1990 the KMT approved a plan for the retirement of the senior parliamentarians elected in 1947. This plan was significant in two ways. First, it finally opened the door for the people of Taiwan to be able to elect their representatives. Second, it symbolically represented the end of the KMT's long term claim to be the legitimate government of all of China. The last of the senior parliamentarians finally left office in December of 1991, allowing for the body to be fully elected by the people on Taiwan.

While the forced retirement of the senior parliamentarians symbolically represented the end of the KMT's claim to the Mainland, the link was formally broken in May of 1991 when President Lee officially abolished the *Temporary Provisions During the Period of Communist Rebellion* adopted in 1948. The abolishment of these provisions reinstated the parts of the ROC Constitution that had been frozen for over 40 years. It opened the door for increased protection of civil rights, and allowed for significant constitutional reforms.

At the same time that the Temporary Provisions were eliminated, Lee promulgated ten *Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China* recently passed by the National Assembly. The articles were designed to reflect the fact that Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland are administered by two separate political entities. The *Additional Articles* also provided the legal basis and guidelines for the structure of representation and election of the Second National Assembly and the Second Legislative Yuan, which would be representative of Taiwan.

After the Second National Assembly assumed office on January 1, 1992, its delegates adopted *Additional Articles* 11 through 18. These articles, promulgated on May 28th, establish the rules for the popular election of the President and Vice-President,

transform the Control Yuan from a parliamentary body to a quasi-judicial organ, and establish the rules and structure of the provincial and local self-government. On July 28, 1994, the Second National Assembly revised the 18 *Additional Articles*, reducing the number to ten. Under the revised *Additional Articles*:

1. The president (beginning with the ninth-term president since the Constitution went into effect in 1947) will be directly elected by the entire voting population in the Taiwan area.
2. The Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates will run on a single ticket
3. The President can appoint and dismiss those officials who were appointed with the consent of the National Assembly or Legislative Yuan without the co-signature of the president of the Executive Yuan.
4. The National Assembly may have a speaker and deputy speaker.
5. The dismissal of the president of the Executive Yuan may take effect only after the new nominee to this office has been confirmed by the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan GIO).

The *Additional Articles* underwent yet another amendment in May and June of 1997. Under these most recent revisions, the roles of the provincial governor and the Control Yuan underwent dramatic changes. Most significantly, these changes declared that the provincial government would be streamlined and the elections of the governor and the members of the provincial council would be suspended. Article 9 of the Additional Articles stipulates:

1. A province is to have a provincial government of nine members, one of whom being the provincial governor. All members are to be nominated by the president of the Executive Yuan and appointed by the president of the Republic.
2. A province is to have a provincial advisory council made up of a number of members who are nominated by the president of the Executive Yuan and appointed by the president of the Republic.

In addition to the above clauses, the reforms included the statement that the terms of office of the elected governor of Taiwan Province would end on December 20, 1998. Elections for members of the provincial assembly were suspended. At that time more power was shifted into the control of the county governments.

Finally, *The Provisional Statute on the Adjustment of the Function, Business and Organization of the Taiwan Provisional Government* was passed in October 1998. According to this statute, after the Provincial Government is streamlined all of its assets and liabilities will be assumed by the central government. The downsized Provincial administration became a non-autonomous body and was made a branch of the central government. In other words, this statute essentially eliminated the government's recognition of Taiwan as a province of China, and institutionalized the reality that Taiwan and China are two separate political entities controlled by two separate political authorities. [2]

The changes to the Constitution did not completely wipe out all remnants of the *Temporary Provisions*. The revisions contained two articles that continued to grant the president special powers to enact emergency measures. Article 7 read, "The President may, by resolution of the Executive Yuan, issue emergency orders and take all emergency measures to avert an imminent danger to the security of the state or the people or to cope with any serious financial or economic crisis, without being subject to the restrictions prescribed in Article 43 of the Constitution" (GIO-ROC Yearbook, 1997). Article 8 read, "If any laws originally intended to be applicable solely during the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion shall not have been revised by the termination of the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of

[2] This decision was quite controversial and caused a significant split in the KMT. James Soong, the governor of the Taiwan Province was so enraged at the decision that he left the KMT to run as an independent candidate in the 2000 presidential elections. His candidacy is supported by the more conservative members of the KMT, primarily Mainlanders, and thereby has weakened the KMT's candidate, Vice President Lien. Although he was for a long time a very powerful member of the KMT, Soong's rhetoric against President Lee and the KMT has turned quite vitriolic. For example, on March 12, 2000 in discussing corruption and inefficiency in the system, Soong made the comment that "if the Provincial government team were still in place now, many fewer people would have died," in the 921 Earthquake.

the Communist Rebellion, said laws shall remain in effect until 31 July 1992" (GIO-ROC Yearbook, 1997).

One of the great ironies of the reforms is that they officially ended the state of war with China and highlighted the fact that Taiwan and the ROC are ruled by two separate entities. Yet, the *Additional Articles* started with the following phrase: *"To meet the requisites of national unification*, the following additional articles are added to the ROC Constitution" (Italics added).

The reforms discussed show the often-contradictory nature of political reform in Taiwan. This study argues that the conflict and competition with the PRC helped to lead to political reform on Taiwan. But the influence of the conflict and competition is not one sided, that is while it led to reforms, it is also clear that the political reforms on the island are constrained by the presence of the PRC and by the ongoing dispute over the relations between the two systems.

The dramatic political reforms implemented in Taiwan have served to increase tensions across the Taiwan Strait. Without specifically or officially stating so, the reforms in Taiwan have established Taiwan as a separate, sovereign political entity. The recent statements of President Lee declaring that relations between Taiwan and the PRC should be handled on a *state-to-state* basis have highlighted this fact. While the PRC has claimed that it does not desire to use force to reunify China and Taiwan, it has claimed that it will do so under certain conditions. Those conditions have long included Taiwan declaring independence, a foreign invasion of Taiwan, and internal strife. In February of 2000 the PRC issued a new white paper that stated that China may also resort to the use of force if Taiwan refuses indefinitely to "pursue the peaceful settlement of cross-straits reunification through negotiations" (Erkholm, 2/22/2000).

In this way the reforms have also been a double-edged sword in regards to relations between Taiwan and the United States. While the US supports Taiwan's democratization and continues to maintain quasi-official relations with the government, Taiwan's reforms have caused the US tremendous headaches in its relations with the PRC. The United States officially supports the one-China principle but has agreed to support Taiwan if China launches an unprovoked attack. For that reason, the United States clearly does not want to see Taiwan alter the status quo.

Internally, it is clear that the chosen process of democratization was not the only possible path for the regime. This is evidenced by the divisions emerging within the KMT including the splintering of the non-mainstream faction conservatives who formed the New Party and the defection of James Soong and others who now declare themselves independent. These groups strongly oppose the weakening of the Provincial government and Lee's special *State-to-state* policy. A group existed within the party that continued to advocate maintenance of the existing system. And it is not apparent that the regime had lost its ability to continue the suppression of the opposition and the calls for reform. Why then did the KMT regime pursue its path of reform? This question will be discussed below.

As shown in the literature review in Chapter Three existing explanations for reform in Taiwan fail to fully explain the process. One thing that these explanations have in common is that they focus on internal political, economic, and social factors. Each of these factors is significant but cannot seem to explain the process on its own merit. Yet in the context in which Taiwan existed it seems that events around the world, and specifically across the Taiwan Straits must have some significance. One factor that must

be given attention is that Taiwan exists in a state of division in which it is in a zero-sum competition with the PRC for control of China and the Chinese people.

Again, Chiang highlighted the zero-sum nature of the competition in an address to the Annual Constitution Day Meeting of the National Assembly in 1978, when he stated, "the government of the Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the people of the whole nation. The Mainland is the territory of the Republic of China, and the government of the Republic of China will never give up its sovereignty there" (Chiang, 1984: 18). As explained in Chapter Four, when this level of competition exists, the competition itself strongly influences the behavior of the regime. For that reason, the application of the model that is proposed in Chapter Four might help us better understand the reasons for change.

5.10 Explanation for Reform: Legitimacy Competition and Regime Identity

Viewed through the lens of the model presented in this study, the sense of comparison and competition with the Mainland may help us better understand the timing and direction of reforms in Taiwan. When one observes the language of both Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui during the reform period, it is clear that the presence of China and China's actions were extremely influential in the development of Taiwan's identity and its political and economic reforms.

A very important issue influencing the leaders of Taiwan was the renewed reunification campaign being waged by China following the normalization of its relations with the United States. Emboldened by its newly achieved status, the PRC started to promote the peaceful reunification of China. China proposed a "one-country, two systems" approach in which Taiwan would be able to maintain separate political,

economic and social systems. China's proposal appeared to be well received as rational and reasonable by much of the international community. The proposal gained steam with the Reagan administration's acceptance of the 1982 Shanghai Communiqué promising to gradually decrease arms supplies to Taiwan, and in 1984 when China and Britain signed an agreement over the future of Hong Kong with a "One-Country, Two Systems" formula (Nathan and Ho, 1993: 37).

Taiwan did not want to reunify with the PRC under the current conditions. Yet, due to the changes in international status, it became increasingly important for Taiwan to explain why such reunification was not feasible. The regime in Taiwan argued that the tremendous differences between the political, economic and social systems of Taiwan and the PRC made reunification impossible at that time. That argument made it more essential that Taiwan could clearly distinguish between the two systems. Given the rather repressive nature of the regime, that task was not as simple as one might expect.

Viewing the process of identity development within the context of the model used for this study we can start to develop a better understanding of the decision-making process at work by the leaders of the regime. The language used by both Chiang and Lee indicates a concern with what was happening in China and a strong effort to compare the two regimes to show Taiwan's superiority. While this was not unusual, the leaders of Taiwan had long been comparing Taiwan to China, the terms of the competition seemed to start to change.

As indicated above, the language and behavior of the regime in Taiwan long indicated that it felt that it was outperforming China in its competitive relationship. It was clearly outperforming China in economic terms and since China was living under somewhat of a self-imposed isolation and was seen as somewhat of a pariah state, Taiwan

had a stronger position in the international community. The regime was under little pressure from outside to reform its existing political situation as long as it remained a strong member of the anti-Communist camp. For that reason, although the domestic conditions for reform seemed ripe in Taiwan, the regime chose to maintain the status quo. It wasn't until the reforms on the Mainland had really started to take hold and the international environment had changed for Taiwan did the regime begin to feel that international pressure for change.

By 1986 Chiang's language started to change. He started to refer more and more to the development of democracy in Taiwan and appeared to be willing to admit what he hadn't like to admit before, that Taiwan was not yet democratic. Only Chiang's constant comparison of Taiwan's situation with the situation on the PRC remained constant. Whether he was talking about Taiwan's progress in economics, government, or society he would often end with a comment about the dreadful conditions on the Mainland. For example, in an address at the opening of the Third Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the KMT Chiang was highlighting the political and economic successes of Taiwan. But he ended the statement by saying, "This situation starkly compares with the extreme suppression and abject poverty on the Mainland – the fruits of over 30 years of capricious power struggles under the Chinese Communist tyranny" (Chiang, 1997: 11).

In that speech alone there were no less than eight direct comparisons between China and Taiwan and an entire section entitled, *Lessons from the Disaster Caused by the Communist System to China.* The issue that Chiang was most concerned about was the Chinese promotion of the idea of "One-country, two systems" approach to reunification. He was trying to justify why that is not acceptable to Taiwan, and therefore he was trying to show why Taiwan's system was superior.

Chiang was increasingly forced to discuss the political and economic reforms in the PRC. Naturally he dismissed them as a ploy put forth by the communists to fool other countries into dealing with China. As he said in his address to the Central Committee of the KMT in March of 1986:

> In order to deceive people around the world, the Chinese Communists fabricated the grotesque slogan, "developing socialism with Chinese Characteristics," and coupled it with the strawman of "modernization." It has also appealed to "patriotism" and "nationalism" in an attempt to woo overseas Chinese. However, we Chinese are not blind; we know fully well that Marxism-Leninism knows of no country and national consciousness – that although the Peking regime calls itself China, it is actually anti-China (Chiang, 1987: 14).

The zero-sum issue of reunification was of central importance to Chiang and the KMT. The efforts in the Socialist countries to revive their systems led to a change in the global context. To the rest of the world, the distinctions between the Socialist and non-Socialist world were not as black and white as before. These changes had complicated matters for the KMT. But Chiang was forced to stick to his guns and as he did above, describe the reforms as a trick and to continue to promote the zero-sum nature of the competition. In his 1986 speech to the Central Committee Chiang stated:

> Although the world situation today appears complex, the underlying conflicts of democracy versus dictatorship and freedom versus slavery remain unchanged. The distinction in essence is so profound and so incompatible that they leave no room for compromise and appeasement. To defend democracy and freedom, therefore, one has to be staunchly anti-Communist. If we allow Communist forces to expand, we in fact allow freedom and democracy to shrink (Chiang, 1987: 16).

A very central them in Chiang's speeches and statements was that reunification must be conducted under the guidance of the KMT, based on the comparative success of the regime on Taiwan and the clear superiority of *The Three Principles of the People* over Communism. There was no room for compromise on this. China must be reunified under the banner of democracy. This is where Chiang ran into trouble. As the global

situation changed, and as Taiwan was confronted by a different approach from China, he was forced to explain what he meant by democracy. Chiang had previously defined democracy as anti-Communism. This definition was no longer adequate.

This conflict of rhetoric versus reality apparently bothered Chiang. Ma Ying-jeou made this point very clearly in a 1989 interview when he stated:

> He felt at the time that domestic conditions were mature. But also, strengthening democratic politics was an important step for improving our international image and appealing to our Mainland brethren. We had been saying that the Mainland should emulate Taiwan in politics, but what in our politics should they emulate? If our level of democratization was insufficient, did that mean that we wanted them to emulate our use of martial law? President Chiang was perfectly clear about this point (Nathan and Ho, 1993: 39).

Apparently, that concern was strong enough to compel Chiang to implement reform. As mentioned above, he gave the first public indication of that desire in his October 1986 interview with Katherine Graham of the Washington Post. When asked about the lifting of martial law, Chiang stated simply, "the problem of national security and the termination of *Chieh-yen* are being under assiduous study. I expect a program will soon be worked out, and I believe it will be a progressive policy suitable for meeting the current needs of the nation" (Chiang, 1987: 31). From that point forward, Chiang continued to discuss the issue of national security and political freedom, but instead of looking at political freedom as a threat to security due to the Communists Chiang said, "political freedom is the best defense of our national security" (Chiang, 1988: 19).

When Lee came into office following Chiang's death, he made it clear from the very beginning of his administration that he would continue Taiwan down the path of democratic development, and he wasted no time in working toward the continuation and expansion of the democratic reforms initiated by Chiang Ching-kuo. The bulk of reforms finally arrived in 1991.

During Lee's presidency, China was continuing its reform program and further assimilating itself into the international community. China did suffer a setback in 1989 due to the government's violent response to the *Tiananmen* protests. But even the *Tiananmen* incident put pressure on the regime in Taiwan. The violent resolution to the *Tiananmen* protests in 1989 had similar impact on Taiwan as the issue of the prior repression of the Democracy Wall Movement. While the incident validated the KMT's depiction of the communist regime in China as ruthless it pressured the KMT to demonstrate that it was truly kinder and gentler in handling political protest and dissidents (Wachman, 1994: 220).

It is interesting that in Lee Teng-hui's comments about democratization he seldom pointed specifically to the issue of domestic conditions for democratization. He did point to comparison of conditions between the two sides and the importance of Taiwan strengthening its position as compared to the PRC. In a 1991 speech to the American Chamber of Commerce and the American University Club in Taipei, Lee stated: "I feel the time has come to make a rational examination of the successes and failures of the respective systems on both sides of the Taiwan Straits and to seek out a new path for the future of the Chinese nation" (Lee, 1992: 72). This continues to be a common theme for Lee as evidenced by the fact that he made an almost identical statement in his 1999 book tellingly entitled, *The Road to Democracy: Taiwan's Pursuit of Identity* (Lee, 1999:115).

Through the 1990s Lee recognized the PRC's reforms and even credited the Communist regime for its efforts, but still clearly pointed out that as compared to Taiwan, the regime was lagging far behind. Lee loved to point to discussions and articles in the international media that highlighted the differences between China and Taiwan. In his

July 1991 speech to the American Chamber of Commerce Lee was clear to point out that both *The Asian Wall Street Journal* and *Time Magazine* had highlighted Taiwan's successes in economic development and democratization (Lee, 1992: 78-79).

Just a few days after that speech, Lee made it clear in an interview with *The Washington Times* that he perceived Taiwan's democratization as the central factor in Taiwan's ability to deal with the PRC. The reporter asked him why Taiwan appeared to be on the defensive with the PRC. He responded:

> A very important question. But what is most important to us is our own internal democratic reform. Nothing has a higher priority. Elections in December, further democratization, Constitutional Amendments will strengthen our democracy and leave the Mainland no alternative but to deal with us as a democratic system that is here to stay and cannot be changed by force. When we are fully successful in our democratization, dealing with Mainland China will be seen by the whole world in a different light. We will also be in a more powerful position (Lee, 1992: 84).

Lee then pointed to the Chinese efforts to isolate Taiwan and argued that as long as Taiwan continued down its path of development, the world would have to deal with Taiwan one way or another. He concluded by saying, "after we have strengthened our own democracy, we will be ready to consider other important moves *vis-à-vis* the Mainland" (Lee, 1992: 84).

In that same interview, Lee was asked to compare South Korea's situation with Taiwan's. He pointed out that South Korea had the advantage of the security umbrella provided by the United States as well as positive relations with the Soviet Union that has been pressuring North Korea to reform. Taiwan's case was very different because, "we don't have such a formidable combination of forces supporting our own democratic efforts. If we went to the table with the Mainland now, without strengthening ourselves first, they would most probably swallow us alive" (Lee, 1992: 88).

The economic reform in China garnered the attention of the international community and increased contacts between Taiwan and the Mainland. As mentioned in Chapter Four, increased contacts between adversaries does not always lead to more cooperative behavior and assimilation, it might also lead to efforts for the parties to highlight their distinctiveness. Lee did not hesitate to clearly state that while increasing contact with the PRC was to be viewed as a positive development, it did not come without difficulties. The primary issue was that it forced Taiwan to clearly define itself. As Lee stated in a 1993 International Press Conference:

> The changes in the international situation may be very helpful to our pragmatic policy, though some may not be very helpful. This difference gave rise at home to the question of national identity when we made evaluations of these changes. If the exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits had not occurred, the question of national identity would not be serious. In the past, the two sides of the Taiwan Straits were totally divided. When we started to make our exchanges, the division was blurred and this definition of the two sides of the Taiwan Straits became a big problem (Lee, 1994: 49).

This issue forced Taiwan to change. This did not mean abandoning anti-Communism but it meant changing the method for opposing communism. As Lee stated, "instead of being anti-Communist in words, we should be anti-Communist at heart" (Lee, 1994: 50).

Taiwan currently makes a very concerted effort to use its new identity to improve its diplomatic position. While Taiwan long focused on the issue of pragmatic economic diplomacy, it has now added the component of its democratization to the equation. One area in which Taiwan is making concerted and vocal efforts is in its program to promote Taiwan's readmission to the United Nations. The Government Information Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and President's Office pump out one publication after another with titles like *The Virtuous Will Not Be Alone; A Worthy Nation Deserves a UN Seat;* and, *The Now Silent Partner in the Founding of the UN.*

In one such MOFA publication somewhat undramatically entitled, *Why the UN Resolution in 1971 Should Be Reexamined Today*, the government makes it clear that Taiwan belongs in the UN because of its democratization. The publication first points to the significance of its political reforms of 1991 including the removal of the Mainland members of the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan. It continues, "On March 23, 1996, with the first direct election of its president, unprecedented in Chinese history, the ROC became a full-fledged democratic country. As a result, the ROC now embodies a connotation that is totally different from what it was in 1971, when it was forced to withdraw from the United Nations" (MOFA, 1996: 1).

We see here clear evidence of Taiwan's use of democracy to promote its international status. We also see another example of Taiwan's confusing behavior. Again, while it continues to emphasize the fact that it is not independent, it makes every effort to participate in the international community as an independent nation. The reasons for Taiwan's behavior can be explained in the model as represented in **Diagram 5.2**. We can see that in the process of identity development in the context of the legitimacy war, Taiwan had few alternatives other that democratic reform and a readjustment of its policy toward China.

The model diagrams the regime's decision-making process. It was clear that Taiwan was losing the battle. China's economic growth was drawing the attention of the world. As mentioned in Chapter Four, even a relative decline or directional shift in advantage can affect the evaluation of relative identity. This subjected Taiwan's political performance to increasing scrutiny. In addition, Taiwan's increased contact with the PRC forced it to find a different way with which to strengthen itself and protect itself versus China. In looking at the situation, the regime was presented with a very limited

Diagram 5.2 Taiwan Reform Era Process of Identity Development



number of cognitive alternatives. Not all of them were acceptable due to the affective nature of the conflict. For example, one option would be absorption. That is, since China has clearly won the international legitimacy competition, because the regime had military superiority, and because the regime was reforming, perhaps the time was ripe to move toward reunification. Obviously while this was a cognitive alternative, due to the level of animosity between the systems it was not a policy that could be chosen.

The apparent option was democratic reform. Taiwan had ideological superiority on paper but its ideology was not being practiced. That was the one area in which Taiwan could clearly distinguish itself. Continuing authoritarianism and rigorous anti-Communism had become a dead end path for Taiwan and placed it in the position of losing the rest of the war. The choice of democratization allowed Taiwan to change the terms of competition and once again find an area in which it could claim clear superiority. In fact, in choosing this path, Taiwan even claimed to change the nature of the game from zero-sum to positive-sum.

As indicated above, democratization at home coincided with a change in contacts and relations between Taiwan and the PRC. In fact, they were two sides of the same coin. In democratizing, Taiwan was forced to take the dramatic step of ending the state of war with the PRC and recognizing the legitimacy of the Communist regime on the Mainland. As Lee stated in a 1991 press conference:

> I announced the end of "The Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion." This is critically important because it is part of a chain reaction that we need to reconstruct our domestic political system. It has already affected the relationship between both sides of the Taiwan Straits. Communist China is no longer considered an illegal rebel and all that (Lee, 1992: 85-86).

Lee continued to state that, "the end of our state of mobilization against the Communist regime does indeed imply constitutional amendments" (Lee, 1992: 86).

This issue of the connection of democratic reform in Taiwan with relations with the Mainland can help explain some of the seemingly contradictory behavior of Taiwan in recent years. In the name of controlling the terms of reunification, the regime in Taiwan had to make itself separate and distinct from the regime in the Mainland. The regime in Taiwan argues that its new position moves the competition with the Mainland from a zero-sum game to a positive-sum game. As Lee states in his 1999 book:

> From long ago there was an oft-repeated slogan that "The Han and the rebels cannot stand together." In other words the Han people (i.e. The Nationalist Party) and the rebels (The Communists) cannot compromise. But Taiwan discarded this idea long ago in favor of the quest for a "win-win" situation for China as a whole. It no longer seeks the demise of the Mainland Chinese regime. Taiwan has shown its readiness to cooperate with the Mainland if there are things that can be improved in dealings across the Strait. It has advanced many specific proposals such as summit meetings, joint international projects, the building of an offshore transportation center, cultural exchange, agricultural cooperation, and reform of state-run enterprises (Lee, 1999: 118-119).

Taiwan's revised policy toward the Mainland called for increasing cooperation and its model for reunification shifted from insisting that the Communist regime must surrender to stating that peaceful reunification is possible only after China democratizes. As Lee states, this is presented as a "win-win" situation. It can be argued that the "win-win" model came about because the regime in Taiwan was losing the legitimacy war. That is, it is clear that Taiwan was not able to compete with the PRC in terms of international legitimacy. Its only option was to change the rules of the game to say that it was now acceptable to them to co-exist with China.

In reality then, the "win-win" statement was nothing more than recognition of reality. It's a similar situation to two children competing in a heated game of basketball. They fight and struggle and when one wins, the other says, "I wasn't really trying, I just wanted to have a chance to play with you." Yet that child is still playing a competitive

game, he has simply changed the rules to say that the winner is the one who is less competitive, the one who can admit that everybody who plays wins.

So, while Taiwan claims that it is willing to work with the Mainland regime toward a "win-win" solution, its official policy is that the only hope for reunification is democracy. In short, while Taiwan is willing to deal with the PRC on some level, when it comes to reunification Taiwan is still playing a zero-sum game. Lee makes it clear that the two systems can not co-exist when in discussing the PRC's reunification proposal he states, "The formula is also contradictory, for it seeks to wed communism with capitalism" (Lee, 1999: 121).

Thus, although Taiwan claims that it is willing to work toward a compromise and "win-win" situation, it clearly will settle for nothing less that the end of the Communist regime on the Mainland. The model for reunification is democratization based on the Taiwan model. Taiwan does not want reunification with China under the Communist regime. It desires the collapse of the Communist regime followed by the formation of a new government led by the people of Taiwan.

The reality is that in its reforms guided by competition with the Mainland, Taiwan has become increasingly separate and independent. Yet, due to the threat of invasion from the Mainland, the lack of international support for its independence, and a very emotional division of opinion at home, Taiwan can not officially declare itself an independent nation. The regime in Taiwan is thus stuck in an odd position in which it unofficially behaves as an independent system while at the same time promoting its official policy of reunification. In the current context, the regime must simultaneously deal with the apparently contradictory goals of maintaining its sovereignty and independence and working toward better relations with the Mainland. This can help

explain the often-confusing behavior of one-day talking about improving relations across the strait and the next provoking the PRC with language that indicates the independence of Taiwan. This matter is further complicated by the resurgence of Taiwanese nationalism on the island.

In the end though, it appears that China's actions and the changing international environment forced Taiwan to find alternative ways to handle its competition with China because the China threat has been the dominant factor guiding Taiwan's domestic political affairs. As Klintworth states, "Taiwan's experiment with political reform and its attention to human rights are in part a product of the rivalry between the two governments, over which one can morally claim to best represent all Chinese" (Klintworth, 1995: 91). It is clear that the elite in Taiwan view their choices through the lens of the legitimacy competition with the Mainland. The terms and highly affective nature of the competition guided the choices available to the regime.

CHAPTER VI

NORTH KOREA: THE DOMINANCE OF IDEOLOGY

In 1998 Kim Dae Jung, long a leader of the opposition, assumed the presidency of South Korea. He came into office promising improved relations with North Korea under what he called his *Sunshine Policy*. The *Sunshine Policy* is based on three principles: 1) South Korea will never tolerate any armed provocation by North Korea; 2) South Korea has no intention to undermine or absorb North Korea; and 3) South Korea will act to pursue reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea (Hong, 1998: 565). Given Kim's background in opposing the military-authoritarianism of South Korea, this looked like a promising event for the improvement of ties between North and South Korea, possibly leading to a gradual opening of North Korea.

North Korea's response to Kim's policy was not what he had expected or hoped. Almost immediately the North started to condemn the policy, claiming that it was a trick to weaken North Korea. An August 1999 statement from a spokesman from the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs included the following comment on the Sunshine policy, "Their 'sunshine policy' is a variant of the 'peaceful transition strategy' of the United States. In a nutshell it is an intrigue to induce the north to 'reform' and 'opening' under the cloak of 'reconciliation' and 'cooperation' and thus achieve 'unification' by absorbing the north into their 'free democratic system' (DPRK UN Mission, 1999: 1).

North Korea's actions spoke as loudly as its words. In 1998 the discovery of a suspected underground nuclear facility at *Kumchang-ri* , the launching of the *Taepodong-*

1 ballistic missile through Japanese airspace, the discovery of a North Korean submarine in South Korean waters and the incursion of North Korean agents across the border all led to increased tensions. Even something apparently as innocent as an agreement to allow South Korean tourists visit Mount *Kumgang*, an important historical site in North Korea, turned ugly when a South Korean housewife participating in a tour in June of 1999 was detained by North Korean authorities on charges of espionage. All of this behavior appears even more perplexing when one considers that North Korea is suffering the worst economic crisis in its history and has been making some gestures toward improving relations with the outside world.

On the domestic front, the North Korean regime has refused to respond to its economic problems by implementing significant reform. Although the regime has implemented some minor reforms, most of them are geared toward making small adjustments to the existing economic structure rather that addressing the major structural flaws. The most common response of the regime has been to heighten and strengthen its traditional economic mass movements such as *Chollima Undong, The Three-Revolution Campaign* and the *Three-Revolution Red Flag Movement*. Each of these campaigns and movements is geared toward emphasizing political education and ideology over economics. More recently, Kim Jong Il has emphasized the fact that the military and military preparedness take precedence over all else. All of these actions cause observers to question the true goals and objectives of the North Korean leadership.

In Chapter Five, we noted that one author stated that Taiwan should be in the hands of a psychiatrist. North Korea's behavior is also often referred to as completely irrational, suicidal, or even insane. One significant statement to that effect came from

Hwang Jang Yop, a high ranking North Korean official who defected to South Korea in 1997. Shortly after he defected Hwang wrote a letter explaining his reasons for defecting. In the letter he expressed his concern over the irrational behavior of both South and North Korea. He wrote:

> Starting with my family, all the people [in the North] will judge that I have gone mad when they learn that I have decided to go to the South, abandoning everything. I actually feel – on not a few occasions – that I have gone mad myself. But am I the only person who has gone mad? More than 50 years after the Korean people were divided, the two halves regard each other as an enemy and keep threatening to turn each other into a sea of flames while saying that they want to realize national reunification. How could we regard this as the behavior of a sane people? In addition, at a time when workers and farmers are starving, how could we consider people sane who loudly say they have built an ideal society for them (Oberdorfer, 1997: 400)?

When one views the historical patterns of North Korean behavior, its recent actions do not appear to be so out of the ordinary. North Korea has frequently exhibited behavior that is perplexing to outsider observers, and scholars and policy makers interested in North Korea have frequently failed to accurately predict its behavior. North Korea's behavior has been perceived as irrational, paranoid, and even suicidal. To be fair to North Korea, it must be pointed out that just across the DMZ are stationed 38,000 American and 660,000 South Korean troops heavily armed with the most advanced military technology, all pointed north. These troops occasionally hold the very threatening *Team Sprit* exercises along the border. Until 1991, the United States had tactical nuclear weapons deployed in the South. In addition, North Korea has been the target of an economic embargo and efforts to isolate it throughout its history.

While North Korea may act in an extreme fashion at times, its sense of being surrounded by hostile enemies its not entirely a creation of its imagination. As Golda Meir once said, "even paranoids have enemies." Given those realities, it is hard to

imagine that North Korea's behavior is not heavily influenced by events to the south of the DMZ. One problem in most of the analyses of the system is that they tend to focus exclusively on either internal political dynamics or on the external environment of North Korea. They do little to link the development of North Korean ideology and behavior to its division and competition with the South. This study will attempt to do that.

North Korea has perhaps the most unique political system on the planet today. Initially founded in 1948 under the guidance of the Soviet Union and with later cooperation from the People's Republic of China, North Korea started as a somewhat typical member of the socialist camp. The ideology, structure, and policies of the regime did not differ much from those of the socialist superpowers. However, over the years the North Korean political ideology and political system have undergone a tremendous transformation. The Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il regime has created an ultra-nationalistic and closed system that can not be easily categorized[1]. While other socialist systems in Asia and around the world have either collapsed or reformed, the North Korean system is holding firm. In fact, it can be argued that for each step of reform other socialist systems take, North Korea appears to take a step in the opposite direction. More importantly for the purposes of this study, as more time progresses, North Korea moves further ideologically and politically from South Korea.

It is quite common for analysts and scholars to predict the imminent demise of the North Korean regime. According to these individuals or organizations, change in North

[1] Although Kim Il Sung died in 1994, he is still considered the eternal leader of North Korea. For that reason although there was a transition of leadership when Kim Jong Il assumed control after his father's worldly demise, he is said to be ruling in his father's name. The younger Kim has not broken from his father's most fundamental ideology and in fact has strengthened the elder Kim's place in the political rhetoric. For that reason, the administrations under the leadership of the two Kims will be considered as one regime.

Korea is just around the corner. The change might be a "Big Bang" in the form of system collapse or a "soft-landing" in the form of gradual, incremental reform leading to system change (Suh, 1993; Do, 1996; Moon, 1996; Choi, 1996; Okonogi, 1996; Koh, 1996 and Moon, 1996; Kim, 1997). The reasons for the predictions of collapse or at least reform range from economic hardship, divisions within the leadership, and the death of the Great Leader, Kim Il Sung. Yet somehow, North Korea has so far survived all of the troubles it has encountered without implementing significant reforms. North Korea's economic system faced its most severe crisis in the early and mid-1990s, but the regime held on. And Kim Il Sung died in 1994 but his son was able to control the situation, eliminate any opposition, and assume leadership of the government. Therefore, it is clear that reports of North Korea's demise are greatly exaggerated.

Even more interesting is the fact that North Korea has not only avoided collapse, but it has also apparently avoided any moves to reform in line with its socialist allies. China initiated a dramatic reform program in the late 1970s that continues today. Even worse for North Korea, China broke from the hard-line socialist camp and formed closer relations with the United States. The Soviet Union under Gorbachev started to reform and then completely collapsed. These changes placed North Korea on an island, separated from its former allies, and left to confront the capitalist enemy on its own.

One might assume that these events in combination with the international trend for liberalization would at least lead North Korea to work toward some minor and gradual reform. This has not been the case. In fact, as the regime's direct contact with South Korea and the United States increased, it responded by further developing the independent stand of *Juche* and continuing to behave in an independent manner.

Although the regime has occasionally put out rhetoric that indicated a willingness or desire to open its economy to and establish better relations with the outside world, its behavior has not supported that rhetoric.

One thing is clear; the North Korean regime has indicated no desire to follow the paths of the Soviets or the Chinese. The regime consistently puts out statements condemning the revisionist actions of China and Russia and clearly states that the type of reforms implemented by China are not well suited to the North Korean system. And naturally the North Korean regime does not want to go the way of the Soviet regime. The statements of the regime generally support the notion that socialism has not failed, but that the people and governments of reforming socialist nations were never true socialists, or that they abandoned the socialist ideal too quickly. This is consistent with the North Korean ideology that places great emphasis on Socialist consciousness. Had the leaders and citizens of other socialist nations simply listened to the Great Leader, they would eventually arrive at the same socialist utopia toward which North Korea is rapidly marching.

To be sure, it appeared that the opportunities for reform were present. The reform of the socialist superpowers provided the Kim regime the opening to follow suit. The United States' desire to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula for security and economic reasons has led to occasional diplomatic efforts to improve communication with North Korea. Kim Dae Jung's election to the presidency of South Korea and his promotion of the *Sunshine Policy* has led to a softening of rhetoric from the south and opened the door for more constructive discussions. Yet as mentioned above, each time

these efforts seem to open the door for progress, the North Korean regime does something slam it shut.

Even North Korea's food crisis could have provided the regime with an opportunity to reform and improve ties to the outside world. The regime blamed the economic and food crisis on a series of natural disasters beyond its control. The regime could have used the natural disaster scenario as a pretense to opening the system as an emergency measure. This would have allowed the regime to admit to the existence of problems and a need to enact emergency policy changes without claiming any fault for the initial crisis. Yet, the regime has continued to maintain a hard line even in accepting emergency food relief from abroad. The acceptance of relief has typically been tied to stipulations or conditions that serve to protect the closed nature of the system.

North Korea now claims a number of enemies. Included in these are South Korea and the United States. Also included are the less tangible entities of imperialism and revisionism. The North Koreans consistently claim to be superior to all enemies and to be above any movement toward revisionism and too strong to under the weight of US-South Korean imperialist efforts to isolate and destroy it. Those beliefs represent what North Korea is not. It is not capitalistic, it is not revisionist, and it is certainly nothing like South Korea, The United States, the former Soviet Union, or even China. That begs the question then, "what is North Korea and why?"

As discussed in Chapter Three, studies of North Korea's political development and behavior point to factors ranging from superpower influence to leadership styles to explain the unique structure and content of the system. One issue that has not been given systematic attention in describing North Korean behavior is the impact that division and

legitimacy competition with the South Korean regime had on its identity development, and how that identity development has guided behavior. That is the goal of this study. Applying the model proposed in Chapter Four, this study attempts to look at the development of the North Korean political identity in the context of its legitimacy competition with South Korea. It is argued that when North Korea started to lose the legitimacy competition with the South, it was forced to seek cognitive alternatives to improve its situation. In North Korea's case, the best available, or perhaps only available, alternative was the promotion of it independence and self-reliance. This led to the development of the unique North Korean ideology and continues to influence its behavior. It must be pointed out here that while this study discusses certain policy behavior to highlight specific points, this is not a detailed policy study that attempts to explain and predict specific policies and behavior. Rather it is a theory proposing study, which attempts to put forth a model within which more detailed policy studies can be conducted.

To accomplish this goal, this chapter will first include a brief history of the development of the North Korean system in the context of its relations with South Korea and the rest of the international community. The study will trace the development of Kim Il Sung's power, changes in the environment surrounding North Korea, and finally the resulting development of *Juche* to clearly detail what forces or factors influenced system development in North Korea. We will then demonstrate how the model proposed in Chapter Four might help us trace the decision making process in North Korea. We will attempt to show that the zero-sum competition with South Korea limited the number of policy alternatives available to North Korea. Through this framework we can better

understand the unique development of the North Korean system and North Korea's policy behavior.

6.1 The Early Years: Factionalism and Kim's Consolidation of Power

While the North Korean system was initially modeled after the Stalinist system of the USSR, it has transformed since that time. Although many of the original institutions are still in place, their structure and power have been altered through several constitutional revisions and political maneuvers over the years. Today, terms such as Socialist, Communist, Stalinist, Authoritarian, Totalitarian, and Cult of Personality are used almost interchangeably to describe the regime. To be sure, the regime is in part each of these things. But at the same time, none of those terms paints a completely accurate portrait of the system. So, what is North Korea? In short it is a system controlled by a highly centralized leadership and guided by a unique political, socio-cultural, and economic philosophy known as *Juche*.

The North Korean system is an unusual blend of more typical socialist characteristics with characteristics quite unique to North Korea. While North Korea exhibits some typical tendencies of Socialist systems, these features make it unique. For example, the dominant political institution in North Korea is the Worker's Party of Korea (WPK). The dominance of a party is not uncommon in socialist systems. What is unique in North Korea though is the concentration of power and control of the party and government in the hands of the Kims, first Kim Il Sung and then his son, Kim Jong Il. Like other socialist states, the North Korean system was initially founded on Marxist-Leninist principles. But later, Kim's removed Marxism-Leninism as the ideological

guidepost and replaced it with *Juche*. By 1992, references to Marxism-Leninism were completely eliminated from the constitution. While preserving some of the institutional structures common in socialist systems, North Korea in actuality broke from the socialist camp to create a system unlike any other. In that light it is not too surprising that in the 1980s and 1990s while the other socialist systems were changing, North Korea held its position. Thus, in order to understand what North Korea is, and why it behaves the way it does, it is important to trace the history of system and ideological development.

Up to and following the end of the Korean War, Kim Il Sung was confronted by a number of serious challenges and threats to his leadership. Among those were rival factions vying for power, a country and economy devastated by the war, and the continuing threat posed by South Korean and United States' troops on his border. Kim's first concern was domestic opposition. It is widely accepted that there were several powerful factions within the Korean Worker's Party in the early 1950s: the pro-Kim *Kapsan* group; those who returned from the USSR; the group that returned from China know as the *Yenan* Faction; the non-Communist nationalist group; and the South Korean Communists of Pak Hon-yong, who fled to North Korea after 1948 (Hong, 1998; Suh, 1988; Scalapino and Lee, 1972; and Lee, 1978). Kim's first course of action was to eliminate any domestic opposition, specifically focusing first on purging opponents or those who might challenge his position of authority. Kim's early efforts to eliminate opposition were clearly successful, a success that paved the way for his continuing monolithic rule of the DPRK in the years to come.

Kim Il Sung's rise to power can be divided into two phases. First was the period to establish a collective Communist system and second was the period of creating and

consolidating Kim's one-man rule (Park, 1979: 113-114). Following the end of World War II, Kim made an effort to create a unified Communist system. He made a rather dramatic speech in which he advocated collective struggle and a united front with all democratic forces. His message was very similar to the ideals of Mao's *New Democracy* in China. And much like Mao, Kim's rhetoric of unity was quickly followed by a concerted effort to rid the party of anyone who challenged his rule.

In the Second Party Congress of March 1948, Kim initiated his first strong efforts to gain absolute control by successfully purging members of the domestic faction of the Party, most importantly O Ki Sop. Kim then continued on to move toward the elimination of more opponents. In 1950, the Korean War started and both sides attempted to reunify the peninsula by force. The North Korean military did quite well in the early stages of the war, occupying a large portion of southern territory in a very quick period of time. But following the US led UN entry into the conflict the Northern troops quickly began losing ground. North Korea was on the brink of collapse only to be saved by the arrival of the PRC's People's Volunteers who were able to push the UN troops back to the 38th parallel. The war ended in a stalemate and the peninsula remained divided.

The war was a near disaster for Kim and North Korea. Not only did North Korea fail to achieve the goal of reunification, its infrastructure and economy were decimated by the war. Kim's efforts led to the near demise of the system. Ironically, Kim was able to use the war to strengthen his position further by purging more of his opponents. He pointed to their duplicity in preventing the success of the war effort in order to remove them. In December of 1952, Kim went after the high-ranking members of the South

Korean Worker's Party. The leaders were tried for charges including 1) espionage on behalf of the United States; 2) Efforts to destroy the democratic capacity of the South Korean people to fight for Communist Reunification; and 3) a conspiracy to overthrow the People's Republic by an armed uprising (Park, 1972: 118-119; Koo, 1992).

Kim did not go after the well-respected leader of the Southern Faction, Pak Hon-yang at that time, recognizing that it might cause dissent. Rather, he waited a few years until Pak was sufficiently weakened by the absence of his allies and then went after him. In December of 1955, Pak was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death by the Supreme Court. His "crimes" included: 1) espionage activities on behalf of the American Imperialists; 2) abandonment of Communist thought during the Japanese occupation period; 3) efforts to weaken the patriotic struggle of the South Korean working class; 4) supporting the espionage activities of other individuals; and 5) conspiring to lead an armed uprising against the government of the DPRK (Park, 1979: 119).

Kim's next purge occurred in 1956 following a period known as the *August Sectarian Strife*. In June of 1956, Kim left on a trip to visit the Soviet Union and several Eastern European states. While he was gone a group of opponents got together and attempted to organize a movement against Kim. When Kim returned in August a meeting was held in which the opponents criticized him for his individualistic leadership style and the failure of the heavy industry development plan that had caused the people so much hardship. They argued that Kim should issue an apology to the North Korean people. Unfortunately for the opposition, Kim's support within the party was stronger than they had imagined. When it became clear that their efforts would fail, a number of them escaped to China during a recess of the meeting. The remaining members were

eventually stripped of their positions and purged from the party. While this was the last major effort by Kim to purge his opponents, more purges continued on for a few more years until by 1961 Kim had clearly established his complete control of the party.

Kim's dominance of the Worker's Party of Korea and the government jumped from *de facto* to *de jure* in the new constitution of 1972. In that constitution it was clearly stated that North Korea was a socialist state and that the concentration of power was in the hands of the WPK. All functions of state institutions were under the guidance and supervision of the WPK. Therefore, while the government institutions were technically given authority to make and enforce policy and law, it was clear that in practice their only role was to carry out WPK directives. More importantly, the role of the government was to organize the masses around the party and the leader. The real decision making bodies and the bodies in charge of all political policy in North Korea were the Political Committee of the Central Committee and the Secretariat of the WPK.

It was no coincidence then that Kim occupied the most significant positions within the WPK and within the government. Kim was made the head of state representing state sovereignty, the Chairman of the Central People's Committee, Secretary-General of the WPK, the highest-ranking member of the party, and the Chairman of the National Defense Committee. He was, in short, the head of all major institutions in North Korea, the WPK, the socialist government, and the military. Specifically, the 1972 constitution gave Kim the following powers:

1) to directly lead the Central People's Committee;
2) to command the military forces;
3) to promulgate the laws of the Supreme People's Assembly, ordinances of the Central People's Committee, agreements of the Standing Conferences, Supreme People's Assembly, and orders of the head of state;
4) to ratify or denounce a treaty;

5) to accept credentials and subpoena of foreign diplomats;
6) to propose election and summons key government positions;
7) to present bills to the Supreme People's Assembly, and
8) to supervise the Central Court and Central Prosecutors Office (Park, 1979: 135).

Clearly, Kim had placed himself in the position of controlling all political activity within and outside of the party.

Perhaps equally as significant as Kim's positions in the party and the government was the way in which he institutionalized his political and economic ideology and guiding policies by finding a place for them in the 1972 constitution. Article 4 of the Constitution prescribed the *Juche* ideas. Article 4 read, "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is guided in its activities by the *Juche* idea of the Workers Party of Korea which is a creative application of Marxism-Leninism to our country's reality." Also included was Article13, which mentioned the *Chollima* economic Campaign. Article 13 read, "The *Chollima* movement in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the general line of socialist construction. The state accelerates socialist construction to the maximum by constantly developing the *Chollima* movement in depth and scope." Another article prescribing Kim's philosophy was Article 12, which prescribed the *Chongsan-ri* economic and political structure. It read, "The state thoroughly applies in all its work the great *Chongsan-ri* spirit and *Chongsan-ri* method of guarantee that the upper units help the lower, the masses opinions are respected and their conscious enthusiasm is roused by giving priority to political work, work with people." Finally Article 30, which discussed the *Taean* collectivization system and development plan read:

> The state directs and manages the nations economy through the *Taean* work system, an advanced socialist form of economic management whereby the

> economy is operated and managed scientifically and rationally on the basis of the collective strength of the producer masses, and through which the new system of agricultural guidance whereby agriculture is guided by industrial methods (Suh, 1981).

These articles of the Constitution are interesting not only because of their fascinating language and insight they give us into North Korean policy, but also because they institutionalized the personal political and economic ideologies of Kim Il Sung. As Park states, "Thus all the powers in the North Korean Political System originate in an individual, Kim Il Sung who stands above the party and political organs. That is, political power has been personalized" (Park, 1979: 135). Most significant though is the institutionalization of the *Juche* ideology into the constitutional framework. *Juche* itself has been revised and restructured over the years, moving from a basic political and economic philosophy to an ideological structure that influences all aspects of North Korean life from politics, to economics, to social-structure and culture. It is, in short, the primary force that guides North Korean behavior.

The story then, is not strictly about Kim. It is also about *Juche*, how it came to become such an important part of Kim's power, how it was transformed and came to occupy such a significant place in the North Korean system, and finally how it guided North Korean behavior. For while the power struggle between the different factions certainly played a role in the initial development of the system, it can not explain everything. Power struggles explain purges, they also explain Kim's efforts to institutionalize his rule, but they can not explain why *Juche* came to occupy such a central position in the North Korean system. Nor can they explain why *Juche* took on its unique form. By all accounts, Kim had consolidated his power by 1961. For that reason, it is questionable to point to factionalism as a cause of further development of the system.

If internal political factors can not paint the entire picture, then perhaps we need to look outside the borders to see what was happening around North Korea that might have influenced its behavior.

Following the division of Korea at the end of World War Two and the failure of the Korean War to unify the peninsula, North and South Korea were in constant competition to gain both domestic and international political legitimacy. This quest for legitimacy was broad in scope, including economic, military, diplomatic, and ideological competition. The environment surrounding the country determined which area of competition was emphasized. While domestic political forces influenced the competition, the international political and security environment influenced it as well. We will now provide a brief overview of the development of the *Juche* ideology and some of the domestic and international factors that influenced it. Following that we will be able to apply our model to look more specifically and systematically at how competition structured regime's ideology and behavior.

6.2 The Development of *Juche*

Kim Il Sung first officially proclaimed the *Juche* principal in 1955. In a speech entitled *On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work* (Kim, 1965), Kim called for an independent, creative stand opposed to dogmatism and imitation of the policies of the USSR and China. Kim stated:

> During the war, Ho Kai, Kim Chae Uk, and Pak Il U once quarreled stupidly among themselves over how to do political work in the army. Those from the Soviet Union insisted upon the Soviet method, and those from China, the Chinese method. There should be no set rule that we must follow. Some advocate the Soviet way and others the Chinese, but is it not high time we work out our own (Kim, 1965: 583)?

In this section, Kim is sending a strong message that he is working to purge some of his opponents by emphasizing that they do not understand the Korean revolution. Kim continued:

> What is *Juche* in the ideological work of our party? What are we doing? We are engaged not in the revolution of any other country, but in the Korean revolution. This, the Korean revolution, constitutes the very *Juche* in the ideological work of our party. Therefore all ideological work must be subordinated to the interests of the Korean revolution (Kim, 1965: 587).

Kim stressed the need for the Korean people to find their own way in revolution, and criticized those who refused to do so for practicing revisionism and flunkeyism. In that initial announcement of *Juche*, the concept more simply meant ideological, political, economic and military independence or self-reliance. But over the years *Juche* has changed from being a political line and basis of party work to a broader ideology including more socio-cultural concepts, to something approaching a theological construct.

There were several reasons for Kim's promotion of *Juche* at that time. First, due to changes in the Soviet Union and the emerging Sino-Soviet rift, Kim wanted to promote the idea of a critical need for a truly Korean revolution. Second, Kim was looking for a way to counter Soviet influence in the face of Kruschev's policy of de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence. In 1955, Kruschev was implementing reform in the Soviet Union. He visited Tito in Yugoslavia and recognized that different countries can follow different paths of Communism. This both opened the door for the promotion of a unique form of Communism in North Korea and allowed Kim to deal with the Sino-Soviet split. The third reason, closely related to the second, was that Kim was looking for a method to purge some of his opponents. Kim used *Juche* as a weapon against both the Soviet and

Yenan factions. The ability to express a unique Korean political ideology while at the same time condemning those who followed the Soviet line served Kim well (Park, 1979; Park and Park, 1990;.Park, 1996; Koo, 1992; Hong, 1998). Therefore, *Juche* was at once an ideology used to mobilize the masses around the government and the party as well as a means with coping with inner-party rivalries (Gothel, 1996: 24).

Ten years after his initial introduction of *Juche*, Kim gave a more explicit description of the concept in a speech in Indonesia. In this speech he stated that, "*Juche* means an independent stand of discarding the sprit of relying on others, displaying the spirit of self-reliance, and solving one's own affairs on one's own responsibility under all circumstances" (Kim, 1965, IV: 129). While *Juche* was not at that time included in the constitution or the laws of North Korea, it played an important role not only in mobilization and in domestic and foreign policy formation and decisions. The Sino-Soviet split during the 1960s gave the DPRK both the reason and opportunity to try to follow a new path.

Juche took on an extremely nationalistic form in the 1960s and early 1970s. This was in part due to the fact that Kim and the WPK derived much of their legitimacy from the anti-Japanese struggle. Therefore, everything the party did was based to some extent on strong opposition to foreign influence. The nationalism was also in part a result of the competition between North and South Korea. South Korea was for a time under the leadership of Syngman Rhee and Rhee was under strong American influence. The connection between Rhee and the United States gave Kim the appropriate ammunition to condemn the Rhee regime as a flunkey of the imperialists. The situation in South Korea, according to Kim, was practically a continuation of the Japanese occupation period. In

his 1972 New Year's Address, Kim stated "our people can never allow the US imperialists and Japanese militarists to rob them of their country and become slaves for the latter, and repeat the disgraceful history of 1910 when their country was lost" (Kim, 1976: 92). But as is often the case with new political organizations or governments, it is much easier to say what you are not than it is to clearly define what you are. So, while nationalism was primarily defined in terms of anti-foreignism, North Korea had to find a way to define itself and provide itself with positive identity. By the early 1970s, *Juche* started to be represented by the more positive meanings of political sovereignty, economic self-sufficiency, and military self-defense (Park, 1998: 36).

The Kim regime focused on two primary goals at that time, the building of a self-reliant economy, and the strengthening of the military for self-reliant defense. By the end of 1962, there was a new military line with four basic themes. First was to arm all of the people. Second was fortification of the country. Third was the effort to train all of the soldiers as a cadre force. Fourth was the modernization of arms. As will be discussed below, the simultaneous goals of militarization and economic development caused problems for the North Korean regime because it simply did not have the resources to accomplish both goals effectively.

6.3 Socialist Economic Development in the 1950s and 1960s

During the years immediately following the Korean War, North Korea initiated a program of rapid industrialization to attempt to rebuild the economy and strengthen itself in the competition with South Korea. For some time its efforts were quite successful, but eventually South Korea was able to surpass the North in economic performance. It is

essential therefore to explore North Korea's economic strategy to see how it and its strength relative to the South changed over the years.

North Korea suffered tremendous devastation during the Korean War. Much of the destruction was brought about by US aerial bombardment of the North during which the US dropped more bombs on North Korea than they did on the Japanese Islands during World War II (Hong, 1998). Rapid economic reconstruction was an urgent need. North Korea implemented several multi-year economic plans. The first plan was a three-year plan from 1953 through 1956, which focused on economic recovery through the promotion of rapid growth in heavy industry. The results of this program were outstanding, with output increasing at a rate that even surpassed stated goals. For example, coal output increased from 700,000 tons to 4 million tons, electricity output increased from 1.07 billion kWh to 5.12 billion kWh, steel production increased from 122,000 tons to 365,000 tons, and the production of chemical fertilizer increased from 4,000 tons to 190,000 tons. Although the efforts of the government were focused on heavy industry, some gains were also achieved in the agricultural sector. An additional 149,000 acres were added for rice production and an additional 899,150 acres for corn (Koo, 1992: 67)

The successes of the three-year plan for reconstruction set the stage for Kim's 1956 announcement of a five-year plan to be initiated in 1957. While the three-year plan was focused on reconstruction, the five-year plan was focused on growth. Pushing the idea of an independent national economy, Kim proposed extremely ambitious goals for the North Korean economy with a focus on socialist industrialization and the growth of heavy industry. At the same time, Kim emphasized the need to meet the basic needs of

the people. The plan also included the objectives of completing the collectivization process and improving agricultural technology. The plan achieved amazing growth. The growth was so fast in fact that the goals set were achieved in a period of 2.5 years (Koo, 1992: 78).

In 1958, North Korea created a model similar to China's Great Leap Forward with its own collectivization and industrialization program called The *Chollima Undong* (Flying Horse) Movement. The term *Chollima Undong* refers to horse from Chinese folklore that is able to run great distances at tremendous speeds. The *Chollima* movement was quite similar to the Great Leap Forward in that it promoted the mobilization of the masses in the effort to industrialize. And like the Great Leap Forward, the *Chollima* movement went beyond economic behavior to also include a strong dose of political education and mobilization as well. The movement not only stressed the economic restructuring of North Korean society, but the political and ideological restructuring as well. The masses were to be rallied around the cause of the building of the independent socialist economy. This meant that the people had to develop proper consciousness toward the socialist cause. People had to be reeducated and properly motivated. The *Chollima* movement therefore became a mass movement centered on work teams (Koo, 1992; Park and Park; 1990).

During the 1960s, Kim implemented two programs that were geared toward the restructuring of industrial and agricultural management techniques and injecting an additional dose of political mobilization to economic development. The *Chongsan-ri* method was implemented after Kim's visit to a farm in Chongsan Village in 1960. During that visit he discussed management techniques with the members of the

cooperative farm and concluded that restructuring was needed. The *Chongsan-ri* method calls for a cooperative effort between workers and managers, and cadres and production sites. Supervisors were to help workers better understand their responsibilities, and through a sharing of information, supervisors were to learn from the workers and develop better management techniques. Naturally all of this was conducted within the framework of proper thought and with the goal of developing proper consciousness.

In December of 1961, Kim visited the *Taean* electric plant to give "on-the-spot guidance." Kim again came up with a new management structure for industry, very similar in structure to the agricultural *Chongsan-ri* method. The *Taean* method brought the notion of collective leadership to the factory by placing the factory Party Committee at the center of the management structure. Workers were encouraged to apply their creative abilities and to go to the Party Committee with suggestions for improved management and production. The Party Committee was to insure that workers and management had all of the resources they needed and of course to insure that the workers were receiving proper ideological guidance in their work.

Due to the incredible success of the five-year plan, North Korea initiated a seven-year plan "to carry out an overall technical reconstruction and a cultural revolution, and to radically improve the livelihood of the people relying on the triumphant socialist system" (Kim, 1961: 57). While things started out fairly well for the plan, several factors eventually contributed to disappointing results. One cause for the slow-down in the North Korean growth was a structural problem in the economy. For example, an excessive emphasis on heavy industry created sectoral imbalances. In addition, a

combination of inadequate infrastructure and poor centralized planning caused logjams in distribution (Koo, 1992).

Other causes of the stagnation were more external. One major barrier to the success of the plan was the declining amount of assistance coming from both the USSR and the PRC. Conflicts between the Soviets and the DPRK led to a decline in economic support for the North Korean regime. China was undergoing its own dramatic transformation and simply wasn't willing or able to provide the same level of assistance to the DPRK. **Table 4.1** shows the progressive change in assistance provided to the DPRK by the socialist superpowers.

Table 4.1 ***Foreign Assistance to the DPRK from the USSR and China 1949 - 1978***
(Unit: U.S. $ in Millions)

	1949-1953	1954-1956	1957-1960	1961-1970	1970-1973	1973-1978
USSR	196.25	367.5	156	360	254	145
China	120	456	29	0	100	180
Total	312.25	821.5	182	360	354	325

(Source: Koo, 1992: pgs. 106 & 158)

As seen in Table 4.1, North Korea suffered a dramatic decline in annual economic assistance during the nine-year period from 1961-1970. In the seven-year period from 1954 through 1960, North Korea received over $1 billion in aid averaging $143.35 million per year. From 1961 through 1970, North Korea received $360 million in assistance averaging only $40 million per year. Most noticeable is the absence of assistance from the PRC. The decline in assistance was especially painful to the North Koreans because they built their plans around the assumption that assistance would continue at approximately the same level (Koo, 1992; Fendler, 1996:164).

An additional problem for the North Koreans was its heightened emphasis on military self-reliance and national security, which led to a dramatic increase in defense spending. Defense spending naturally drew resources from economic reconstruction plans. In the end, due to the problems in its seven-year plan, the North Koreans extended the plan by three years (Koo, 1992: 106; Fendler, 1996: 164).

Even with the problems mentioned above, North Korea made economic progress during the 1950s and early 1960s. During that period the industrialization efforts had paid off and North Korea was actually outperforming the South in economic output. Due to its economic successes, North Korea was able to trumpet the superiority of the socialist economy as compared to the authoritarian capitalism of the South. But as in the case of the Great Leap Forward in China, the accelerated economic growth came with tremendous costs and created structural problems in the North Korean economy. Unlike the Chinese though, the North Koreans did not abandon their failing economic strategy, thereby insuring that the problems would continue.

Again, at that time the content of *Juche* was not terribly unique to North Korea. Many of the slogans and rhetoric tied to *Juche* were nearly identical to the slogans and rhetoric coming out of China at the time. There was nothing so unusual about a socialist system wanting to break ties with or conquer imperialism, nothing so unusual about the goal of rapid industrialization, and nothing so unusual about the goal of being able to adequately defend one's borders. Another similarity to Chinese behavior was the notion of mass movements or banner campaigns. Radios constantly blared messages extolling the virtues of the leadership and the socialist way. People were required to devote a

significant part of their time to ideological study, and the hard work and sacrifices made were all in the name of building the party and the nation.

If we look at the behavior of North Korea in the 1960s, as represented in our model, we will see that North Korea maintained relative superiority versus South Korea in every category. North Korea was outperforming the South economically, its system was more stable, and it could easily condemn the South for its lack of independence and strength. For that reason, although North Korea was having problems with its socialist superpower allies, those problems had not caused it to fall behind South Korea. North Korea therefore had no reason at that time to dramatically move away from its initial Marxist-Leninist line. This process is represented in **Diagram 6.1**.

6.4 Changing Economic and Diplomatic Conditions: The 1970s and 1980s

It wasn't until 1970s that *Juche* really started to take its unique form. Elaboration of *Juche* started to come not from Kim himself but from social scientists in North Korea, of course under the guidance of Kim. *Juche* started to truly deviate from Marxist-Leninist theory at that time. *Juche* thought argues that there are two conditions for socialist revolution: the objective condition and the subjective condition. The objective condition refers to more tangible factors such as socio-economic and political conditions. The subjective condition is more abstract. Roughly, the subjective condition refers to the psychological determination and willingness to make sacrifices for the cause of the socialist revolution and the goals of the nation. The subjective aspect of *Juche* breaks from Marxism-Leninism in that class division becomes a matter of the subjective issue of consciousness, instead of the objective issue of socio-economic position. This

Diagram 6.1 North Korea 1960s Process of Identity Development



conceptualization of *Juche* led to two types of revolutionary struggles: 1) struggle against exploiting classes supported by imperialists; and 2) struggle to eradicate bad thought from the masses (Park, 1979: 150-151).

In 1972, a further elaboration of *Juche* was put forth by a group of social scientists gathered in Pyongyang. In that meeting Yang Hyong-sop described *Juche* as having an independent stand and a creative stand. The independent stand meant discarding dependence on others, thinking with one's own brain, believing in one's own power, exalting the revolutionary spirit, and being responsible for solving one's own problems. The creative stand meant opposing dogmatism, and creatively applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism and other countries' experiences to one's own historical condition and national characteristics (Koo, 1992: 25).

As mentioned above, it was also in 1972 when *Juche* was formalized and institutionalized by being included in the New Constitution. The reason for this can be debated, but because Kim had already successfully purged his opponents and established his dominant rule, the expansion of the *Juche* ideology and its inclusion into the constitution was not strictly done to enhance Kim's leadership position in the party. Several other events of the time might help to explain these changes. North Korea experienced some major shocks during the early 1970s. Included in these were South Korea's economic emergence and the Sino-US rapprochement. It was during that period that it became apparent that North Korea was losing its economic competition with the South. This dealt a major blow to North Korea's claim of the superiority of its socialist economic system.

The comparative superiority North Korea held versus the South in economic performance did not last long. By the middle 1960s South Korea's economic growth started to outpace that of the North and by the middle 1970s South Korea had closed the gap and passed North Korea in essentially all indicators of economic performance (Koo, 1996; Oh, 1998; Buzo, 1999). As **Table 4.2** indicates, by 1970 South Korea had closed the gap and then passed North Korea in GNP by the early 1970s.

Table 4.2 ***Comparison of GNP for the ROK and DPRK 1960, 1966, 1970-1980***
(Unit: US$ Billion, trade exchange rate)

Year	ROK	DPRK	ROK/DPRK
1960	1.95	1.52	1.28%
1966	3.67	2.41	1.52%
1970	7.99	3.98	2.00%
1971	9.37	4.09	2.29%
1972	10.57	4.62	2.29%
1973	13.50	6.27	2.15%
1974	18.55	7.29	2.54%
1975	20.85	9.35	2.23%
1976	28.68	9.68	2.96%
1977	27.42	10.64	3.52%
1978	51.96	13.32	3.90%
1979	62.37	12.40	5.03%
1980	60.30	13.50	4.47%

(Source: Buzo, 1999: 91)

The trend that is shown in Table 4.2 is also shown in comparisons of GNP per capita between the two systems as indicated **Table 4.3**.

Table 4.3 ***Comparison of ROK and DPRK in GNP Per Capita, 1960 - 1989***
(Unit: US$)

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1982	1984	1986	1989
ROK	79	105	252	590	1,598	1,773	2,044	2,300	4,968
DPRK	137	192	286	579	758	736	762	860	987

(Source: Koo, 1992: 212)

North Korea's problems at that time were not strictly economic. The regime was also starting to suffer increasing diplomatic isolation. The problems between North Korea and its socialist allies not only impacted the level of aid received by North Korea but also served to further isolate North Korea. The improving relations between China and the United States concerned North Korea because it signaled the reality that China was reforming. That reform created the potential for increased international isolation for North Korea. In addition, tensions between North Korea and the Soviet Union had been increasing. During the 1960s the rhetoric between the two sides often became quite heated, with North Korea condemning the leaders of the USSR for being revisionists, and the Soviets expressing frustration with North Korea for its isolationist, self-reliant line.

In 1964, North Korea sponsored an Asian Economic Conference in Pyongyang. The conference focused on the importance of an independent economy and self-reliance. The Soviets leveled an attack on the conference, stating that the participants in the conference were ignorant of the science of economics. North Korea was furious and issued a strong response in *Nodong Sinmun* on September 7, 1964. In the paper, the North Koreans stated:

> What a contemptuous and arrogant attitude! What pretentious, insolent, and shameless nonsense! These are words that can be used only by the great power

> chauvinists who are in the habit of thinking that they are entitled to decide and order everything, others are all ignorant and they alone are learned (Koo, 1992: 105).

The conflict between the two did not end there, with the Soviets accusing the North Koreans of irrational behavior and the Koreans accusing the Soviets of superpower arrogance and exploitation. North Korea accused the Soviets of exploiting their weakness by overcharging for equipment supplied and underpaying for materials obtained from North Korea. The conflict was not strictly rhetorical. The Soviets started to reduce the amount of financial and technical aid provided to the Koreans, dealing a severe blow to the North Korean's development efforts. The combined domestic and international problems caused a major setback for North Korea. In one quick period, it became apparent that North Korea was losing ground on both its domestic and international claims to be the stronger and more legitimate Korean system.

The comparative international legitimacy went beyond the North Korea's diplomatic relationship with the Socialist superpowers. While North Korea's efforts to garner more international support were effective in absolute terms, the North was losing ground in relative terms as compared to South Korea. **Table 4.4** shows the number of diplomatic partners each side exclusive of the other throughout the 1960s.

Table 4.4 ***DPRK and ROK Exclusive Diplomatic Partners in the 1960s***

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
DPRK	15	15	18	22	23	23	25	27	32
ROK	27	57	67	69	74	75	76	79	80

(Source: Gillis, 1996: 165)

It appeared that North Korea had two clear options at that time. One was to follow suit with its communist partners and attempt to improve relations with the United States and South Korea, the other was to dig in its heels and continue to promote the superiority of its unique system. The regime ended up doing something in between those two options. It increased contact with the outside, but refused to seek any true compromise in negotiations. Each time the North Koreans talked with parties from the outside, progress in negotiations was prevented by North Korea's ideological rigor.

Due to the changing international environment, North Korea not only felt pressured to increase outside contact but to increase direct contact with South Korea. North Korea was placed in a new position. While almost all of its contact with South Korea had been conducted through its socialist superpower allies, North Korea was forced to confront South Korea more directly at this time. Although the two sides talked, no significant progress was ever made in the negotiations. North Korea has been insistent on specific preconditions it knows are unacceptable to the South before it will allow for further progress. In fact, it appears that every time the two sides move toward negotiations, North Korea initiates some provocative behavior.

Ironically, it might have been the movement toward contact that prompted North Korea to increase its ideological rigor. As discussed in Chapter Four, intergroup contact will not necessarily lead to harmonious or cooperative relations. Certain conditions such as equal status among the groups and a supportive surrounding environment are necessary for positive interaction (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994). Due to the economic and strategic realities of the time, North Korea entered the negotiations with the South in a weakened position. It could claim neither economic superiority nor international

legitimacy as compared to South Korea. What, then, did North Korea have to bring to the table? It might be argued that the best things the North could claim were the ideas of nationalism and independence contained in the *Juche* ideology. The content of the ideology constrained North Korea from carrying out truly cooperative behavior with the South. This helps to explain the lack of progress in negotiations.

The talks between North and South Korea, beginning in 1971 and continuing through 1973, showed signs that North Korea was in fact forced into playing the nationalism and independence card. In those talks, and in virtually all talks since that time, North Korea has insisted that a precondition to further negotiations is the removal of US troops from the Korean Peninsula. It was argued that the United States was the true belligerent in Korea and until South Korea would abandon its flunkeyist line no progress could be made in talks. This gave the North the opportunity to increase its highly nationalistic rhetoric focusing on independence and Korea for the Koreans (Buzo, 1999: 95-96). As Park states:

> In this period, North Korea campaigned against the South in terms of its legitimacy. Isolated and empowered by its nationalist sentiment, Pyongyang believed that the Seoul regime could be overthrown by its own masses on the grounds that it lacked nationalist solidarity, and thus, political legitimacy (Park, 1998: 36).

This attitude was quite apparent in Kim's New Year's address of 1972. In that address, even at a time when the North was sitting at the table with the South, Kim's condemnation of South Korean flunkeyism was even more adamant and heated than usual. Also significant is the fact that in that speech, Kim made no reference to the superiority of the Socialist economic system, instead focusing on the importance of

independence and reduction of the influence of United States and Japan in South Korea. For example, Kim stated:

> After they assumed power as puppets, they put up such ostentatious slogan as "independence," "rehabilitation," and "modernization," in their attempt to deceive the South Korean people, but their true colors were exposed long ago in the eyes of the public. Over the past ten years south Korea has traveled not the way to "independence but to complete "dependence" (Kim, 1976: 88).

Kim went on to say claim that peace and prosperity could never be achieved without independence. He focused on the ideological superiority of the system of the DPRK:

> The successive puppet rulers of south Korea, too, without exception, have made every desperate attempt to oppose communism under the slogan of anti-communism. But communism, far from being destroyed in our country, has rather gained in scope and strength with each passing day. In the northern half of the Republic communist ideology became an absolutely dominant ideology long ago, and has turned into a great material force in all fields of politics, economy, culture, and military (Kim, 1976: 90)

The real emphasis of Kim's speech was that if reunification was truly desired the south must develop a more independent position. He stated that if the South Korean leaders truly wanted a solution to their problems, they would:

> Stop their acts of selling out the country and the nation to the U.S. imperialists and Japanese militarists, discontinue their fascist suppression of the south Korean people at once, and respond to the earnest call of the Government of our Republic to realize peaceful reunification through negotiations between the Koreans themselves (Kim, 1976: 91).

Kim added that, "If the south Korean rulers renounce their reliance on the outside forces and depart from the road of treachery to the nation and return to the position which is truly Korean," he would not ask questions about their past but would settle the reunification issue with them (Kim, 1976: 92).

All of Kim's language in this address clearly pointed to the path that North Korea was going to follow in its relations with South Korea and the outside world. It showed that in the face of direct contact with the South, North Korea found itself in the position of having to focus its rhetoric on the one issue area in which it could truly exhibit strength: independence and self-reliance. This was reflected in North Korea's international and domestic behavior.

In the international arena North Korea started an aggressive effort to increase its diplomatic partnerships in the Third World. The emergence of new revolutionary governments throughout Asia, Africa and Central America provided the North Koreans with an excellent opportunity to expand its role and alliances. The principles of *Juche* provided the North Korean regime with an outstanding ideological platform with which to attempt to lead the Non-Aligned countries. In a September 1972 interview with the *Mainichi Shimbum* of Japan, Kim Il Sung made North Korea's position clear when he stated:

> Our government also strives to unite with the new independent countries, and all other countries, on the five principles – respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Our party's *Juche* idea and our Government's independent foreign policy enjoy the active support and sympathy of the world's people. With each day, more and more people throughout the world are expressing sympathy with our Party's revolutionary *Juche* idea, and positively supporting the principle of independence maintained by the Government of the Republic (Kim, 1976: 129).

North Korea's diplomatic efforts paid off, at least in terms of the numbers. North Korea rapidly increased its number of diplomatic partners from 1970 through 1975 and closed the gap with South Korea as seen in **Table 4.5**.

Table 4.5 ***DPRK and ROK Diplomatic Partners, 1970 – 1975***

	1970	1971	1972	1974	1975
ROK	82	84	85	90	92
DPRK	34	36	45	60	87

(Source: Gillis, 1996: 127)

North Korea used the Non-Aligned Movement as a platform to promote its ideological and policy agenda. For example, In the September 1972 NAM Foreign Minister Conference in Georgetown, Guyana the Georgetown Declaration was put forth which advocated the removal of foreign troops from and elimination of foreign influence on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea achieved similar success in the September 1973 NAM meeting attended by 100 Third World Governments. Algeria took the lead in promoting North Korea's cause and put forth the *Algerian Political Declaration*. This Declaration once again called for removal of foreign troops and influence from the Korean Peninsula. NAM also agreed to promote North Korea's position in the United Nations General Assembly by opposing simultaneous entry of the two Koreas (Gillis, 1996: 133-134).

Thus, while North Korea was on the one hand promoting the idea of talks and improved relations between the two sides, it was on the other going around South Korea and attempting to weaken South Korea's diplomatic position. In the end, though, while North Korea was able to acquire expand its diplomatic relations through the NAM, the tangible benefits of that are questionable. North Korea was able to gain some ground on South Korea and to at least temper US strength in the UN for a short period. But in the end the growing strength of South Korea's economy and changes in the policies of many

socialist countries limited the amount of real influence North Korea could exercise over international events.

On the domestic front the North Korean regime was grappling with its economic situation. As shown above, South Korea's economic performance started to catch and surpass North Korea's by the early to mid-1970s. Increased contact with and exposure to South Korea made very clear the emerging economic gap between the two sides. North Korea was willing to admit to some problems in its Socialist economy, but its response once again indicated the influence of ideological competition with the South.

In February 1973, Kim Il Sung delivered a speech in which he discussed the economic situation. In this talk entitled, *On Some Problems for the Improvement of Management of the Economy*, Kim clearly laid out some of the problems and inefficiencies in the centralized management system in Korea. He made it clear that material incentives were to be taken into consideration in managing the economy. But, of course, Kim was not willing to accept or admit that capitalism was a solution. He stated:

> In the transition period when the survivors of the old society linger on in various aspects of social life, it is vital to use such economic levers as the law of value correctly in order to manage the economy rationally. While it is not permissible to overestimate the importance of the law of value in a socialist society and attempt to manage the economy in a capitalist way, it is also a mistake to ignore the importance of that law totally in disregard of the transitional character of a socialist society (Kim, 1992: 338-339).

According to Kim, the primary problem of the North Korean economy was the fact that people were not correctly educated and politically motivated. As Kim said:

> In a socialist society it is important to combine political and moral labour incentives properly with material incentives. In a socialist society the main thing in raising the working people's enthusiasm for production and inducing them to assume the attitude of owners to production is to increase the political and moral incentives to labour by conducting work with the people, political work, in advance (Kim, 1992: 339).

As one might expect given the language of this crucial speech, North Korea did not respond to its economic problems by making more rational reforms to the economy. Instead it embarked on another mass movement campaign to promote development. The regime initiated the *Three-Revolution Team Movement*, in February of that year. This movement promoted three revolutions: ideological, technological and cultural. There was an effort to crack down on any ideas of economic conservatism in Korean society. The regime simultaneously initiated the *Three-Revolution Red Flag Movement*, which was a propaganda campaign attached to the program. During this time students were sent around the country to promote correct thought and to encourage hard work and political study. As might be imagined, the results of the program were not good and the North Korean economy stagnated.

At that time, Kim still commonly referred to Communism and Marxism-Leninism in his speeches. The term *Juche* was not as prevalent as it would later become. This exhibited the fact that *Juche* was still primarily an expression of nationalism and anti-imperialism that was a component of the North Korean form of Communism. It had not yet developed into the more comprehensive ideological and political construct it would later become. From the late 1970s into the 1980s *Juche* was expanded, transformed, and started to move from being an addition to Communism to completely replacing Communism and Marxism-Leninism as the dominant ideology.

While *Juche* was consistently being reworked, the major changes in the ideology occurred in several large steps. The major changes came in 1982, in 1986 with the development of Socio-Political Body Theory, and in 1992 when Marxism-Leninism was

completely expunged from the revised Constitution. These significant changes coincided with a change in North Korea's position *vis-à-vis* South Korea.

North Korea's economic and diplomatic problems of the 1970s continued through the 1980s. First, North Korea's economic situation appeared be deteriorating. The second seven-year plan in effect at that time was not having the positive results the North Koreans had hoped for. North Korea was still suffering from economic shortages and the quality of life for the people was not improving. This was in stark contrast to the continuing rapid expansion of South Korea's economy. In addition, North Korea was at that time attempting to confront its succession question and insure that Kim Jong Il was in place to take the reigns of power from his father.

During the 1980s and 1990s, South Korea continued its tremendous economic success. Internationally, South Korea started to expand the concept of economic diplomacy, using its economic strength to establish more diplomatic relations and strengthen its international status. The efforts of economic diplomacy were quite successful. Throughout the 1980s North Korea watched as South Korea achieved recognition from one country after another. More painful to the North, though, was the fact that diplomatic relations between South Korea and Beijing, Moscow, and Tokyo were apparently on the upswing.

Both China and the Soviet Union were implementing dramatic reforms to their systems, making it apparent that they were moving away from hard line socialism. For example, during the Sixth Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee in 1986, the PRC put forth a strong policy statement on ideology and culture in China. In that statement the CCP admitted that the reforms had significantly altered China and the thinking of the

Chinese people. While the policy statement contained compromises for the hardliners, it was clearly a statement of China's plan to continue reform and to even consider further political and social liberalization (Wang, 1995: 60).

North Korea felt betrayed by the reforms this and by the level of contact between South Korea and the socialist superpowers. Trade links were expanding and it was apparent that the nations were moving toward full diplomatic relations. Symbolically, North Korea was wounded when South Korea was awarded the Asian Games of 1986 and the Olympic Games in 1988. Much to North Korea's dismay and despite North Korea's pleading and protests China decided to participate in both games. Many Socialist states participated in the Olympic games.

By the end of the 1980s in addition to suffering economic problems, North Korea was experiencing immense diplomatic losses. The diplomatic crisis was quite severe for North Korea. As Oh states:

> At the end of the cold war, in 1992, North Korea's diplomatic scorecard recorded full diplomatic relations with 19 states in the Asia-Pacific, 20 in the Americas, 33 in Europe, 14 in the Middle East, and 42 in Africa. By comparison, South Korea had diplomatic relations with 31, 34, 45, 19, and 41 nations in these respective regions. South Korea wins by 170 to 128. North Korea is also a member of 22 international organizations, compared to South Korea's 54 memberships (Oh, 1998: 132).

It wasn't only the quantity of the relationships that mattered, but also the quality. North Korea lost great ground versus South Korea when the South established diplomatic relations with Moscow in 1990 and Beijing in 1992. To add insult to injury, the highly contested issue of North and South Korean participation in the UN was decided in South Korea's favor. North Korea had attempted to block South Korea's unilateral entry into the UN by proposed that North and South Korea share a single seat, while South Korea

proposed simultaneous membership. Finally North Korea was forced to succumb to the South's proposal and the two systems entered simultaneously in September of 1991.

All of this was occurring simultaneously with increasing contacts between the two Koreas. A series of talks between the two sides occurred throughout the 1980s covering topics from separated families, to security, to economic relations. Inter-Korean trade started on a small scale, gradually increasing until South Korea became the North's third-largest trading partner by 1995. It was clear that North Korea was losing the legitimacy competition in terms of economic performance and diplomatic recognition. Yet, because the North considered relations with South Korea a zero-sum game, it could not easily admit to the relative advantages held by the South. The regime was therefore forced into a position of finding terms of competition in which it could succeed. The path that North Korea chose was the expansion and strengthening of the ideas of Korean nationalism and independence under the *Juche* banner. On the international front, North Korea attempted to expand its cooperation with and influence in the Non-Aligned movement.

6.5 The Response to Economic and Diplomatic Setbacks: The Expansion of *Juche*

In a bit of a departure from the typical language extolling the virtues and superiority of the North Korean system, Kim Jong Il gave a speech in October of 1982 in which he admitted to some of the regimes' concerns and signaled changes to come. Kim stated:

> Today our party has entered a new stage of development. Our revolution is assuming a protracted and arduous nature and generations are changing among our revolutionary ranks. The internal and external situation of our revolution is strained and complicated. Realities raise the establishment of the monolithic

> ideological system of the Party as a still more important problem (Kim as quoted in Buzo, 1999: 108).

In this speech, it is apparent that while Kim is pointing to the difficulties faced by North Korea, he is also emphasizing the importance of focusing on the further development of the *Juche* ideology to resolve the crisis. It was in that context that *Juche* started to undergo yet another transformation.

In the 1980s, *Juche* moved from being a strong statement of militant nationalism to a form of paternalistic Socialism and finally to a very comprehensive worldview and something resembling a religion. The major shift in the structure and application of *Juche* was signaled with a treatise written by Kim Jong Il in March of 1982 and sent to the National Seminar on the *Juche* idea held to mark Kim Il Sung's 70th birthday. This treatise was in part a confirmation of Kim Jong Il's place as the rightful heir to the leadership of North Korea. It was also in part the indication that *Juche* was to take a more central place in the North Korean system. The centrality of *Juche* was emphasized when Kim wrote:

> The history of the Korean revolution pioneered and led by the leader is a glorious history, which records the splendid application and over-all victory of the great *Juche* idea. The *Juche* idea represents an invariable guiding idea of the Korean revolution and a great revolutionary banner of our time. At present, we are confronted with the honorable task of modeling the whole society on the *Juche* idea (Kim, 1985: 14).

In this treatise, Kim went on to explain the historical conditions that led to the formation of *Juche* and then to provide the most elaborate description and explanation of *Juche* to date. According to Kim, *Juche* contains philosophical, socio-historical, and guiding principles. Kim described *Juche* as a man-centered philosophy that explained man's place in the world. Thus, as Kim states, the *Juche* idea is "based on the

philosophical principle that man is the master of everything and decides everything. The *Juche* idea raised the fundamental question of philosophy by regarding man as the main factor" (Kim 1985, 20).

According to Kim, man is a social being with independence (*Chajusong*), creativity (*Changuisong*), and consciousness (*Uisiksong*). Central to the philosophical idea of *Juche* is the concept of *Chajusong*. *Chajusong* roughly means independence from manipulation by institutions, material conditions, or mythical beliefs such as religion. *Chajusong* is what grants man the power to control the material world, to be the master of everything. As Kim states, "*Chajusong* is an attribute of social man who is desirous of living and developing in an independent way as master of the world and his own destiny. On the strength of this quality, man throws off the fetters of nature, opposes social subjugation of all forms and puts everything at his own service" (Kim 1985: 21). In broader terms, Kim's description of *Chajusong* represents the fundamental principle of self-reliance in *Juche* but has moved self-reliance from being a statement of national independence to a principle of individual independence.

Also important to the philosophy of *Juche* is the notion of creativity or *Changuisong*. According to *Changuisong*, man is not only an independent being, but a creative being as well. Creativity gives man the ability to adapt to objective conditions and to make changes appropriate to that condition. Kim writes, "By virtue of his creativity, man transforms nature and society to be more useful and more beneficial to him by changing the old and creating the new" (Kim, 1985: 22).

The third important philosophical component of *Juche*, as described by Kim, is consciousness, or *Uisiksong*. Consciousness is more scientific in its nature, and as Park

describes it is a "mental activity, a special function of the brain which directs man's independent and creative activities in a unified way (Park, 1996: 13). Or as Kim explains, "Because he has consciousness man understands the world and its laws of motion and development, reshapes and advances nature and society as he desires. Consciousness guarantees the *Chajusong* and creativity of man, the social being, and ensures his purposeful cognition and practice" (Kim, 1995: 22). *Uisiksong*, then, is the conscious decision of man to focus his energies on the correct application of independence and creativity toward making the world a better place.

These rather abstract concepts within *Juche* had a very practical application for the regime. While the regime was struggling with economic development and international legitimacy, the philosophical components allowed for the justification of mass movements, for the continuous education of the masses, and for the development of a unique Korean approach to development. North Korea's problems, as recognized by Kim above, could be explained not as a failure of the regime's policies but as a failure of the people to properly apply *Chajusong*, *Changuisong*, and *Uisiksong* to North Korea's current condition. This allowed the regime to justify the continuation of its current policies even in the face of crisis.

The socio-historical principle of the *Juche* idea is based on the role of the masses in history. The working masses are the "subject of history and the motive force of social progress" (Kim, 1985:25). That is, armed with *Chajusong*, *Changuisong*, and *Uisiksong*, the masses go out to transform nature and society. The primary goal of the working masses in their efforts to transform the world is to defend *Chajusong*. But, of course, the

masses cannot defend *Chajusong* without proper leadership and guidance from the party and the leader of the masses. As Kim states:

> Only when they receive correct guidance from the party and the leader, would the working class and the masses of other people be able to vigorously develop the deep-going and complicated revolutionary struggle to transform nature and society, achieve national and class liberation, build a socialist, communist society successfully, and run it properly (Kim, 1995: 27).

The idea of defending *Chajusong* not only carries the positive message of building socialism, but also the negative message of destroying capitalism and imperialism. Capitalism is described as the latest exploiting system that prohibits people from achieving *Chajusong*. Not until capitalism and imperialism are destroyed will the people of the world achieve realize their true independence. Thus, the struggle to defend *Chajusong* is an international struggle.

The concept of consciousness, or *Uisiksong*, is given a central place in the movement of the masses to defend *Chajusong*. That is, consciousness takes precedence over materialism. If consciousness falls behind materialism in importance, man can never achieve *Chajusong*. One of the great tragedies of capitalism is that it places greater significance on materialism, thereby robbing man of his independence and creativity. As Kim writes, "Capitalism subordinates even man's thinking and action to money considerations, but socialism and communism make the masses of the people the true masters of society, and therefore give full play to the revolutionary enthusiasm and creative zeal of the masses" (Kim, 1985: 39).

If one looks at Kim's comments in the context of the environment in which the regime was operating at that time, it is clear that a very strong message is being sent about the path that North Korea will follow. It is significant that Kim makes no mention

of the economic superiority of socialism or *Juche* economics as compared to capitalism. He in fact, almost seems to be making a tacit admission that capitalism can create greater wealth. But the cost of that achievement is too high. In order to achieve wealth, one must sacrifice independence, creativity, and consciousness. Capitalism may create material wealth but it will destroy spiritual development and the achievement of a better society.

In the context of events at that time, it is clear that Kim is making the conscious decision to respond to the domestic and international crises not by following his socialist partners in reform, but by strengthening the *Juche* idea, and increasing the role of *Juche* in society. For that reason, Kim did not simply discuss *Juche* as a philosophical concept but as a guiding principle that would instruct North Korea and the North Korean people how to behave. In this way, the philosophical and socio-historical principles of *Juche* took a stronger role in guiding policy and action.

Kim explained the significance of and the role that the guiding principles of *Juche* would take in his Treatise. He wrote:

> The guiding principles of the *Juche* idea the guide to establishing *Juche* in Party and state activities, and in all spheres of revolution and construction. They are explicit fundamental principles which must be observed in successfully carrying out the revolution and construction by adhering to the independent and creative stands and enhancing the role of ideological consciousness (Kim, 1985: 41).

Essential to the guiding principles are *Juche* in ideology, independence in politics, self-sufficiency in the economy, and self-reliance in defense. Kim described each of those in detail.

The principle of *Juche* in ideology is primarily concerned with the notion of anti-flunkeyism, opposing the influence of foreign powers in national development. This

concern with of anti-flunkeyism was a very blatant criticism of South Korea and represents the clearest statement of North Korea's claim to superiority over their adversary. According to Kim:

> What is most harmful and dangerous at present is flunkeyism toward U.S. imperialism in particular. This servility, which is expressed in the fear and worship of the United States, is doing great harm to the revolutionary struggle of the people. The harmfulness of this servility is most notable in south Korea today. Servility to US imperialism, which has been spread by the US imperialist aggressors and their stooges, is the most harmful ideological poison which is paralyzing people's national and class consciousness in south Korea and trampling upon the precious cultural heritage and beautiful customs of our nation. Unless the struggle is intensified to oppose the fear and worship of the United States among the south Korean people and to heighten their spirit of national independence, neither the victory of the south Korean revolution nor the independent reunification of the country would be possible (Kim, 1985: 45).

Again, it is significant to note that nowhere in his Treatise does Kim refer to the economic superiority of the North Korean system. All comparative references focus on the relative independence of North Korea and its ideological superiority. A powerful nation is one that is independent from foreign domination.

Kim's discussion relating to independence in politics and self-reliance in economics and national defense focus on the same theme. Independence does not mean total isolation from the outside world, but means freedom from domination by outside powers. It is at that point that Kim makes clear his agenda for political and economic behavior in North Korea. He describes the *Juche* work method that will instruct the masses on how to build the society and defend *Chajusong*. The *Chongsan-ri* and *Taean* systems are the fundamental guidelines to work in North Korean society. Work is guided by ideological strength not by financial incentives. Kim argues that the "*Juche* work method is fundamentally opposed to the method of moving people by offering money or using force (Kim, 1985: 58).

Kim again strives to make a clear distinction between North and South Korea in his discussion of work toward the development of society. While in South Korea, work is guided by the profit motive and material incentive, North Korea focuses its energy on ideology, ideological remolding, and the precedence of political work. He writes:

> Neglecting the political and moral incentive and placing the main emphasis on the material incentive runs counter to the essential character of socialist society. This is a very dangerous and harmful tendency. It fosters selfishness among the working people and makes them mercenary and acquisitive. In the final analysis, it undermines the socialist system and the revolutionary achievements. Under socialism the political and moral incentive should be the first precedence in all circumstances. The essential superiority of the socialist system lies in the fact that the popular masses, who have become the masters of everything, consciously work in firm unity for the country and the people, for the society and the collective (Kim, 1985: 67-68).

Again, Kim does not try to argue that socialism provides greater material wealth, but instead provides greater ideological and spiritual progress through the protection of *Chajusong*. The method for achieving national greatness, then, is not in capitalism, but in the promotion of independence through ideological and political education and mass movements.

It seems that in 1982 Kim is drawing a political and ideological line in the sand. In his 1982 Treatise and in subsequent writings for the next several years Kim reiterated the place of *Juche* in North Korean society and politics. In the face of rapid changes in the international environment and domestic economic situation, Kim clearly stated that North Korea will not follow other socialist countries down the path of revisionism, but will instead strengthen itself through ideological and political means. Only in this way can North Korea preserve its independence and prove its superiority to the South Korean system.

From that point forward, North Korea continued down the path of developing *Juche* as a unique ideology and statement of national independence. Through the 1980s and into the early 1990s *Juche* was further explained and expanded. Articles and speeches discussed not only the significance of *Juche* in politics and economics but in all other aspects of life, especially education and the arts. *Juche* started to take on more of a religious structure in the mid-1980s and ultimately came to replace Marxism-Leninism as the official policy of North Korea. The changes in the *Juche* ideology and the behavior of the regime coincided with a number of major shocks to the North Korean quest for legitimacy and with increasing contacts with the south. Perhaps the most significant change to *Juche* came in 1986 with the advent of the Socio-Political Body Theory.

6.6 Socio-Political Body Theory

In July of 1986, Kim Jong Il delivered a talk to the Senior Officials of the Central Committee of the WPK. In that speech entitled, *On Some Problems of Education in the Juche Idea*, Kim explained the meaning and significance of Socio-Political Body Theory. In that speech Kim started to more clearly distinguish North Korean *Juche* from other forms of socialism and to present it as an improvement on Marxism-Leninism. He stated that *Juche* "does not abandon the ideological and theoretical achievements of Marxism-Leninism, but further develops and enriches them as required by historical progress" (Kim, 1987: 9). From that point forward, *Juche* has taken on a much more spiritual tone, in opposition to the weaknesses of some forms of socialism and the decadent materialism of capitalism.

Kim makes a strong statement about the importance of North Korea developing a unique ideology and not falling into the trap of following the lead the socialist superpowers. He sends a message that North Korea is not going to fall prey to the capitalist powers as the Soviet Union and China had done. He states:

> We must not harbor any illusions about large countries or developed nations. Illusion is not reality. We must always base ourselves on the specific realities of our country. Large countries or developed nations are not always right, nor do their experiences suit the specific situation in our country. We should appreciate the role of large countries and develop friendly relations with them, but we must not abandon *Chajusong* and follow them blindly. Friendship is necessary for the sake of *Chajusong*, and genuine friendship can be ensured only when we maintain an independent stand. The greatness of a nation is by no means attributable to the size of its territory and population. Just as a man's worth is defined by his ideology, so the greatness of a nation is determined by the greatness of its guiding ideology (Kim, 1997: 15).

In this speech Kim makes it quite clear that in the face of the current international environment and domestic situation, North Korea must distinguish itself as a unique ideological system.

In Socio-Political Body Theory, the entire society is viewed as a single living organism whose separate parts: the workers, the party, and the leader have specific roles. By all contributing to the socio-political body, the masses can help create an immortal independent being. Kim states:

> By uniting around the leader into one organization with a single ideology, under the guidance of the party, the masses form a socio-political organism as an independent being. The physical life of an individual person is finite, but the integrity of the masses rallied as an independent socio-political organism is immortal (Kim, 1997: 19).

The biological analogy is very strong in Socio-Political Body Theory. In the North Korean Socio-Political Body, the leader plays the role of the brain of the society. It is from the brain that all guidance must emanate.

> Just as a man's brain is the center of his life, so the leader, the top brain in a socio-political community, is the center of the life of this community. The leader is called the top brain of the socio-political organism because he is the focal point which directs the life of this organism in a unified manner. The leader is the center which analyzes, synthesizes and integrates the interests of the masses and their desire for independence; at the same time, he is the center which has unified command of their creative activities to put them into effect (Kim, 1987: 20).

The party is the nerve center of the socio-political body. It serves to transmit the messages from the leader and guide activity of the masses.

> When individuals are united organizationally and ideologically with the leader, the center of the socio-political organism, through party organizations and share the same destiny with the party, they will acquire an immortal socio-political integrity. It is only when people take an active part in organizational and ideological activities as members of a party organization or a socio-political organization led by the party that they can become more closely tied in kinship with the leader, the center of the socio-political organism, and exalt their socio-political integrity (Kim, 1987: 20).

It is apparent that Kim is attempting to distinguish North Korean ideology by placing emphasis on the leader. No society can have true socialism or true revolution without the leader. Kim states that appreciation and loyalty to the leader are the "lifeblood of a true communist" (Kim, 1987: 24).

The more spiritual side of Socio-Political Body Theory comes from how man achieves happiness in life. Man can achieve a full life, or socio-political integrity, by making a contribution to the whole of society, to being accepted by the social collective. Kim Jong Il explained this when he wrote:

> Loyalty to the leader is based on the collectivist outlook on life that the integrity of a socio-political community is the source of an individual's integrity. It is life that is most valuable to a man. In this regard, his socio-political integrity is more valuable than his physical life, and the integrity of a social community is more precious than an individual's integrity. The integrity of a social community is the basis of an individual's integrity (Kim, 1987: 25).

Kim emphasizes that the spiritual life provided by being a part of the socio-political body is far superior to a materialistic life geared toward satisfying physical needs. If a man's life is geared toward satisfying only physical needs, "then it is no different than that of an animal and if a man's life is isolated from the leader, the party, and the masses, it is worthless and contrary to the man's social nature (Kim, 1987: 25).

In an important part of the speech, Kim points out that in spite of the struggles North Korea is facing, the masses must not abandon the teachings of the leader of submit to "defeatism." In fact, Kim claims that misunderstanding of the leader's teachings caused North Korea's problems in the first place (Kim, 1987: 26). For that reason, the essential goal is to work harder to follow the leader regardless of the circumstances. He states:

> The worship of the major powers and a dogmatic approach to things foreign are a further expression of a lack of the proper revolutionary attitude towards the leader. As a matter of principle, revolutionary duty and comradeship should not change according to circumstances and conditions. Children love and respect their parents not because their parents are superior to others nor because the children receive special attention from them but because the parents gave them life and brought them up. A man with the sense of revolutionary duty shares the same fate with the leader, the party, and the masses, which are the parent body of his integrity, at all times, whatever the circumstances, whether favorable or unfavorable. In a man feels disappointed and thinks badly of his country because it is backward, or betrays his threatened motherland in order to save himself, no-one and no country will consider him a man of conscience. A man with the sense of revolutionary duty will neither worship the major powers nor betray his leader, his party, and his motherland, whatever the adversity (Kim, 1987: 27).

Again, Kim is sending the message that following the ways of the other socialist countries is not acceptable for a true revolutionary. North Korea is taking an ideological stand. No matter what how much adversity it confronts, and no matter what the rest of the socialist world does, North Korea will adhere to its policy of independence and self-reliance. Any other behavior would sacrifice the integrity of the nation and of the

individual. While the masses might have to suffer economic hardship, such hardship will be well worth the spiritual benefits.

In a later treatise published in *Rodong Sinmun* in 1994, Kim expanded on the concepts and importance of Socio-Political Body Theory and tried to clarify its uniqueness and superiority. Socio-Political Body Theory provided the regime with both a way to promote the centrality of the leader and the party in North Korean society and a way to attack the capitalist systems and the socialist systems that were reforming. Because *Juche* provided man with the opportunity to achieve socio-political integrity, it was far superior to capitalism, even if capitalism could provide material well being. Socio-Political Body Theory was presented as a "scientific" approach to socialism, different from the "utopian socialism" embraced by the Soviet Union and China (Kim, 1988; Kim, 1989; Kim; 1994). In line with that, the North Korean regime started to make clear distinctions between traditional Marxism-Leninism and *Juche* theory.

According to Socio-Political Body Theory, capitalism denies man of his ability to live a good life. Kim states, "a decadent material life, a poor mental and cultural life, and a reactionary political life – these can be said to be the main characteristic of capitalist society, and they show the anti-popular nature and corruption of modern imperialism" Kim, 1994: 10). Socio-Political life and Socio-Political integrity is more important than physical life.

Kim Jong Il explained several fundamental flaws in traditional socialism. First, with its emphasis on materialism and relations of production, the traditional theory of socialism viewed social and historical movement as a "natural historical process which changes and develops due to material and economic factors" (Kim, 1994: 5). While Kim

argued that this view of social relations made a contribution, it was not free from historical limitations. The primary flaw in the traditional socialist ideal was that it left little room for human agency, and didn't give enough emphasis to the importance of the influence of the masses. Kim claimed then that socialism in some countries was failing because in "seeing material and economic factors as fundamental in the revolutionary struggle, the preceding theory of socialism failed to rise to the task of strengthening the motive force of the revolution and enhancing its role as the best way to carry out the revolution" (Kim, 1994: 6).

Another flaw in Marxism is in its definition of man's essential quality. Marxism's definition of man's essential quality as the sum total of social relations did not truly capture the essence of man. Again, Marxism did the world a service by shattering the myths upon which capitalism was built, but it didn't go far enough. As Kim stated due to this flaw in Marxism, "it cannot correctly explain the relations between man and the world, or the position and role of man in the world" (Kim, 1994: 11). Of course, *Juche* solves this problem. "The *Juche* idea has, for the first time, found a scientific solution to the question of man's own essential qualities. On that basis, it has thrown a new light on his position and role in the world. Man is a social being with independence, creativity and consciousness. Herein lie his essential qualities" (Kim, 1994: 11).

Without an understanding of this essential nature of man, and a proper understanding of the meaning man can obtain in life by becoming a part of the socio-political body, it is clear that there is no hope for the long term survival of either capitalist or Marxist societies. Only North Korea has the answer in *Juche*. It is no surprise then that the socialist systems were becoming revisionist and reactionary.

Not surprisingly, the advent of Socio-Political Body Theory was accompanied by a number of attacks not only on capitalism but also on the reforming socialist systems. Due to their failure to understand the true driving force behind socialism, these nations fell prey to the propaganda of the capitalists. He argued that these "stooges" of the capitalists believed that they could compromise with the capitalists and repair some of the fundamental flaws inherent in the capitalist system. As Kim stated:

> The exploiter class and their stooges put forward the "theory of class cooperation" and tried to block the struggle of the exploited working masses against exploitation and oppression. Within the communist movement, reformists and revisionists demanded "class cooperation" and seriously harmed the revolutionary movement. Today, traitors to socialism are also clamoring for a return to capitalism, harboring illusions about capitalism and expecting "aid" and "cooperation" from the imperialists. History shows that to expect "good will" or "class cooperation" from the exploiter class is to make a mess of the revolution (Kim, 1994: 4).

Again, the fundamental flaw of these socialist systems was that they did not understand the essential quality of man, and the importance of the masses in leading the revolution. These countries placed emphasis on objective economic and material conditions and focused exclusively on economic construction. They failed to give proper attention to the ideological remolding of the masses. For that reason, their systems stagnated. If the leaders of these systems truly understood the mistakes they made and the proper nature of revolution, they could have responded to stagnation appropriately, by placing the proper emphasis on ideology and political education. Instead, taking advantage of this lack of proper understanding, "the renegades of socialism carried out 'reforms' and committed counterrevolutionary acts, destroying the socialist economic system itself" (Kim, 1994: 7).

Kim's statements make it clear that in the 1980s and 1990s North Korea was making a clear effort to distance itself from the reforming socialist systems. Socialist reformers were added to the list of enemies along with imperialists, capitalists, and flunkies. The North Koreans went so far as to remove all reference to Marxism-Leninism in their 1992 Constitution.

North Korea's behavior through the 1980s and 1990s falls in line with its ideological statements. The regime showed some signs of opening the system but in the end fundamental and substantive reforms were avoided. In spite of all of North Korea's very severe problems, the regime refused to stray from its hard intellectual line. Although the regime has at times made some moves toward reforming the system and opening further to the outside world, each time it has done something to anger and alienate the international community and either slow or stop progress.

In spite of worsening conditions, North Korea's domestic economic program seemed to follow the same pattern as in the past. In response to the stagnation of the economy the regime implemented one of its standard mass mobilization campaigns. In the early 1980s, the regime initiated the *Speed of the Eighties* campaign under the slogan, "Let Us Create the Speed of the Eighties in the Spirit of the Great *Chollima* Upswing." The *Speed of the Eighties* campaign was essentially a continuation of the *Three-Revolution* and *Three-Revolution Red Flag Movement.*

In his speeches of the day, Kim Jong Il continued to emphasize the ideological nature of economic reform. In a May 1983 speech entitled *Let Us Advance Under the Banner of Marxism-Leninism and the Juche Idea*, Kim highlighted this when he stated:

> The ideological, technical and cultural revolutions are a continuation of the revolution under socialism and its advancement to a new higher stage. The

> revolution for independence of the working class and working masses, which started with the struggle to overthrow the old exploiting system, is carried forward to the struggle in socialist society to eliminate the ideological, technical and cultural backwardness, the legacy of the old society, and is completed through this struggle.... In carrying out the three revolutions our party adheres to the principle of giving definite precedence to the ideological revolution and vigorously pushing ahead with the technical and cultural revolutions simultaneously (Kim, 1995: 121).

During the 1980s, the regime continued to push for the dominance of ideology in economic reform. An effort was made to expand the *Three-Revolution Red Flag Movement* and promote ideological education. In a 1996 speech to the Vanguard of *the Three-Revolution Red Flag Movement* entitled appropriately, *Let Us Step up the Three-Revolution Red Flag Movement*, Kim stated that the movement was achieving great success. He stated:

> The technical revolution has been accelerated through the *Three-Revolution Red Flag Movement* so that the levels of mechanization and automation in production processes at factories and enterprises have been raised, and the material and technical foundations of the rural economy have been strengthened. Thus heavy labor has been eased to a great extent and major achievements have been made in production and construction (Kim, 1989: 2).

Of course, Kim's proclamation that the movement was successful was greatly exaggerated. By all indications, the North Korean economy was stagnating. Starting in the second half of the 1970s the growth of North Korea's GNP declined to 4% (Chun, 1996: 3). The decline continued in the late 1980s. From 1987 through 1989 it was estimated that North Korea's economic growth rate averaged less that 3% per year (Ahn, 1997).

Did North Korea simply sit back and watch the decline? The answer is yes and no. North Korea did attempt to implement some economic reforms during the 1980s. Some of the reforms included reorganization of the planning system, the expansion of the

independent accounting system, and reorganization of collective farms to national farms or agricultural associated enterprises. All of the reforms were geared toward fine tuning the socialist system rather than toward introducing capitalist oriented reform (Chun, 1996: 22). And all of the reforms were influenced and guided by the ideological principles of *Juche*.

Perhaps the most significant effort in reform of the economy was the 1984 enactment of a Joint Venture law and the creation of a special economic zone in the northeastern part of the country. North Korea started to place laws on the books that supported foreign enterprises operating in the country. And on paper, these laws looked fairly progressive. Yet, the Joint Venture Law and the SEZs have not lived up to their promise. Noland points to the controlled nature of North Korean society and political obstacles in North Korea as an explanation for this failure. He states, "The successful operation of an SEZ requires freedom of movement and a culture, if not of efficiency, then at least of non-interference. Everything in the broader North Korean society where economics is subservient to politics works against this" (Noland, 1996: 11).

While the North Korean regime spoke of opening the economy for more foreign trade and investment, it was intentionally and unintentionally blocking progress on that front due to the fear of ideological pollution caused by exposure to the outside, and by the continuing efforts to put ideology over economics in practice. Foreign firms were hesitant to invest in such a risky situation in which the North Koreans invited them in and then condemned them for being corrupt bourgeois imperialists. North Korea's policies to open the economy have been half-hearted at best and that is reflected in the performance

of the economy into the 1990s. In the early 1990s, North Korea actually had a negative growth rate as seen in **Table 4.6**.

Table 4.6 ***DPRK and ROK Economic Growth Rates, 1990-1994***

Year	Country	GNP US$ bn	GNP/cap US$	Growth Rate %
1990	DPRK	23.1	1,064	-3.7
	ROK	242.2	5,659	9.3
1991	DPRK	22.9	1,038	-5.2
	ROK	281.7	6,518	8.4
1992	DPRK	21.1	943	-7.6
	ROK	305.7	7,007	5.0
1993	DPRK	20.5	904	-4.3
	ROK	330.8	7,513	8.2
1994	DPRK	21.2	923	-1.7
	ROK	376.9	8,483	8.2

(Source: Ahn, 1997: 4)

As seen in Table 4.6, North Korea's economy declined into the 1990s. To make matters worse, South Korea's economy was performing exceptionally well during the same period. North Korea dug itself an ideological hole and due to its insistence on distinguishing itself from South Korea it was losing the economic legitimacy competition.

As mentioned above, North Korea's performance in the diplomatic international arena was not much better than its economic performance. In fact, a series of diplomatic crises contributed to the problems in the economy. Through the 1980s and 1990s, North

Korea has exhibited inconsistency and confusing behavior in the diplomatic realm. One of North Korea's stated goals was to improve direct relations with the United States in an effort to place pressure on South Korea. Yet North Korea even showed inconsistency in its behavior toward the US. Examples of North Korea's seemingly erratic behavior are numerous.

One glaring example of inconsistency in North Korea's behavior occurred in 1983. On October 8, 1983, the North Koreans sent a message to Washington through Beijing that it would like to initiate direct talks. The following day, South Korean President Chun and some of his closest advisors were visiting Rangoon, Burma to attend a wreath-laying ceremony at a monument to that nation's founders. A group of North Korean agents detonated a bomb during the ceremony, killing some of Chun's closest advisors (Oberdorfer, 1997: 144).

In November 1987, while North Korea was trying to attract foreign investment into its new economic zone and was in discussions with South Korea concerning its place in the 1998 Olympics, two North Korean agents planted a bomb on Korean Airlines Flight 858. The bomb detonated on its flight from Abu Dhabi to Seoul killing all 115 passengers. The act was reported to have been initiated by Kim Il Sung in order to dissuade other nations from attending the 1988 Olympics in Seoul (Oberdorfer, 1997: 183).

Efforts on the part of both North and South Korea during the late 1980s and early 1990s to promote economic linkages between the two systems appeared to pay off. In 1991, the two sides signed the historic *Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North.* In this agreement,

North and South Korea promised non-interference in each other's internal affairs, efforts to work toward lasting peace, confidence building measures and arms reductions, and economic, social and cultural exchanges. The following December, North and South Korea signed the *Joint Declaration on the De-Nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula*. The progress of these two agreements was fairly quickly wiped out due to suspicions over North Korea's nuclear program and came to a halt when North Korea announced it was leaving the NPT in 1993 (Mo, 1996; Oberdorfer, 1997).

North Korea's economic and food situation hit crisis proportions in the mid to late 1990s. North Korea had to take the very difficult step of requesting assistance from the South. In 1995, negotiations were held in Beijing to discuss rice shipments to North Korea. The talks eventually broke down because North Korea insisted on several conditions including one that stated that any rice must come in the form of civilian assistance and that the markings must be removed. The North Korean delegation left the meetings, stating, "We will not sacrifice our political independence because of rice" (Hong, 1998: 562). When shipments of rice were made, the North Koreans responded by forcibly hoisting the DPRK flag on the first South Korean ship to deliver rice. The North Koreans also detained the entire crew of another ship claiming that one of the crew members had engaged in espionage by taking pictures of the harbor (Koh, 1996: 15).

In 1996, when North Korea was in the middle of attempting to negotiate toward improved relations with the United States, a North Korean submarine ran aground off the coast of South Korea. The incident initiated a South Korean effort to locate any North Korean infiltrators. South Korea reported that it found eleven North Korean soldiers already dead, executed with bullets to the back of their heads. One of the soldiers was

captured alive. The submarine incident set off another round of belligerent talk and behavior between the adversaries, and slowed progress in negotiations.

Also during 1996, South Korea and the United States proposed four party talks including the South Korea, North Korea, the United States and China to negotiate a permanent peace on the Peninsula. While North Korea agreed to participate in the talks, it has consistently insisted that a precondition be an agreement for the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. A condition to which North Korea knows neither the South nor the United States can agree. The difficulty in the Four Party Talks for North Korea is that South Korea is so directly involved. North Korea would rather deal with the United States. In 1997, the Japan based Newspaper *People's Korea* interviewed Kim Byong Hong, the Acting Director of the Institute for Disarmament and Peace at the DPRK Foreign Ministry. When asked about why the United States must participate in the talks, Mr. Kim made clear North Korea's position on South Korea's involvement in the negotiations. He answered:

> Because the US is deeply involved in the Korean question. The US is one of the two members of the armistice commission, while the other is the Korean People's Army and the Chinese Volunteers. The Chinese Volunteers withdrew in 1958, leaving the DPRK and the US to discuss all the raised issues. *The Americans have the final say in the political, military, and security issues in south Korea where American combat forces are deployed* (People's Korea, 1987:2).

Why, when they emphasize the goal of reunification so strongly, do the North Koreans so loathe the idea of dealing with South Korea? One reason may be that dealing with the South grants the regime a degree of legitimacy the North is not willing to provide. In addition, by dealing with the United States, North Korea can continue to promote the idea that South Korea is nothing but a puppet of the United States and that it North Korea alone can act to represent the will of the Korean people. Direct contact with

the South also serves to highlight the vast power differences between the two systems. Thus, although North Korea claims to desire improved relations with South Korea and the outsider world, its competition with the South has led to the creation of an ideological structure that allows for little or no true compromise. This idea will be discussed further below.

What we see out of North Korea is often unpredictable and seemingly contradictory behavior. While its people are starving to death, the North Korean regime attaches stringent conditions to the acceptance of aid. While North Korea claims to be trying to improve relations with Japan, it fires the *Taepodong* missile over the Japanese Islands. Even when it claims to be trying to lessen tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the regime shrouds its nuclear program in mystery and launches guerilla incursions into the South. So, several questions remain. First, what can explain the unique development of the North Korean system and the sometimes-contradictory behavior of the North Korean regime? Second, why did the North Koreans choose this path of intransigent ideological restructuring, especially since they had not been hesitant to follow the path of the other socialist nations in the past. The literature review in Chapter Three demonstrates that existing studies of North Korea do not adequately explain North Korean behavior. We will now look to see if the model proposed in Chapter Four provides us with a better method of analysis.

6.7 Analysis: The Influence of Legitimacy Competition

According to the model presented in Chapter Four, a nation will develop its sense of identity through a comparison of itself with significant others. In the case of North

Korea, the significant other is clearly South Korea, and to a lesser extent The United States, South Korea's key ally. Due to the division of Korea and the desire of each side to control the terms of eventual reunification, North Korea was in a constant state of competition with the South for both domestic and international legitimacy. In the event that two sides see each other as hostile enemies intent conquering one another, the competition for legitimacy becomes much more heated and turns into a zero-sum game. The superiority and survival of one means the demise of the other either through collapse or by reunification on the other side's terms.

The competition for legitimacy and the comparisons made can include a wide variety of factors from economic performance, to international recognition, to military strength, to ideology. Of course the factors compared can change over time depending on the environment in which the comparison is being made and the resulting outcomes. It is a dynamic process in which the results of a prior comparison may instruct later comparisons.

As described above, if through comparison a nation finds itself to be superior it will respond by trying to maintain its relative superiority or by trying to enhance its relative superiority. If, in the comparison a nation finds itself to be in a weaker position several outcomes are possible. These outcomes depend on the perception of the presence of cognitive alternatives. If cognitive alternatives are perceived the nation will respond by choosing one of those. If no cognitive alternatives exist, the nation might choose an option similar to surrender, and assimilate into the superior system. Because that is such an unsatisfactory outcome for the nation, it will make every effort to avoid it.

According to this model, in the case of North Korea what we witness over time is a relative decline in comparative strength and a resulting alteration of the terms of competition and basis of comparative legitimacy. If we look at a comparison of the two regimes in the 1960s, we witness that North Korea compared fairly favorably to the South in both domestic and international terms.

As we saw represented in **Diagram 6.1**, North Korea's economy was developing rapidly. It appeared that the socialist strategy in place was propelling North Korea past the South in relative strength. For that reason, early on the North Korean leadership promoted the idea of the superiority of socialist economics and promoted North Korea as a solid member of the socialist camp and an advocate of Marxism-Leninism. *Juche* at that time was primarily a simple statement of strong nationalism defined as anti-foreign influence, in line with the anti-imperialist stances of China and the Soviet Union.

If we look at the same comparisons in the 1980s, we see that North Korea started to lose some of its relative advantages. South Korea during and after the Park regime experienced rapid economic growth while North Korea was stagnating. Both the Soviet Union and China had altered their foreign policies to work toward improved relations with the capitalist world. South Korea was making tremendous strides internationally through the application of economic diplomacy. In all objective terms of comparison, South Korea was winning. This process is represented in **Diagram 6.2.**

North Korea was thus confronted with a crisis and clearly had to seek change. It had the option of trying to improve its performance in the objective measures. Realistically though it was apparent that even if North Korea could improve its comparative situation in these areas, it would not happen overnight. As discussed above,

Diagram 6.2 North Korea 1986-Present Process of Identity Development



Outcome: Creativity and Redefine Characteristics

even as early as 1982, Kim Jong Il was admitting to the problems confronted by North Korea and the long and difficult road ahead. A second option for North Korea was to admit the failure of its system and implement radical liberalizing reforms as other socialist countries had done. If that was a viable option for other states, why was it not an option for North Korea? Given the context of division, this was the equivalent of national suicide and not a viable alternative for the North. The North Korean regime certainly did not want to follow the paths of East Germany and the Soviet Union if at all possible. The third option for the North was to admit failure and to enter into negotiations with the South for reunification. Again, this was the equivalent of national suicide and not a viable alternative for the regime. Given the highly affective nature of the division and competition with the South, these alternatives were not viable choices for the North Korean regime.

Were there any cognitive alternatives for the North Korean regime? One option, and the one that the North Korean regime appeared to choose, was to redefine the characteristics of comparison. That is, if you can not win under the current rules of competition, change the rules. What the North Korean regime did was to change the terms. Yes, maybe South Korea was richer. Yes, maybe South Korea had more allies. But South Korea's success in those terms came at the expense of the things that really matter: Korean nationalism; self-reliance; independence; creativity; and consciousness. North Korea then embarked on a path of developing and implementing a program of ideological strength and superiority. It was in that way that North Korea could express superiority to the South, even if at the expense of the material well being of its people.

Juche was created and further developed in competition with the South. Its primary objective became establishing legitimacy through expressing the uniqueness of North Korea and the nationalistic, ideological, and spiritual superiority of the North Korean system as compared to the system in the South. For that reason, North Korea moved created a self-imposed isolation and behavior that prevent it from reforming without losing its fundamental basis of legitimacy. If we look at the development of North Korea in this light, we can more easily comprehend why the regime continues its intransigence in negotiations and its provocative behavior even when better relations with the outside world would clearly enhance its security and the well being of its people.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION: SIGNIFICANCE AND FURTHER RESEARCH

The regimes on Taiwan and North Korea have both existed in the context of division and conflict since their inception. Because both regimes were weaker than their opponent on the other side of the divide it was anticipated that they would either collapse or be conquered. Yet somehow the two systems have survived, and in the case of Taiwan, prospered. Both regimes have also promoted reunification of the nation as their top policy priority. Yet over the years the nations have not only failed to reunify, it appears that they have moved further apart. While both Taiwan and North Korea have spoken of a desire to improve relations with their opponent their behavior has indicated a different agenda. This study is an effort to explain that phenomenon.

This study started as a much more ambitious effort to delve into the minds of the leaders of Taiwan and North Korea in an effort provide a comprehensive explanation of regime behavior in the two systems. Yet, it quickly became apparent that no truly adequate model for such an analysis was in place. In the process of researching the two systems, I found that most studies at least allude to the actions of the leaders as instrumental in system development and at most give that leadership role exclusive, explanatory power. Yet at the same time, none of those studies provide a more systematic analysis of the leaders' decisions. They tend to point to the necessary conditions that allowed for the decision-makers to implement their chosen policies but they do not explain the linkage between sufficient conditions and action. I found my

research proceeding down the same path. The study then turned to an effort to propose a more appropriate theory or model within which one might explain the behavior of the two systems. Because of the unique environment in which the regimes and their leaders operate, it seemed obvious that any effort to understand their behavior must recognize the influence of the state of division and the presence of that "significant other." For that reason, I looked to psychological theories relating to intergroup behavior for an answer. Social Identity Theory emerged as an attractive option. Social Identity Theory's explanation of the psychological process of defining one's identity and how that effort effects behavior fits nicely as a model within which one can explain regime behavior in a divided system.

Yet, Social Identity Theory does not paint the entire picture. As pointed out in Chapter Four, Social Identity Theory lacks an affective component that allows us to more clearly specify the goals and objectives of a group within a given context. For that reason, the concepts of perceptions and images were synthesized with Social Identity Theory in order to bring the influence of affect into the equation and to develop a comprehensive and parsimonious model.

While more detailed analysis must be done, what this exploratory study shows is that in nations that occupy a weaker position in a divided system, the competition for legitimacy with the stronger nation of the system influences behavior. Identity is derived through comparisons with the other side. The nation determines whether it compares favorably with the other side such as of prosperity, stability, recognition, and ideology. Behavior is guided by that evaluation. If a nation compares favorably, it will continue to pursue similar strategies and behaviors. If it compares unfavorably, it will seek

alternative strategies and behaviors. It is likely that the level of influence of comparison is determined by the images held of the other side in the context of competition. That is, the influence will be stronger in the case of a highly competitive or zero-sum game. This model seems quite applicable to the cases of Taiwan and North Korea.

In Taiwan, the KMT regime long held very strong, authoritarian control. While calls for reform were heard from the people throughout the regime's rule, the regime typically responded with repression. In 1986 Chiang Ching-kuo finally initiated democratic reform and his successor Lee Teng-hui expanded the democracy. The decisions to reform have often been viewed as a natural outcome of the development of the system and as the best way for the KMT to maintain its power. These explanations ignore the fact that the KMT still maintained the ability to control dissent. They also ignore the reality that political reform in Taiwan as it occurred threatened the KMT' long-standing claim to legitimacy: its status as the legitimate government of all of China.

As shown in the study, existing explanations for Chiang and Lee's decisions fail to go beyond pointing to the necessary conditions in place at the time. In fact, most of the necessary conditions pointed to were in place long before reform was implemented. For that reason, it appeared that some additional factor influenced the decision-making process. According to this study, that factor was the leadership's desire to maintain comparative superiority versus China in a rapidly changing environment.

In the case of North Korea, the Kim regime, initially formed under the guidance of the USSR as a Marxist-Leninist government, transformed as well. Over the years, North Korea went from being a rather typical member of the Socialist world to taking on a truly unique form. *Juche*, which started out as a political slogan advocating nationalism

and independence, was transformed into an all-encompassing ideology and theological system. And while the rest of the Socialist world reforms, North Korea seems to be determined to maintain its rigid ideological stance.

Explanations of North Korea's behavior range from Kim's efforts to control the party to the North's emulation of the Socialist superpowers. None of those explanations can adequately explain the peculiarities of the North Korean system or North Korea's intransigence in the face of increasing deprivation and isolation. That is, it may not be surprising that the North Korean regime became more conservative but its peculiar form of conservatism is more difficult to explain. This study shows that looking at the competition with the South and the specific terms of that competition can go a long way in explaining Kim's behavior and the development of *Juche*.

The study can help us better understand some of the more recent events in Taiwan. The year 2000 presidential elections in Taiwan highlighted the fact that the democratization of the island has increased tensions between Taiwan and the PRC. Prior to both of Taiwan's presidential elections, in 1996 and 2000, China threatened invasion if Taiwan moved too far out of line.

The winner of the 2000 election, Chen Shui-bian, is a member of the opposition DPP. The DPP, given birth to by some of the leaders of the *Meilidao* opposition, has been an advocate of Taiwan Independence. And although Chen specifically stated that if elected he would not declare independence nor hold a popular vote to determine Taiwan's fate, he is still perceived as an advocate of independence. China's threats against Taiwan were very pointedly telling the Taiwanese people not to vote for Chen. While it will be up to political scientists to provide a more detailed analysis of the factors

responsible for Chen's victory[1], one might speculate that, in part, the Taiwanese people voted for Chen because China told them not to. In that sense, Democracy has become a vehicle for the Taiwanese people to express their independence and uniqueness from China.

Even more interesting though is what happened to the KMT in the time surrounding the 2000 election. Lee Teng-hui's comments promoting *state-to-state* relations between China and Taiwan combined with the Constitutional reforms that included the elimination of the Provincial Government, created a tremendous rift in the party. James Soong's independent candidacy appears to have pulled a significant number of votes away from the KMT's candidate Lien. As a result, Lien suffered a humiliating defeat, coming in a distant third behind the winner Chen Shui-bian and the runner-up, Soong. Following the election, staunch KMT supporters turned against the leadership and rioted outside of the party's headquarters in Taipei. The protesters called for the immediate resignation of Lee and some of his top advisors from the leadership of the party. James Soong has decided to create a new party, the People First Party which will likely draw significant support from KMT conservatives and members of the New Party. This makes clear the argument that reform was not an easy choice for the party, and clearly not one that would guarantee its dominant position in leading Taiwan.

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[1] Chen won election by a very narrow margin, receiving 39.2% of the vote as compared to James Soong's 36.8% and the KMT candidate Lien's surprisingly low 23%. The very narrow margin of victory makes questions about factors that influenced the outcome intriguing. Especially intriguing is the very poor showing of the KMT candidate Lien. Polls during the campaign showed that the race was neck and neck throughout, with each of the three major candidates showing support of approximately 25% with the remaining 25% undecided. The publication of polling results is prohibited during the last two weeks of the campaign. During that two-week period Lien really stepped up the China Threat rhetoric in his campaign saying essentially a vote for Chen is a vote for war. It will be interesting to see as further survey data is gathered and analyzed whether the China threat had a significant impact on the outcome of the election.

Outside observers are often by perplexed by Taiwan's contradictory behavior and seeming desire to provoke China and to put the United States in an awkward position. One the one hand, the KMT continues to claim that it will eventually lead the reunification of China, while on the other hand it implements policies that increasingly separate the two systems and seem to indicate that reunification has faded as a sincere goal of the regime. This might appear to indicate that the division and China's presence have a less significant role in Taiwan's politics than before, taking a back seat to domestic political dynamics. But one only has to watch the media and listen to the politicians in Taiwan to know that the China factor has not faded away. So, what explains this behavior? This study shows that the events in Taiwan and the behavior of the regime are more understandable if one looks at them in the context of competition with the PRC. Because the regime perceived itself in a position of competing with the PRC for legitimacy, it had little choice but to move down the path of democratic development, even at the expense of its domestic power and goal of reunification. Democracy is the factor that most clearly distinguishes it from the PRC. In that way, the very effort to be the stronger party in the effort to control the terms of reunification has weakened the KMT and made reunification less likely than ever.

North Korea's behavior is also quite perplexing to outside observers. In spite of its continuing economic problems and food shortages, the North Korean regime seems unwilling to reform. Even though the North Koreans have occasionally given some indication that they are willing to open the system ever so slightly, they usually find a way to back out of the deal. It seems that for every step the regime takes toward reform, it takes two steps back. It is likely that this behavior will continue in the near future.

North Korea has placed itself in a situation in which reform is nearly impossible. Many analysts argue that domestic factors prevent North Korea from reforming: North Korea can't reform because the regime fears domestic instability caused by a loss of regime legitimacy. I do not find that to be an entirely compelling reason. It is clear that the North Korean regime has strong control over the society, and there is no reason that given the level of control the regime has over information and the people of the society the North Korean regime could persuade the people that reform is good. If the North Korean regime can hold the society together through its recent crises, I find it hard to imagine that it couldn't hold it together through a reform program. If China can do it, its likely that North Korea can as well.

As argued throughout this study, I believe the more compelling explanation for North Korea's intransigence is the significance of the division and the legitimacy competition with South Korea. In this competition, both sides are urgently and desperately attempting to control the terms of their relations and reunification. In that context it is essential for North Korea to show its relative superiority to the South and as important, to never admit that the South does anything right. Any reform that even gives the slightest indication that the North is accepting any aspect of the South Korean system is in essence an admission of defeat in the legitimacy war.

This helps explain North Korea's current and expected behavior. Even in instances when there is contact and communication between the two sides, North Korea must insure that the terms of the contact are in its control. Even when there is economic interaction between the sides, North Korea must show that it is the South that needs the contact, not the North. This helps us understand North Korea's reaction to the policies

of the Kim Dae Jung government in the South. Under the *Sunshine Policy*, Kim has made a number of compromising overtures toward the North. Many of those include discussions of more of an effort to reduce the United States role in their relations. Yet the North flatly rejects each one. The North's response to Kim is interesting. Kim was long a leading member of the opposition to the military government in South Korea and a leading critic of the South's belligerent policies toward the North. He was, in that sense, an ally of the North Korean's in the struggle to condemn the behavior of the South Korean government. It would appear that his election and his gestures toward the North would be received more favorably than those of previous leaders. Yet the regime has responded to him with great hostility, demonizing him in the press, and rejecting his policies as a ploy to lull the North to sleep and allow for aggressive actions by the South.

More recent changes to *Juche* and the promulgation of the 1998 Constitution provide us with another look at the course North Korean seems to be following. North Korea has continued in recent years to give *Juche* more of a religious tone. Following the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994, the regime started the process of deifying the Great Leader and making it known that he was still with the North Korean people in spirit if not in body. Propaganda promoting the concept of the eternal leadership of Kim appeared everywhere. The deceased Kim was given a place in the 1998 Constitution as the Permanent President of the DPRK. Trust in and support for Kim has become a matter of faith, not just acceptance of his secular policies. Even Kim Jong Il has been deified to some extent. The Korean Central News Agency recently published an article promoting a new book about Kim Jong Il entitled, *God of the Present Century* (KCNA, 3/10/2000).

This religious tone of *Juche* makes it even less likely that the North Koreans can easily reform.

The 1998 Constitution, and the writings and speeches since that time, have also indicated that the military has taken a more prominent place in the North Korean political structure. It is clear in the Constitution and in writings that Kim Jong Il's policies are guided by the principle of Military First. The military is of prime importance to the domestic development of the society and of course to the protection of North Korea's security. A recent press release from the DPRK UN Mission was entitled, *WPK's Policy of Giving Priority to Army is Invincible.* The press release stated:

> The mode of give-priority-to-the-army policy is a mode of leadership which solves all problems arising in the revolution and construction on the principle of giving top precedence to the military affairs and pushes ahead with the socialist cause as a whole, putting forward the army as the pillar of the revolution (DPRK UN Mission, June 17, 1999).

Economically, North Korea is in the throes of its Second *Chollima* Movement. Despite some language that indicates some gradual opening it appears that rather than reforming the economy, the regime is digging in and reviving the spirit of earlier economic policies. The language of the original economic mass movements is prevalent as witnessed in a *Pyongyang Times* article entitled, *Second Chollima Movement Goes Full Steam Ahead.* The article reads in part:

> But it [the growth of the economy] was interrupted when some socialist countries collapsed and the imperialists intensified their moves to isolate and stifle the DPRK, the bulwark of socialism, and consecutive natural disasters came into the bargain. With its economic development and the people's living in difficult conditions, the nation had to set out on an "Arduous March." However, the people never backed down in despair but pulled themselves up in one body in the spirit of self-reliance and fortitude. The target was to build a powerful nation, not merely breaking through immediate difficulties (*Pyongyang Times*, August 28, 1999: 3).

Again, in the light of our model, this behavior is not surprising. Friendly gestures from the South rob the North of three of its principle foundations of legitimacy and identity. These foundations include the argument that the capitalist, imperialist aggressors in the South are hell bent on the conquest of the North and that the South is simply a flunkey of the United States that cannot and will not act without it. And third that North Korea is economically, politically, and ideologically self-reliant, and is a truly Korean government. According to the North Koreans, there is really no place to go in negotiations until the South stops being a flunkey and removes the US troops. For that reason, it is unlikely that we can expect North Korea to respond favorably to any gestures in the future. All of these issues and events in Taiwan and North Korea deserve more focused and in depth research attention in the future.

7.1 Significance and Future Research

The significance of this research two-fold. First, it synthesizes several different theories and concepts from psychology into one coherent model that can be applied to the study of divided nations. The second is that the findings of the study show that in cases of division and conflict, ideology and policy can be guided or constrained by the terms of competition. The model applied in the study goes beyond simply looking at objective measures of comparison and shows how those measures can influence behavior. It attempts to show how we can link the outcome of comparison to an expected behavior. For example, we can easily look at two systems in competition and use objective indicators to show that one is outperforming the other economically, or that one is stronger militarily. This type of comparison is done regularly. Yet, what that

comparison can not tell us is how a nation might respond to its relative superiority or inferiority. How do the nations process the information to determine the best available option to respond? Understanding the environment in which the systems exist in combination with an understanding of the process of identity development in that environment can provide a clearer understanding of past behavior and expected behavior.

Identity is both a cognitive and affective construct. That is, looking strictly at objective factors does not give us a complete picture of a nation's identity. We must also understand the group's perceptions of the world in which it exists. The focus exclusively on objective measures explains the bias toward evaluating behavior as rational or irrational. It is quite simple, when a nation is poor it should reform its economy. Any behavior that prevents economic improvement can be described as irrational. Yet in that context, individuals, groups, and nations often behave "irrationally." What is more interesting and more informative is determining why groups appear to be behaving in an irrational manner. If one brings the affective component into play, one might often find that what appears to be irrational behavior on the surface can easily be explained by understanding the emotions involved. This study takes a step toward providing a model with which we can more systematically take into account environmental factors, cognition, and affect, in explaining the behavior of nations or groups in conflict.

The competition between systems in conflict is often all encompassing. That is, every aspect of life between the two sides is fair game for comparison. The behavioralist movement in the social sciences led us down the path of comparing by looking at quantifiable, "objective" measures. Yet due to the all-encompassing nature of comparison in conflict, not everything subject to comparison is easily quantified. Beliefs

and ideology play an essential role in defining a group's identity. But how are those measured? We cannot assign a numerical value to ideologies and claim that one is worth more than the other. Yet we know that ideology matters so we must find a way to deal with it. Viewing the process of identity development in the context of competition can help us better understand how ideology comes to play such a central role in a system, and more importantly how ideology formation is guided by the competition.

The model proposed in this study may also contribute to the process of negotiation and conflict resolution. Resolution of conflict is a complex matter. Part of the problem lies in determining the specific causes of conflict and the most appropriate issues and problems to address in negotiation. Thus, negotiators must start by looking at the "problem problem." That is, what are the root problems or causes of the conflict? Explanations for conflict are often couched in vague terms or stereotypes geared at criticizing the opponent. Efforts to resolve conflict are often complicated by this stereotyping and an inability to understand an adversary's behavior or the motives behind that behavior.

As mentioned in Chapter Four, nations will often attribute their enemy's conflictual behavior to internal dispositions or evil intentions while pointing to environmental or situational factors when explaining their own conflictual behavior. The opposite holds true, of course, for positive behavior. Little attention is given to systematically developing an understanding of how one's own behavior within the given environment influences the choices available to the opposing side. The more systematic method proposed here might help adversaries better understand the causes of particular

behaviors or policies and thus might assist in the discovery of the issues or behaviors that should be discussed in negotiation.

In any intellectual inquiry, we tend to find that the more we study, the more we need to learn. That is certainly the case with this study. This research just scratched the surface of the study of identity development in Taiwan and North Korea. Because of its exploratory, theory-proposing nature, this study did not provide all of the answers, but it certainly opens the door for a number of future research projects. The study has shown that the model proposed provides a nice framework for the study of divided systems. Based on this preliminary research then, future studies should make an effort to go a bit deeper and provide more detailed analysis of the decision-making process in both systems, including the application of the model to specific policy decisions and behavior. This should include more detailed and rigorous analysis of the speeches and writings of the decision-makers in addition to efforts to interview those involved in the process. That type of data and a more scientific analysis of the data would provide us with a much richer study and with a much more rigorous test of the theory.

Obviously, this study is not without its flaws. This study followed the process of deductive theorizing. That is, it borrowed existing theory from psychology and applied it to the study of regime behavior at the national level. The strength of this approach is in its use of theories that have already been extensively tested in another area. The weakness of this approach is the potential for ecological fallacy. That is, that there is no certainty that the theory or the assumptions behind that theory will fit perfectly in a different context. For example, in this study we selected the cases of Taiwan and North Korea at least in part because of the power differential issue. One of the questions that

motivated and drove this study was to determine how and why Taiwan and North Korea were able to survive in the face of a stronger opponent. Psychological studies have shown that in intergroup contact power matters, and the less powerful groups will behave differently. I accepted that as an assumption of this study.

It may be the case though that power differentials do not have the same impact on the behavior of nations as they do on the smaller groups studied to form the initial psychological theory. This study did not allow for a test of that possibility. But the study did develop a model that can be used to conduct such a study. An interesting and appropriate future study would be to apply the model to the cases of South Korea and the PRC to determine whether we see similar outcomes. Based on this study, we would expect to see the more powerful nations behave in a more proactive manner than these weaker nations because the level of threat perception is not as significant and thus the comparative component of identity development would not have as strong an influence.

While Taiwan and North Korea are clearly unique cases, the application of this model to other cases of division and conflict around the world might prove useful. By performing comparative cases we can further test the validity of this model and perhaps shed more light onto the factors that influence behavior in the context of division and conflict. Unfortunately, these cases seem almost limitless. In any case, where there is division and conflict over territory, ideology, or leadership, viewing the terms of competition and the process of identity development may help us better understand behavior and the intractability of conflict. That understanding might guide us toward more effective methods of resolving those conflicts.

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